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Abstract
This thesis gives a philosophical assessment of a contemporary movement,
influential amongst physicists, about the status of microscopic and macroscopic
properties. Although it is a recognisable version of older metaphysical theses of
emergentism, these “New Emergentists” support their position by appealing to
recent discoveries in condensed matter physics. The fountainhead for the move-
ment was a short 1972 paper ‘More is Different’, written by the physicist Philip
Anderson. Each of my chapters is concerned with themes mentioned in that paper,
or subsequently expounded by Anderson and his followers.
In Chapter 1, I aim to locate Anderson’s existence claims for ‘emergent prop-
erties’ within the metaphysical, epistemological and methodological doctrines that
identify themselves as ‘emergentist’. I argue, against the commentators’ consensus,
that the New Emergentists make claims about the metaphysical status of physical
properties, and should not be read as concerned only with matters of research
methodology for physics.
In Chapter 2, I look at the physical examples that the New Emergentists appeal
to, and propose a way of formulating their main claims within modern analytic
metaphysics. I argue that it is possible to view their thesis as an updated version
of ‘British Emergentism’ a movement popular in the early years of the twentieth
century. I support this contention by comparing examples of emergent properties
put forward by the British and the New Emergentists.
Chapter 3 is a discussion of the significance of renormalisation techniques, a
theme not present in ‘More is Different’, but prominent in Anderson’s later work
and emphasised by his followers. I concentrate on a set of claims by Robert Bat-
terman, who presents renormalisation as an explanatory strategy unrecognised
by the philosophy of science. I attack his thesis by separating several different
methods of renormalisation analysis, and arguing that he has conflated them. I
go on to examine some seemingly contradictory views of the significance of renor-
malisation methods, and present an interpretation that goes some way towards a
reconciliation.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the theoretical representation of phase transitions in
condensed matter physics; in particular, their appeal to the limit of an infinite
system. While this theme is mentioned in Anderson’s work, I focus on a debate
which has arisen independently, within the philosophical literature. I examine
and refute various claims to the effect that the ineliminability of the infinite limit
in modelling phase transitions is of great metaphysical significance. I suggest a
definition of phase transitions for finite systems that dissolves this illusion, and
gives us reason to trust the results of the theories that only apply in the infinite
limit. I then comment on the significance of these results for a suggestion of Laura
Ruetsche, that quantum statistical mechanics should be used as a guide to the
interpretation of quantum field theory.
Chapter 5 revisits the doctrines of the New Emergentists in order to place their
views within some wider philosophical debates. I look at how their doctrines bear
on issues in the interpretation of quantum mechanics, in the philosophy of mind
and the philosophy of science. I close by returning to the context within physics,
in which the New Emergentists originally made their presence felt: the controversy
over whether elementary particle physics should enjoy greater status than other
areas.
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Chapter 1
New Emergentism: Metaphysical
Positions
Throughout the twentieth century, those scientists and philosophers of science
willing to call themselves ‘emergentists’ have been engaged in a slow, but steady
retreat across subject areas. The term was first used in its modern sense by Lewes
(1877), and quickly adopted by a number of writers. Although they differed on
many points of doctrine, they were united by a belief that certain large systems
studied in the special sciences — in chemistry, biology, or psychology — exhibited
fundamentally different properties to those of the very smallest systems studied
in physics. In the first decades of the century, one could find emergentists in
certain areas of large-scale physics; then the front line shifted to chemistry and
then to biology, as a steady march of reductionist success pushed emergentists to
less developed areas of science (McLaughlin, 1992). In the late twentieth century
it seemed that psychology and the sciences of the mind were their last bastion:
everywhere else, a reductionist programme had triumphed. The sciences of the
very small — high energy particle physics in particular — were seen as the only
areas engaged in a search for “fundamental” laws. All other physical sciences were
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in a sense “derivative”, in that their subject matter was, ultimately, the behaviour
of physical systems, and this could be derived — in theory at least — from the
laws and principles that governed the very small.
However, the last few decades have seen a strong emergentist comeback hailing
from an unexpected quarter: physics itself, which had been thought to be the
first to fall. The variety of fields claiming to study “emergent phenomena” has
now reached such a point that rival unificatory frameworks have been proposed.
In these first years of the twenty-first century these include complex adaptive
systems theory, nonlinear dynamical systems theory, self-organised criticality, and
the theories based around the study of cellular automata.1 These frameworks
are claimed to have applications well beyond physics, in biology, social theory,
economics and population biology, amongst others.
Much of this startling ‘resurgence of emergence’ can be traced back to a short
1972 paper by the Nobel Prize winning physicist Philip Anderson, entitled ‘More
is Different’.2 Anderson defended the view that the laws and principles he studied
as a condensed matter physicist were emergent, in the sense that they were entirely
different from, but had no lower status than, those studied by particle physicists.
In contrast to some of the later developments, Anderson’s own claims were based
on well-understood physical theories. Nonetheless, his position was, and remains,
a controversial one. Most famously, Anderson was opposed by Steven Weinberg,
who claimed that the physics of the very small held a privileged position in a
1Classics of complexity studies include Holland (1992) and Kauffman (1996). The field is
particularly associated with the Santa Fe Institute in California, which recently celebrated its
twentieth anniversary. Waldrop (1992) gives a history of thinkers and ideas associated with the
Santa Fe institute, which is useful in tracing its origins and connections to other “emergentist”
thought. Nonlinear dynamical systems theory developed from theories associated with chaotic
phenomena. Kellert (1993) provides a detailed philosophical study, which is largely deflatory
as to its metaphysical significance. Newman (1996) takes the opposite view. Self organised
criticality is associated expecially with the work of Bak et al. (1987), and theories of cellular
automata have been brought to public prominence by Wolfram (2002).
2Anderson (1972) is traced as the fountainhead article for emergentist and complexity theories
by several authors, (e.g., Solomon, 2005).
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hierarchy of scientific explanation.
I shall postpone an examination of the details of the Anderson/Weinberg de-
bate.3 My aim, in this Chapter and the next, is to try to relate this new doctrine
of emergence, and its opponent reductionism, to the metaphysical debates and
doctrines that have long existed under the same names. This project comes in two
parts. The first — covered in this chapter — aims to locate the basic metaphysi-
cal position taken by Anderson and his followers amongst those familiar from the
philosophy of mind and of science. I shall argue that their new position does not
fall easily into the most familiar metaphysical categories, and I shall make some
suggestions as to why this might be so. These largely negative conclusions will
then inform the second part of the project, which constitutes the next chapter.
There, I argue that Anderson’s own emergentist position is a metaphysical thesis
of more originality, plausibility and importance than its critics have allowed.
1.1 Preliminaries
It is helpful to start by introducing some nomenclature. I shall refer to the posi-
tion first articulated by Anderson as ‘New Emergentism’, a term that may serve to
distinguish it from the bewildering variety of positions that have precipitated out
from other emergentist debates. ‘New Emergentism’ is intended to cover a reason-
able range of the positions held by those modern physicists who call themselves
emergentists, but it would be a mistake to try to accommodate too many of the
claims made since Anderson’s original, concise presentation. Here I shall perhaps
err on the side of caution and only appeal to a few authors to articulate the cen-
tral position. As well as Anderson, his colleagues in condensed matter physics —
3In this thesis, I will return to it only in §5.2, considering an argument based on the concept
of a protectorate, which is separate to the considerations I shall be engaging with in this chapter
and the next.
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Robert Laughlin, David Pines and Piers Coleman — will be quoted as represent-
ing New Emergentism position due to their explicit identification with Anderson’s
themes (Laughlin and Pines (2000), Coleman (2003), Laughlin (2005)). Ernst
Mayr’s discussions, and especially his position in exchanges with Weinberg, also
put him squarely in the New Emergentist camp, though he is principally concerned
with issues in biological sciences (Mayr, 1988).
It is also useful to reserve judgment on the exact branch of physics that may
describe the very small, so for the moment I shall speak of “microphysics” and
“microphysical laws” leaving it open whether these terms refer to the current
Standard Model of particle physics, to a modification of it in some successful
“grand unification”, or to some advance as yet unimagined.
It is helpful to begin with a short exercise of undergrowth clearing, to address
several points that appear to have a clear resolution, before engaging with more
controversial issues.
1.1.1 Red Herring 1 — A Comprehensive Definition
John Holland, a guru of Complexity Theory, introduces a semi-popular exposition
of emergence with some pessimism:
Despite its ubiquity, emergence is an enigmatic, recondite topic, more
wondered at than analyzed. What understanding we do have is mostly
through a catalogue of instances ... It is unlikely that a topic as compli-
cated as emergence will submit weakly to a concise definition. (Holland,
1998)
Claims that a field is dealing with “emergent phenomena” have become fashionable
in the years since Anderson’s article. The list of the last section could be extended a
great deal further without even venturing beyond physics. Why, in all this variety,
should we expect to find some core criteria, shared also by older “emergentist”
positions in the philosophy of mind and other areas of science?
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A source of much difficulty is that both philosophers and scientists have typi-
cally been driven by their own motivations in searching for emergence, and have
allowed these to influence their selection of criteria. Kim (1995) is concerned with
issues of mental causation, and so it is natural for him to search for emergence
as defined by some appearance of causal autonomy. But contrast his approach
with that of Zurek (1991), who is concerned with issues of how classical behaviour
emerges from the quantum domain, and looks for it in the vanishing of the inter-
ference terms from a decohering wavefunction. It is hard to see how these two can
be covered by a single notion of emergence.
Similar parochial concerns can be expected to appear in any approach which
first constructs a firm list of desiderata for emergence, then searches for examples
which conform to it. There is no reason to think that a single definition will be
suitable for all these hoped-for applications of emergence. In the philosophical
literature in particular, background interests have shown through strongly, despite
pleas to search for examples of emergence in physical science on their own merits,
e.g., Humphreys (1997, 15). I claim that the New Emergentists deserve special
attention for taking the opposite tack: looking within well-understood physical
sciences for simple phenomena that seem to display a few core emergentist char-
acteristics, illustrating fundamental laws, or principles operating on a large scale,
and then examining the theoretical descriptions to see whether they might suggest
criteria for a more general approach.
Thus, our aim is not to discover any neat package of necessary and sufficient
conditions for emergence. Far less are we searching for a definition covering all
those desiderata needed to claim that mental causation, the classical world or a
direction of time are emergent. For these goals, Holland’s scepticism appears well-
founded. Neither is it my ambition to provide a framework for the new sciences
of emergence, by defining such terms as ‘complex’ or ‘self-organised’. Such a
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clear framework is certainly needed, the field being often compared to pre-Carnot
thermodynamics. (I shall make a few comments of the relationship between the
New Emergentist position and Complexity, in §5.1.)
1.1.2 Red Herring 2 — Emergence of What?
Silberstein (2002) gives a careful survey of three separate emergentist debates in
the philosophical literature. They concern the status of physical entities, of causal
powers and of properties. A good first step would be to identify the issue with
which the New Emergentists are concerned.
Fortunately, it is clear that the New Emergentists’ interest is in property emer-
gence (understood to encompass also those laws which govern the emergent prop-
erties). As regards “entity emergence” consider the following from Laughlin and
Pines:
The low-energy excited quantum states of these systems [crystalline
solids] are particles in exactly the same sense that the electron in the
vacuum of quantum electrodynamics is a particle: They carry momen-
tum, energy, spin, and charge, scatter off one another according to
simple rules, obey Fermi or Bose statistics depending on their nature,
and in some cases are even “relativistic,” in the sense of being described
quantitatively by Dirac or Klein-Gordon equations at low energy scales.
Yet they are not elementary, and, as in the case of sound, simply do
not exist outside the context of the stable state of matter in which they
live. (Laughlin and Pines, 2000, 28, italics mine)
This attitude is typical — the New Emergentists accept that there may be an
ultimate microlevel of entities that can usefully be called elementary, or even ‘fun-
damental’, but they deny that this confers any privileged status on the properties
of these elementary entities, or on the laws governing those properties.
While the New Emergentists can concede the issue of entity emergence for
the sake of argument, they never even mention issues of causation. Their writ-
ings contain no discussions of overdetermination, downward causation, or of the
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causal closure of the microphysical. In these two chapters we shall follow them in
their silence, but in doing so we may be accused of bypassing a large portion of
the philosophical debates on emergence, especially those within the philosophy of
mind.
I think this is defensible, since a focus on causal emergence is largely driven
by concerns particular to the philosophy of mind. As one of the foremost meta-
physicians of the mental, Jaegwon Kim is able to look back over his career and
write (with approval), that ‘devising an account of mental causation has been, for
the past three decades, one of the main preoccupations of philosophers of mind
who are committed to physicalism in one form or another.’ (Kim, 2005, 8). A
physicalist will be keen to discover whether there is a conception of emergence
that might imbue mental states with causal roles suitable for a robust conception
of mental causation.4
Important and wide-ranging these debates may be: but we must leave them
aside if we are to understand the New Emergentists, for issues of causation are by
no means apparent in their principal examples. In particular, they place symmetry-
breaking centrally in their discussion, a phenomenon with notorious causal pecu-
liarities. Philosophers of physics have discussed both (i) general questions as to
whether causal powers can be isolated cleanly in such processes (Liu, 2002), and
(ii) particular issues such as apparent violations of Curie’s Principle, which relates
the symmetry characteristics of causes and effects (Brading and Castellani, 2003).
Meanwhile, the causation-concerned philosophers of mind can be accused of
being overly influenced by “ball-bearing physics”,5 based on examples taken from
4Kim himself is the foremost proponent of the view that emergence (or at least the British
version described in §1.5.2) was unavoidably committed to a doctrine known as ‘downward cau-
sation’, and that this is in contradiction with the causal closure of the physical realm (Kim, 1998,
100-104). A brief discussion of the sense in which British Emergence is committed to a version
of downward causation, is found in Appendix A.
5Indeed they often have been so accused: (e.g., Wilson (1985, 2004), Norton (2003)). Suitable
notions of causation are particularly elusive in physical theories built on statistical mechanical
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elementary Newtonian mechanics. Once we take account of the difficulties of dis-
cerning causal processes in a more realistic physics, causal considerations become
too elusive to serve as a useful guide on issues of emergence. At any rate, the New
Emergentists steer well clear.
So, from Silberstein’s list, we are left with property emergence. The New
Emergentists themselves discuss the emergence of novel ‘behaviour’ of systems,
and ‘emergent phenomena’ as well as referring directly to emergent properties,
and emergent laws governing these properties. I shall try to avoid the rather
vague terms ‘phenomena’ and ‘behaviour’, which could cover a whole range of
token or type events, as well as failing to distinguish law-governed events from
mere accidental regularities. I shall focus on emergent properties. Let us introduce
a further useful term: a property of a system made up from many parts will be
called a systemic property.6
As well as the status of systemic properties themselves, the New Emergen-
tists are also concerned with the status of the laws that govern them. They are
often called ‘higher-level’ laws, and take on their distinctions: ‘emergent’ and
‘non-emergent’. This immediately leads to the question of whether the status of
properties determines the status of the laws that govern them, or vice versa. In
what follows, I shall assume that is an issue to be decided by the particular meta-
physical account of laws that we may wish to adopt. For example, a Humean
account would treat properties as primary, laws as derivative. One advocating
necessary laws is likely to reverse this order of priority.
principles, and in this connection it may be significant that Anderson and his principal allies —
Coleman, Laughlin and Pines — are all condensed matter theorists, an area in which statistical
mechanics is used extensively.
6In keeping with common usage, the term ‘properties’ should also be understood to encompass
relations. I shall concentrate on systemic properties which are intrinsic to that system, and
assume that any relations appealed to will be non-external (in Lewis’ 1983 sense).
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1.1.3 Red Herring 3 — Physics and Metaphysics
One of the basic questions we encounter in interpreting the New Emergentist
claims, is whether their thesis is meant to be:
a) one of metaphysics – about the metaphysical status of emergent properties
and laws; or
b) one of epistemology and the methodology of science – about the status of
experimental and theoretical sciences of large-scale systems as compared to
microphysics.
In their canonical statements the New Emergentists are unequivocal: they are
making full-blooded metaphysical claims; that is, they are concerned with the
metaphysical status of laws and properties in the world, not just about the research
that investigates them. Yet this can be obscured by the fact that they do not
base their claims on explicitly metaphysical arguments, but on evidence from the
practice of physics and other sciences. This leads the reader to wonder whether the
New Emergentist claims have support only as epistemological and metholodogical
points about the practice of science.
Anderson himself is an offender on these grounds. He starts More is Different
with claims about the fundamental nature of properties and laws, rejecting the
view that: ‘the only people studying anything fundamental, are those studying
microphysical laws.’ But then he slides to discussing the fundamental nature of
the study, and defends it as ‘research which is as fundamental as any other’. Yet
he finishes back with metaphysical lessons, speaking of the properties of states of
large systems being ‘not only more than, but very different from the sum of its
parts’. Elsewhere, he speaks in wholly objective terms, without any mention of
scientific research at all, describing ‘an “emergent property”: a property which is
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manifested only by a sufficiently large and complex system by virtue of that size
and complexity’ (Anderson, 1989, 586).
These confusions are not helped by the New Emergentists’ use of terms such
as ‘fundamental’, ‘basic’ and ‘elementary’ to refer both to the status of laws and
properties themselves, and to the theories that are supposed to describe them. The
word ‘fundamental’ is particularly difficult, since as we have already seen, the New
Emergentists happily grant that certain small entities can be called ‘fundamental’,
even calling the properties that belong to them, ‘fundamental properties’. Yet
they deny that this implies a privileged status for the properties of very small
systems. This is further complicated by the fact that they also attach the term
‘fundamental’ to sciences — the study of both entities and properties — and here
they do imply an associated privilege, for they deny that the sciences of the very
small enjoy a ‘fundamental status’.
Worse, when speaking of ‘fundamental laws’, the New Emergentists do not
seem consistent in their usage at all. Take for example Anderson’s response to
questioning by the congressional panel in the hearings on the SSC: ‘These new
laws don’t contradict the laws of elementary particles people discover; they are
simply independent of them, and I would argue that they in no way any less fun-
damental’ (Cat, 1998, 265n). (Although this is a statement about the metaphysical
status of laws, Anderson seems unable to express his views without mentioning
the methodological issue of their discovery.) But in ‘More is Different’ he refers
happily to microphysical laws as ‘fundamental laws’, without any hint that this
this is in any conflict with his own position (Anderson, 1972, 393).
Similar remarks could be made about the terms ‘basic’ and ‘elementary’, for
it is trivially true that we can associate these terms with the properties of any of
the smallest objects in our ontology, if all others are made up from composites
of them. The New Emergentists do not challenge this trivial sense, but rather
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the inference that this imbues properties or laws of the smallest entities with a
privileged metaphysical status.
As I shall discuss in §1.4, a popular reaction amongst philosophers is that
the New Emergentists in general, and Anderson in particular, should not make
metaphysical claims, and are simply confused when they do so. On this view,
the only defensible interpretation of New Emergentism is as a fairly unremarkable
position within the methodology and epistemology of science. It will be one of the
main points of this chapter and the next to deny this response. I believe that the
explicit statements of Anderson and his followers can — and should be — taken
seriously as outlining a coherent metaphysical position. Of course this does not
mean that they spell out their position in the form of metaphysical theses familiar
to philosophers.
1.1.4 Prospectus and Statement of Purpose
With these issues cleared away, we should be ready to begin the task of setting New
Emergentist claims in a clear philosophical framework. We shall try to locate their
thesis as a fully metaphysical position, though one informed by physics. What I
mean by that rather cryptic phrase is the following: while they are not committed
to a detailed metaphysical position, they hold some doctrines that are unquestion-
ably metaphysical in nature, and they do so for reasons stemming from physical
theory. I shall follow them, not by seeking to force them into an over-detailed
metaphysical position, but rather by attempting to disambiguate and interpret
those claims that they are committed to. This project is a little more ambitious
than it may appear. The main reason to interpret New Emergentist claims as
methodological, is because they appear incoherent when interpreted as metaphys-
ical doctrines. Part of the project will be to argue that these interpretations are
based on misunderstandings.
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By saying above that the New Emergentists’ position is informed by physics,
I do not mean just that they motivate their doctrines with examples drawn from
their expertise as condensed matter physicists. Rather, their metaphysical claims
are motivated by a desire to be faithful to the discoveries of our best physical theo-
ries, and they believe that to hold microphysical laws and properties as privileged,
is in conflict with this practice. This attitude will come out strongly in Chap-
ter 2 where we take an approach to properties directly influenced by the need to
accommodate the enormous range admitted by physical theories.
The rest of the chapter will be organised as follows. In the next section (§1.2)
I shall try to bring out the central claims of the New Emergentists, expressed
as concise statements of philosophical doctrine. Next (§1.3—§1.5), I shall look
at how each of these New Emergentist claims has been made precise in orthodox
philosophical discussion. I shall then argue that these interpretations fail to give an
adequate appreciation of their position (§1.6 & §1.7). Finally, in §1.8, I argue that
while the New Emergentist position resembles one of the orthodox approaches in
many respects, their explicit claims mean that they cannot occupy the very same
ground. And I give a short argument to show that their position is rather tightly
constrained by their other claims. This looks ahead to Chapter 2, which builds on
these rather negative conclusions to construct a positive interpretation of the New
Emergentists’ metaphysical position.
1.2 New Emergentism: The Central Position
Selecting a few of the many claims made by physicists calling themselves “Emer-
gentists” as “The Central Position”, may seem an exercise in arbitrary selection.
Yet I claim that those chosen here, expressing their acceptance of microphysical-
ism, and the promotion of some systemic properties as importantly novel, are both
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spanning and minimal.
By “spanning” I mean that they are accepted by all — or at least the vast
majority — of those marching under a New Emergentist banner. Rather stronger:
I believe that they are central to the physicalist, yet inclusive metaphysical picture
that tends to be tacitly assumed by physicists working in ‘emergentist’ areas.
(Admittedly, it is hard to justify either of these claims without some sort of opinion
poll; philosophical analysis can only go so far).
By “minimal” I mean that the claims are about as weak as can be made while
still generating controversy. In particular the claims are rejected by self-declared
opponents of the New Emergentists, who hail especially from fields such as particle
physics and string theory. Steven Weinberg is probably the best-known example of
a “New Reductionist”,7 but joining him will be anyone who accords a metaphysical
priority to the discoveries of microphysics above those of the rest of physics.
1.2.1 Physicalism and Microphysicalism
The New Emergentist movement is rooted in physics and as such, its adherents
subscribe to a physicalist world view. Although they make some claims that might
be thought unorthodox, they will have no truck with anti-physicalist doctrines such
as Cartesian dualism, vitalism or epiphenomenalism, which they would doubtless
consider “spooky” and unscientific. The project of turning physicalism into a
precise philosophical claim has of course been the focus of much discussion over
the last few decades, but the New Emergentists help us to identify their position,
by also accepting something stronger:
The reductionist hypothesis may still be a topic for controversy among
philosophers, but among the great majority of active scientists I think
7Weinberg is also the principal opponent of Anderson in public debates on the issue. In §5.3
I address Weinberg’s position and the New Emergentists’ criticisms of it.
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it is accepted without question. The workings of our minds and bod-
ies, and of all the animate or inanimate matter of which we have any
detailed knowledge, are assumed to be controlled by the same set of
fundamental laws, which except under certain extreme conditions we
feel we know pretty well. (Anderson, 1972, 393)
Anderson later lists those who study such laws, and it becomes clear that he is
speaking of microphysical laws, those that govern the tiny elementary building-
blocks which we believe make up our physical world.8
Ernst Mayr is even clearer than Anderson when he accepts what he refers to
as ‘constitutive reductionism’ in the context of biology:
... the material composition of organisms is exactly the same as that
found in the inorganic world. Further ... none of the events and pro-
cesses encountered in the world of living organism is in any conflict with
the physico-chemical phenomena at the level of atoms and molecules.
(Mayr, 1982, 59)
It is rather startling to hear this thesis accepted by those calling themselves emer-
gentist, and even more startling to hear it described as ‘reductionism’, a doctrine
usually understood as a stronger claim about the definability in a certain sense of
one theory in terms of another; (this sense of ‘reduction’ will be the focus of §1.5.1).
But this seems a minor matter of a mismatch in terminology; in metaphysics, the
claim endorsed by Anderson and Mayr is usually called microphysicalism.
[M]icrophysicalism ... is the doctrine that actually (but not necessarily)
everything non-microphysical is composed out of microphysical entities
and is governed by microphysical laws. (Pettit, 1994)
Pettit also brings out the two components which constitute microphysicalism.
The first is that everything in the empirical world — every particular
in that world — is composed in some sense out of subatomic materials.
And second is that everything that happens in the empirical world
8What should we make of Anderson describing these as ‘fundamental’, which he repeats
several times? As outlined in §1.1.3, I think he means no more than to point out that they are
the laws obeyed by the fundamental microphysical entities.
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happens, ultimately, under the controlling influence of subatomic forces
and laws. (Pettit, 1996, 342-3)
As we have seen, the New Emergentists embrace both.
1.2.2 The ‘Novelty’ of Emergent Properties
While accepting the core claims of microphysicalism, New Emergentists deny an
‘at first sight obvious corollary’:
... that if everything obeys the same fundamental laws then the only
scientists who are studying anything really fundamental are those who
are working on those laws. (Anderson, 1972, 393)
Just how obvious this may seem is shown by Pettit’s immediate continuation from
his statement of microphysicalism quoted above:
There are higher level laws but they do not represent forces independent
of those associated with the subatomic. Thus the higher level laws do
not come into conflict with the subatomic, they do not reinforce the
subatomic in the fashion of another shoulder at the wheel, and they do
not take up any indeterminacy or slack that the subatomic laws leave.
(Pettit, 1996, 343)
These claims, the New Emergentists would not accept, nor Pettit’s characterisa-
tion of microphysicalism as involving a belief that ‘the microphysical levels — are
more fundamental’ (342). Anderson holds in opposition, ‘[i]nstead at each level of
complexity entirely new properties appear’ (Anderson, 1972, 393, italics his).
The requirement that emergent properties must be in some interesting sense
‘entirely new’ appears as a central claim in almost every field in which emergentism
is defended. In both his identification of the intuition and his immediate response,
I agree with Tim Crane:
The intuitive idea of an emergent property is the idea of a “novel”
property of a whole or complex that emerges from the parts of the
whole and the way the parts are put together. But how should we
make this idea more precise? (Crane, 2001, 211)
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For if we try to pin down what we mean when we call certain systemic properties
“emergent” in virtue of their novelty, it appears difficult to negotiate the twin
pitfalls of triviality and unreasonable strength.
For example, take this statement from John Wheeler:
When you put enough elementary units together, you get something
that is more than the sum of these units. A substance made of a great
number of molecules, for instance, has properties such as pressure and
temperature that no one molecule possesses. It may be a solid or a
liquid or a gas, although no single molecule is solid or liquid or gas.
(Wheeler and Ford, 1998, 341)
To propose that a systemic property qualifies as “novel” because the property is not
possessed by any of the parts is far too weak for a metaphysically interesting sense
of emergence: for under Wheeler’s definition an “emergent” property could be as
trivial as the total mass of a composite system. For that property is not possessed
by any of its (proper) parts, but is possessed by the whole. To exclude these most
trivial examples Wheeler, (in common with many other physicists associated with
the New Emergentist camp)9 claims here that the whole must be ‘more than the
sum of its parts.’ He cannot mean “sum” (or “more”) literally, for the total mass
of a composite system with any energetic interaction is more than the sum of the
masses of the parts; presumably then, he means the term to cover any simple
operation of composition. But how simple should we allow the operation to be?
A natural strengthening of this criterion is to hold that to be a candidate for
emergence, a property of a system must be not just a new property, but a new
determinable. For example, Spencer-Smith fills this out in detail: ‘a property P is
novel in x if x has P , and there are no determinates P ′ of the same determinable as
P , such that any constituents of x have P ’ (Spencer-Smith, 1995, 117). He thinks
that novelty defined in this way will be necessary for emergence, but does not claim
9e.g., Holland (1998), Morowitz (2002), as well as a mention in the original (Anderson, 1972,
395).
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that it is sufficient. For Wheeler’s examples of pressure and temperature pass this
test of novelty, yet statistical mechanics shows that they may be defined in terms
of fairly simple statistical properties of the relevant collection of molecules. In any
case, I do not think that Spencer-Smith’s criterion is even suitable as a necessary
condition. For it rules out the possibility that systemic properties such as total
mass could be an emergent property, which it surely would be if it could be shown
that there was a system whose total mass was entirely independent of the masses
of its parts.
Anderson suggests a hierarchy of areas of study, in which the elementary entities
of science X obey the laws of science Y , yet the novelty is such that X is in no
sense ‘just applied Y ’. His table starts like this:
Science X Science Y
solid-state or many-body physics elementary particle physics
chemistry many-body physics
molecular biology chemistry
cell biology molecular biology
... ...
Anderson concedes that this table becomes more speculative as we move down
the rows, though others who ally themselves with New Emergentism have con-
fidently continued similar lists with as many as twenty-eight stages (Morowitz,
2002). Nevertheless, at least for these first few rows, Anderson presents clear
candidates for the processes by which the systemic properties mentioned in each
science become “novel enough” to demand a new set of principles and laws for
the science of that domain. In particular he is confident about the first row of
the table: the large-scale properties studied in many-body physics (now usually
referred to as solid-state, or condensed matter physics) should be considered as
having no inferior status to the laws and principles of elementary particle physics.
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As we shall see, the New Emergentists have a clear set of examples of physical
phenomena which they hold to be genuinely novel (and thus for the associated
properties to be judged as emergent). Among these they mention qualitative
differences in dynamics, and difficulties in treating the phenomena in terms of
microphysical theories. But they do not list necessary and sufficient conditions
for novelty, for they do not fall into the trap we identified in §1.1.1; (namely, of
claiming a general definition of emergence motivated by the particular examples
that one is interested in capturing). I will follow their practice, and in Chapter 2
I will look to their physical examples to guide how to interpret their criteria for
novelty.
1.2.3 The Central Claims of New Emergentism
Accordingly, we end up with two simple claims that together make up New Emer-
gentism, each of which which will be examined and compared to existing accounts
in what follows.
1) Microphysicalism (both property and entity varieties) – All entities are com-
posed of microphysical entities, and all their properties are fixed by the
microphysical properties, which evolve according to microphysical laws.
2) Novelty – Some systemic properties are importantly novel : so different to
the microphysical that they and the laws that govern them can be recognised
as having a metaphysical status in no way inferior to the microphysical.
Although we shall concentrate on the nature of the second claim, we must also
be clear as to the apparently harmless first claim of microphysicalism. (Looking
ahead, one of the major claims of this chapter (§1.7.2) will be that there is a
problematic ambiguity in labelling a property as ‘microphysical’.)
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When we compare New Emergentism to existing philosophical accounts, we
must grant that they have not always set out their analyses of emergence in a sim-
ilar form to the claims presented here. But by forcing the philosophical discussions
into a similar framework, it may become possible to see how they might relate to
those of the New Emergentists. So, our task is to see how these two claims can be
interpreted as clear metaphysical doctrines, to arrive at a clear interpretation of
the New Emergentist position. §1.3 will analyse approaches to microphysicalism,
§1.4 & §1.5 will look at ways of making out the criterion of novelty.
1.3 Metaphysical Approaches to (Micro)physicalism
Although the New Emergentists accept microphysicalism, we will start by dis-
cussing metaphysical approaches to the apparently weaker claim of physicalism,
and their links to their stronger cousin. First, we should distinguish the modern
sense from an older one. When the term ‘physicalism’ first entered the philosoph-
ical mainstream, it formed part of the logical positivist programme of “unified
science”, which aimed to provide a single set of scientific methods of controlled ob-
servation and systematic generalization (Neurath et al., 1955). All sciences would
proceed with similar methods to those of the physical sciences, which the positivists
held to be (roughly) the application of rules of induction to sentences expressing
observation reports. Ontological questions such as whether “all is physical” was
of little interest to them, if indeed they judged it meaningful at all.
More recently, this emphasis has reversed. Now, physicalists hold that all prop-
erties mentioned in scientific study have the same ontological status — they are
all physical — but they allow that the methods of the different sciences may vary
widely. The much-discussed fragmentation of sciences into distinct domains and
the rise of analytic metaphysics with its practice of conceptual analysis has brought
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us a modern view of physicalism as having no direct methodological implications.
Indeed, those formulations that can be argued to imply some universal “scientific
method” are sometimes criticised on precisely those grounds. Methodological va-
riety amongst the sciences is treated as a datum, and accounts are designed to
accommodate it. It is these modern versions of physicalism — closer to the old
doctrine of materialism — that we shall be concerned with.
1.3.1 Supervenience Physicalism
Following our discussion of §1.2.1, we can focus on capturing property physicalism:
the claim that all properties are, or are determined by, physical properties. Though
there is still controversy, it is fair to say that an orthodox view has arisen over the
last few decades. The most promising approach to capturing the ‘determination’
inherent in property physicalism is through a relation of supervenience.10
Take a set of objects O, let their physical properties form a set PA, and all their
properties (both physical and ostensibly non-physical) form a set PB. To capture
physicalism via supervenience, we demand that the extensions of elements of PB
are fixed by specifying the extensions of the elements of PA. The simplest way of
accommodating any such n-adic relations amongst objects o1, o2, ...on is to treat it
as a one-place property of the larger object composed of all of these. So we need
to close the set of objects O under the operation of taking ordered n-tuples.
A little more formally: the properties PB supervene on PA with respect to a
set of objects O, on which both are defined, iff any two objects in O that match
with respect to all properties in PA, also match with respect to all properties in
PB. The central claim of property physicalism can then be expressed very simply:
all properties supervene on physical properties.
10For example, Jackson (1998) and Loewer (2001) both give supportive surveys of the modern
supervenience approach to physicalism.
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Although it is widely accepted, supervenience physicalism has its share of dif-
ficulties. For one thing, the scope of the whole claim has to be carefully restricted
if it is to be plausible. Our set of objects O is conventionally assumed not to
encompass all possibilia. (For example, properties of abstract objects can provide
controversial cases.) Neither are the property sets unrestricted, for some accounts
of dispositional properties cause difficulties. It is also often thought necessary to
distinguish several grades of contingency, leading to subtleties such as the distinc-
tions between weak and strong, or local and global supervenience (e.g., Kim, 1993,
§§4-5). But since we are dealing with concrete objects and occurrent properties
suitable to a broadly scientific investigation it is possible to set aside most of these
problems.
Early discussions of supervenience physicalism (such as Hellman and Thomp-
son (1975)) took the property sets PA and PB to be provided by the theoretical
descriptions of the set of objects O. More recent authors have seen a significant
advantage in applying supervenience physicalism directly to properties themselves,
as opposed to those given by a particular theoretical description.11 We shall fol-
low the New Emergentists in adopting a fairly na¨ıve realist view of the properties
mentioned in physical theories, and so not worry much about the distinction. Un-
less there are pressing reasons to the contrary, the descriptions given by physical
theory will be assumed to be our best authority as to the ontological furniture of
the world.
The most obvious difficulty is to determine which properties should be counted
as physical, beyond such unhelpful definitions as ‘those properties that physicists
study’. (The rise of fields such as econophysics suggest that this proposal is not
only glib, but also inadequate.) As often noted, if we approach the question
11Among the surveys already mentioned, explicit claims of these advantages are made by
Howard (2005) and Silberstein and McGeever (1999). Wilson (2005) seems to accept a more
theory-dependent view.
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naturalistically we face a problem, sometimes labelled the ‘Hempelian Dilemma’,12
which can be stated as follows. We cannot use present physics to define what is a
physical property, for almost no-one thinks present physics is complete. But if we
appeal to the properties mentioned in some future or an ideal physics, then the
proposal becomes trivial, for we cannot forsee what this restriction would amount
to.13)
There have been a variety of solutions proposed to the Hempelian Dilemma, the
most promising being that the first horn is blunt, and it is possible to formulate
physicalism using present physics (Hardin and Rosenberg, 1982; Melnyk, 1997).
But perhaps the popular approach to this problem looks to supervenience again,
and seeks to define physical properties themselves, by a further dependence on a
microphysical set.
1.3.2 Supervenience Microphysicalism
The thought behind the microphysical approach to demarcating the physical is a
simple one. Although any attempt to delimit the scope of future physics might
be questioned, it seems plausible that any sciences of the very small qualify as
‘physical’. If, like Anderson, we are sure that all physical properties on larger
scales supervene upon them, we have a promising approach.
Thus, Latham suggests that ‘a property is physical if and only if it logically
12According to Stoljar (2005), the problem was dubbed the ‘Hempelian Dilemma’ in honour
of a discussion of a similar problem by Hempel (1969). The difficulty is discussed in more detail
by Crane and Mellor (1990).
13Nonetheless, there have been several direct proposals for such restrictions, such as Jessica
Wilson’s ‘No Fundamental Mentality’ account. Elaborating the suggestions of Papineau (1993),
she argues that whatever else future physics may involve, it cannot accommodate properties with
a fundamental component of mentality (Wilson, 2005). Even if we set aside as unorthodox those
proposals that invoke a mental aspect in the collapse of quantum mechanical wavefunctions,
Wilson’s proposal appears to be motivated by factors specific to the philosophy of mind, i.e.:
a desire for a ‘physicalism’ which will be useful for setting up clear debates on the mind-body
problem.
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supervenes on microphysical properties.’ (2001, 152). If we take this approach to
demarcating physical properties, then physicalism collapses to microphysicalism.
Microphysicalism is the thesis that the supervenience basis consists of properties
mentioned by theories of the ‘very small’, and thus promises to reduce the problem
of demarcating the physical to the use of a ruler. There is obvious appeal in this
deal: we obtain a clearly specified supervenience basis by paying the price of
defending a rather stronger thesis. And for our purposes, aiming to capture the
physicalist doctrines of the New Emergentists, it looks especially attractive. For
as we saw in §1.2.1, the New Emergentists already accept microphysicalism: there
appears to be everything to gain, and the only cost, one we have to pay anyway!
Thus, to capture the sort of property microphysicalism that the New Emergen-
tists accept, we can use the same supervenience framework as for physicalism. The
objects O are taken as comprising those objects subject to scientific investigation
(or at least those ‘of which we have detailed knowledge’, to reproduce Ander-
son’s hedging as quoted on page 16)14 and PA as some level of uncontroversially
microphysical properties governed by microphysical laws.15
This approach looks promising, but I shall make just a few points of caution.
First, paradoxical as it might sound, not all properties mentioned by theories of
the very small are properties only of very small systems. Although theories such
as elementary particle physics use terms referring to properties such as the spin,
colour, mass and charge of very small elements, the theories may also be used
to describe systems made up from many of the elements together, so can include
the systemic properties of these far larger composites. And it is part of the New
14We may need to cover more under O than actual objects, for there may not be two objects
that match in respect of all properties in PA, in which case the supervenience requirement will
be trivially satisfied. This is likely to involve some modal commitment, but notwithstanding the
concerns expressed in §1.3.1 I shall assume that it is unproblematic.
15Again, there is no requirement that this be associated with any ultimate ontological micro-
level. Anderson even accepts that the level PA could be properties covered by the Standard
Model of contemporary particle physics.
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Emergentist thesis that these systemic properties might be very different to the
spin, colour, mass and charge of the elementary particles. This point is clear if we
consider the set of objects O; it encompasses objects of all sizes. We have called
the properties belonging to these objects ‘microphysical’, not because they are all
properties of small systems — they are not — but because they have been assigned
by a theory we call “microphysical”, such as the Standard Model.
Second, it should perhaps give us pause that even if we did restrict attention to
properties of the very small, we would fail to exclude such non-physicalist theories
as panpsychism and Cartesian dualism from the realm of the physical. To qualify,
such a theory would merely have to associate a small spatial extent with their non-
physical properties. As a matter of fact, existing dualist and panpsychist theories
tend to postulate non-spatiotemporal properties, and so are correctly categorised
by the criterion, but this is by no means a necessary requirement.
These reservations notwithstanding, our characterisation of microphysicalism
by way of supervenience should ensure that we shall be concerned with properties
that really do ‘emerge’ from the microphysical, as opposed to examples such as
dualist properties, which could be said to ‘float’ entirely free of them. We can now
move to the main hunt: for the precise sense of this ‘novelty’ which is meant to
separate out the emergent properties from amongst the systemic.
1.4 Novelty — A Merely Practical Matter?
There is a clear candidate for a distinction of novelty in Anderson’s article, which
he calls ‘anti-constructionism’. But once it is spelled out, those metaphysicians
who have discussed the New Emergentist views tend to express doubts. For it
begins to look as though Anderson has failed to notice a clear distinction in the
sense of the term “emergent”. Namely, the distinction between deductions or
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predictions being possible in practice, versus it being possible in principle.
Almost all conceptions of emergence characterise novelty by appealing to some
conception of predictability or derivability, questioning whether it is possible to
obtain one set of properties from another by some mechanical process of logical
derivation.16 Kim’s 1995 definition is typical from one concerned with the phi-
losophy of mind: ‘a property of a complex system is said to be ‘emergent’ just
in case, although it arises out of the properties and relations characterizing sim-
pler constituents, it is neither predictable from, nor reducible to, these lower-level
characteristics.’ The thought is that if it is possible to derive systemic properties
from those of their components, these properties cannot be truly novel — for they
were “there all along” in the parts, and it was merely a matter of careful analy-
sis to make this fact manifest. This leads naturally to a distinction between this
‘prediction’ or ‘reduction’ being one that could be carried out in practice, and one
that is possible only in principle.
This distinction is often the very first move made in discussions of emergentist
doctrines. The survey article of Silberstein and McGeever (1999) uses a widespread
terminology when they distinguish ‘ontological emergence’ (a failure in principle),
and ‘epistemological emergence’ (a failure in practice). They are also typical in
dismissing the latter as meriting little interest, at least for those who are searching
for a sense of emergence which carries metaphysical significance.17 In this section
16There are clearly differences between a property being ‘predictible’ and being ‘derivable’, each
of which are appealed terms are used in discussion, along with ‘reducible’, and ‘determinable’.
In particular, ‘predictable’ has a temporal connotation, which suggests that we may be want
to draw a distinction between the current systemic properties, and the ones to which they may
evolve in the future. Distinctions between ‘synchronic’ and ‘asynchronic’ emergence have been
discussed (e.g., Stephan, 2002), but we can ignore these distinctions, since we shall be concerned
with the systemic properties of our system at a particular time.
17O’Connor and Wong (2005) use the same terminology as Silberstein and McGeever.
Chalmers’ ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ emergence appears to express the same distinction (Chalmers,
1996, 39), and Bedau (2002) uses the same terms, with the addition of further categories. Though
they are accused of confusion, the New Emergentists are also aware of the difference, see for ex-
ample the distinctions discussed in Mayr (1982, 59-64).
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we shall look more closely at the most popular way of reading the New Emergentist
claims, which appears to accuse them of confusion, between the ‘epistemological’
and ‘ontological’ senses. While I concede that it is one way to interpret some of
their claims, I contend that it makes their claims so mysterious, and attributes
to them such simple-mindedness, that it is uncharitable to accuse them of such
errors.
1.4.1 Anti-constructivism
Anderson accepts that all matter is composed of microphysical parts, that all facts
supervene on microphysical facts, and that all are governed by microphysical laws.
We argued back in §1.2.1 that his reference to this as ‘reductionism’ is at odds
with the metaphysicians’ usage: they would call it ‘microphysicalism’. This should
be kept in mind when we read Anderson making out the following claim, usually
understood as setting out his Emergentist stall:
... the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a con-
structionist one: The ability to reduce everything to simple funda-
mental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and
reconstruct the universe. (Anderson, 1972, 393)
But despite the prominence with which this statement of anti-constructivism has
been quoted in the discussions of Anderson’s claims, his immediate attack on
‘constructionism’ is then based on practical difficulties:
The constructionist hypothesis breaks down when confronted with the
twin difficulties of scale and complexity. (Anderson, 1972, 393)
As is the attack from Laughlin & Pines:
However, it [the non-relativistic Schro¨dinger equation] cannot be solved
accurately when the number of particles exceeds about 10. No com-
puter existing or that will ever exist, can break this barrier because it
is a catastrophe of dimension ... the triumph of the reductionism of
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the Greeks is a pyrrhic victory: We have succeeded in reducing all of
ordinary physical behaviour to a simple, correct Theory of Everything
only to discover that it has revealed exactly nothing about many things
of great importance. (Laughlin and Pines, 2000, 28)
The thesis of anti-constructionism then looks an uncontroversial one. It is com-
monplace that the laws of particle physics are practically useless once we attempt
to apply them to systems beyond a certain size and complexity. No-one in their
right minds would attempt to use the Standard Model to determine the behaviour
of macroscopic objects.18 And reductionists such as Weinberg accept this — all
they maintain that it is possible in principle, a claim that the New Emergentists
do not challenge.
1.4.2 The Orthodox Gloss
The usual reading of the New Emergentist claims is that we should take the claims
of anti-constructionism as the New Emergentist’s criterion of ‘novelty’, i.e. the cri-
terion which distinguishes the ‘trivial’ systemic properties from the emergent ones.
That is, systemic properties are novel, if and only if it is practically impossible to
derive them from the microphysical properties mentioned in microphysical super-
venience.
If we follow these suggestions we can see why the reaction to the New Emer-
gentist claims from philosophers has so often been one of faintly puzzled dismissal.
For Anderson makes claims such as this:
The essential idea is that in the so called N → ∞ limit of large sys-
tems (on our own, macroscopic scale) it is not only convenient but
essential to realize that matter will undergo mathematically sharp,
18There are interesting exceptions. Superconductivity and superfluidity are not exactly every-
day phenomena, but they are on macroscopic scales, and require a treatment using principles
very similar to those in quantum field theory. In fact, many-body quantum mechanics has wide-
ranging and suggestive parallels with techniques exploited in the Standard Model, most famously
in the Higgs-Anderson mechanism — a link we shall not pursue here.
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singular “phase transitions” to states in which the microscopic sym-
metries, and even the microscopic equations of motion, are in a sense
violated. (Anderson, 1972, 395)
It looks as though Anderson moves illegitimately from his premise that it is prac-
tically essential to understand higher-level properties associated with phase tran-
sitions, to an ontological conclusion about the microphysical laws (=equations of
motion) that govern the properties of such systems. But we have also seen him
concede that all systemic properties, even at our own macroscopic scale, continue
to be determined by microphysical properties. And Anderson has given us no rea-
son to think that microphysical laws will be violated — only that it is practically
impossible to use them.
The New Emergentists are thus accused of illegitimately citing evidence for
epistemological emergence (a practical difficulty in deriving the properties of a
large system) as support for claims of ontological emergence (there exist emergent
properties that are “novel” in a metaphysically important sense).
Leaving aside specific quotes, it is hard to see in general how any criteria for
novelty as a “practical” matter could support the full-blooded metaphysical claims
made by the New Emergentists. If criteria for novelty considerations are sensitive
to the availability of physical theories, our interpretations of them, and to our
levels of intellect and ingenuity, how can they could support conclusions about
the status of physical properties and laws? Of course, the interpreters taking this
tack make these very objections: this is the very reason that they they judge
‘epistemological’ emergence to be uninteresting.
Several philosophers have concluded that New Emergentism must be inter-
preted along these lines, and that it does not stand up to detailed scrutiny as a
metaphysical thesis. This is the conclusion of O’Connor and Wong (2005), who
explicitly accuse Laughlin and Pines confusing practical and in-principle deriva-
tions, and of Don Howard who finds no grounds for their claims of emergence
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(Howard, 2005, 17). Similar scepticism is expressed by Chalmers (1996, 129-30),
and it is also implicit in Cat (1998), who is slightly more charitable in his inter-
pretation, but ends by judging that Anderson’s commitments are unclear between
an ontological or epistemological viewpoint.
These dismissive reactions from philosophers are certainly understandable given
the difficulties of relating the New Emergentist positions to existing frameworks
for emergence. But rather than rushing to condemn, it is worth looking at An-
derson’s thesis more carefully. In the next sections, we will look at some existing
metaphysical approaches to the novelty of emergent properties, and ask whether
the New Emergentist theses can be related to them.
1.5 Novelty — Three Metaphysical Approaches
Let us assume that the dismissive reaction of the last section should be resisted,
and look within metaphysics for fully objective conceptions of emergence. Again,
we seek a clean distinction amongst the systemic properties, to separate the ‘trivial’
and ‘non-trivial’: those that are straightforwardly obtainable from the microphys-
ical properties belonging to the parts of a system, and those that are importantly
novel. In §1.5.1 – §1.5.3, we examine three proposals; novelty is shown by: 1) a
failure of inter-theoretic reduction; 2) an impossibility of deducing the systemic
properties from the properties of the parts; or 3) a failure of mereological super-
venience.
These three approaches have rather different histories: the first and last have
been the focus of much recent philosophical discussion, while the second is part of a
rather older tradition, known as “British Emergence”. The main claim I shall argue
in this section is that the approaches appeal to three entirely separate distinctions
between the properties of parts and wholes; thus there are three entirely different
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sets of criteria for emergence.
1.5.1 Failure of Inter-theoretic Reduction
A popular conception of emergence is made out in terms of the possibility of the
reduction of one theory to another (e.g., Hellman and Thompson (1975), Howard
(2005), Butterfield and Isham (1999), Batterman (2002a)). Inter-theoretic reduc-
tion is usually discussed using the syntactic conception of theories, as opposed to
the semantic conception. (I shall assume that nothing hangs on the choice, except
that it is easier to make a clear definition of reducibility in syntactic terms.) In the
syntactic conception the postulates of a theory are treated as sets of sentences, and
in these terms, when we succeed in showing that one theory reduces to another, we
show that is possible to deduce the postulates of one theory from those of another,
by adding judiciously chosen definitions of its non-logical vocabulary. The idea is
that if a reduction is available, the content of the first theory has been shown to
be completely accommodated within the second, though this fact might have been
obscured by differences in terminology, or a lack of appropriate definitions.
Like supervenience, reduction was originally studied to capture the logical pos-
itivist thesis of physicalism as a thesis of the unity of science. As we mentioned in
§1.3, such conditions have been found too strong to capture the modern doctrine
of physicalism. But this disadvantage can be turned around, and exploited in our
search for criteria for novelty amongst the systemic properties. A natural sugges-
tion is that if a theory of the behaviour of these systemic properties can be shown
to fail to reduce to microphysical theory, this constitutes an important degree of
novelty in those properties. Thus, a simultaneous success of microphysical super-
venience, with a failure of reduction to a microphysical theory, can be put forward
as a definition of emergence.
So, the suggested analysis goes as follows: Take our common domain of ob-
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jects O, with properties PA described by a microphysical theory theory TA, and
properties PB described by a higher-level theory TB. If the properties PB de-
scribed in theory TB supervene on the properties PA addressed in theory TA, yet
it is impossible to reduce theory TB to TA, we have emergence. We thus require
precise conditions for theoretical reduction to add to our precise supervenience
conditions for microphysicalism. We define emergent properties as “squeezing”
into the logical space where the second holds, but the first does not.19
Theoretical description of composite
 in terms of macroscopic properties
Theoretical description of composite
 in terms of microscopic properties
Figure 1.1: The relationship relevant to emergence understood as a failure of
Inter-theoretic Reduction. It is between two descriptions of the same system in
microphysical and macrophysical terms.
Inter-theoretic Reduction
In keeping with their pedigree, the classic analyses of theoretical reduction are
based around a logical operation, known as ‘definitional extension’ (e.g., Hempel
and Oppenheim (1948) and Nagel (1961, 366-74)). Definitional extension consists
in adding to the reducing theory TA some further definitions, which aim to capture
19Davidson (1980) seems to want his ‘Anomalous Monism’ or ‘Non-reductive Physicalism’ to
share this space with emergence. Crane (2001) and Robinson (2001) are among those who explore
the question of whether the two can be distinguished.
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the terms used in the reduced TB. Call this augmented theory T
∗
A. If we then
find that it is possible to deduce all the postulates of TB from within T
∗
A then
intertheoretic reduction has been achieved.20 Despite its age, and clear ancestry
in logical positivist thinking, definitional extension has remained a popular way of
viewing inter-theoretic reduction. For example, Don Howard appeals to it in his
examination of emergence:
Intertheoretic reduction is a logical relationship between theories. In
the classic formulation owing to Ernest Nagel, theory TB, assumed
correctly to describe or explain phenomena at level B, reduces to theory
TA, assumed correctly to describe or explain phenomena at level A, if
and only if the primitive terms in the vocabulary of TB are definable
via the primitive terms of TA and the postulates of TB are deductive.
(Howard, 2005, 3-4)
Nagel’s ‘classic formulation’ is found in The Structure of Science, published in
1961, but we should bear in mind that a bare-bones requirement of definitional
extension was only the formal core of a detailed set of proposals, which themselves
inspired an extensive literature on further refinements. Even in his 1961 discussion,
Nagel added further conditions of ‘connectability’ and ‘derivability’, (Nagel, 1961,
353-4) which place some conditions on the relations between the terms defined in
both theories, and discussed the nature of the definitions that can be introduced
to TA to effect the reduction. (See Belot (2005) for further discussion of Nagel’s
own treatment of the problems). However, it seems fair to say that definitional
extension is the centrepiece of his position, and has remained central to the vast
literature it has inspired.
The clearest examples of a reduction achieved by definitional extension come
from mathematics, and the jewel is the success of Frege, Russell, Whitehead,
Zermelo et al, in reducing classical pure mathematics to set theory. Astonishingly,
20To prevent confusion arising from accidental homonymies, we assume here that TA and TB
have disjoint vocabularies.
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it seems to be possible to construct definitions of all the terms of classical pure
mathematics, and deduce its theorems, using just the resources of set theory, cast in
first order predicate calculus. This stunning result is probably the principal reason
that definitional extension became so popular as an analysis of inter-theoretic
reduction.
The most popular objections to Nagel’s proposal (or rather, to this caricature
of it), has been that once we move to reductions in areas beyond pure mathemat-
ics, full definitional extension is far too rigid a requirement. Feyerabend (1962)
mounted a famous attack on the example that Nagel himself used: the reduc-
tion of thermodynamics to equilibrium statistical mechanics. Feyerabend points
out that the concept of temperature is inherently statistical in the latter theory,
non-statistical in the former, and casts doubt on the possibility of constructing
definitional extensions that could accommodate this fact.
Such objections, and more general concerns that strict requirements of def-
inition and logical deducibility are unsuitable to capture relationships between
pairs of scientific theories, have led to more sophisticated variations on Nagel’s ap-
proach. Relationships such as approximation, limiting relations and analogy have
been suggested (the discussions of Nickles (1973) and Schaffner (1976) are partic-
ularly influential), but it is difficult to make them precise, and the success of these
more nuanced analyses remains questionable. It is telling that the “reduction” of
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, has moved in thirty years from being the
archetypal example of a successful inter-theoretic reduction (Nagel, 1961, Ch.11),
to providing the archetypal example of the problems inherent in capturing the
concept (Sklar, 1993, Ch.4).
35
Emergence
Fortunately for our purposes, the question of how we should capture a notion of
emergence can be torn free from the tangled issues of whether definitional extension
does justice to the concept of inter-theoretic reduction. For even if definitional
extension is unsuitable as an analysis of reduction, we could still require its failure
as a necessary condition for property emergence. If it is to play this role there
must merely exist sufficient logical “space” between it and supervenience, that is,
there must be clear cases in which supervenience holds but a definitional extension
is not possible.21
Unfortunately, such a retrenchment does not help. The widespread criticism of
definitional extension as an unreasonably strong requirement for reduction might
be thought to guarantee such clear logical “space”; but disappointment awaits.
Butterfield and Isham (1999) call attention to the fact that inter-theoretic reduc-
tion may be surprisingly weak, and its strength compared to supervenience may be
illusory in many cases. This is shown by a result known as Beth’s theorem, which
proves that the two are actually equivalent under a wide range of circumstances.22
We can repair this by imposing restrictions on the resources we allowed to con-
struct the definitional extensions. Howard’s formulation mentions ‘definability’
and ‘deducibility’, which implicitly calls for the resources of some logic. Tradition-
21At first sight the distinction appears as clear as that between infinite and finite definitions.
For suppose that supervenience holds. Then for each property in the set PA, one can construct
a definition of it in TB ’s terms, by taking the disjunction of the complete descriptions in terms
of properties PB of all the objects in O that have that PA property. Thus there is a definitional
extension of TB that covers the properties in TA. If there are infinitely many ways that an
object can have a PA property in virtue of possessing PB properties, the disjunction will be
infinite, and this is not usually admitted as an acceptable definitional extension. But whether
those disjunctions are finite or infinite, supervenience will ensure that objects matching in their
complete PB descriptions match as regards that PA property. For this reason, supervenience is
sometimes called ‘infinistic reduction’.
22They credit the first application of Beth’s theorem to issues of supervenience and reduction
to Hellman and Thompson (1975), who also pointed out that it holds for first-order languages
only. Accordingly Hellman and Thompson suggest that it can be evaded by holding that realistic
scientific theories are typically formulated in higher-order languages.
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ally, the reduction has followed the example of that celebrated result mentioned
earlier: most of pure mathematics successfully reduced to set theory, formulated
using just first order logic. But when we consider examples of reduction in physics
it is natural to add at least some extra mathematical operations to the basic log-
ical ones. Even very simple theories demand mathematical operations such as
differentiation and integration, which appear rather ‘high up’ in the set-theoretic
hierarchy.
However, once we start to allow further resources to enter our toolkit for build-
ing definitional extensions, many controversial examples of reduction are swept
away by the sheer power of modern mathematics. For example, equilibrium clas-
sical statistical mechanics of isolated systems becomes a definitional extension of
Newtonian micro-mechanics once the calculus of many variables and measure the-
ory are employed (see Butterfield and Isham (1999, 119-120) for more details).
Such power should make us suspicious, and indeed we find that the questions
of which resources should be admitted are often the same questions at issue in con-
troversies of inter-theoretic reduction. Are the resources of measure theory alien to
Newtonian mechanics? Certainly it was alien to Newton and his contemporaries
(or even to Boltzmann, and his); but at what point do the more powerful mathe-
matical developments stop being “mere” aids to construct definitional extensions,
and start defining properties that were not present in the original theory?
For a more contemporary example, consider the recent controversial claims by
(Batterman, 2002a), that there are physical phenomena which can be explained
within TB and not TA, though a successful reduction of TB to TA can be carried
out. The subsequent argument (Redhead (2004), Belot (2005), Batterman (2005))
has centred on the mathematical resources one is allowed to appeal to, both in
reduction and explanation. Distinguishing a reasonable from an unreasonable set
of definitional resources presupposes answers to the very questions that motivated
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us to look to inter-theoretic reduction as an analysis of emergence: the extent to
which the properties of the upper-level theory are novel compared to the old.
We have seen that a criterion of inter-theoretic reduction may be made so weak
as to be equivalent to supervenience, or so strong as to admit of no clear examples
in the physical sciences, simply by altering the resources allowed to construct
the extensions. It is hard to disagree with Butterfield and Isham, who conclude
that the criteria of inter-theoretic reduction made out in terms of definitional
extension are formulated at too high a level of generality to provide a useful analysis
of emergence. Let us turn to our second set of criteria, which has an equally
distinguished history to draw on.
1.5.2 British Emergentism
The British Emergentists constitute a movement active in the early decades of
the twentieth century. They have attracted renewed attention in the last decade,
inspired largely by a careful philosophical history by McLaughlin (1992), which
presented C. D. Broad’s views as particularly interesting and worthy of detailed
study.23
Broad was concerned with the relationship between the properties exhibited
by composite systems and the properties exhibited by their parts when separated
23Other writers also deserve mention, though I shall not discuss their views in detail. I have
already mentioned that Lewes (1877) is thought to have first used the term ‘emergence’ in its
modern sense. Lloyd Morgan (1923) and Alexander (1920) are each at least of equal influence as
was Broad within the British Emergentist movement, particularly to subsequent developments
in biology (Mayr, 1982, 1997). One reason that McLaughlin (and I) have chosen to focus on
Broad is that Lloyd Morgan and Alexander’s writings are rather opaque to interpretation, and
appear to reject any scientific investigation of emergent properties, making them less relevant
to the New Emergentist thesis. Lloyd Morgan appeals to extra forces that are ‘in some sense
extra-natural’ (Lloyd Morgan, 1923, 8), admitting that this may involve an appeal to God as
supplementary to scientific explanation. And Alexander rejects out of hand the idea that there
could be any comprehensible physical process behind emergence: ‘The existence of emergent
qualities thus described is something to be noted, as some would say, under the compulsion of
brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the
natural piety of the investigator. It admits no explanation.’ (Alexander, 1920, 47).
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from those composites.24 His central definition of emergence is expressed in the
following passage:
Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain
wholes, composed (say) of constituents, A, B and C in a relation R
to each other; that all wholes composed of constituents of the same
kind as A, B and C in relations of the same kind as R have certain
characteristic properties; that A, B and C are capable of occurring in
other kinds of complex where the relation is not of the same kind as R;
and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A,B,C) cannot,
even in theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the
properties of A, B and C in isolation or in other wholes which are not
of the form R(A,B,C) (Broad, 1925, 61)
In Appendix A, I separate two quite different ways in which this deduction of
systemic properties might be impossible. Broad’s first suggestion, that there might
be ‘non-behaviourably analysable properties’, is not totally clear, but it looks as
though they may fail to supervene on the microphysical, and so are less relevant to
the present debate. More interesting for our purposes is Broad’s second suggestion
which he introduces via specific laws of composition, a term which can be explained
as follows. Broad held that to derive the properties of a composite system from
the properties of its components, the following is required:
(a) We need to know how the parts would behave separately. And (b)
we need to know the law or laws according to which the behaviour of
the separate parts is compounded when they are acting together in any
proportion and arrangement. (Broad, 1925, 61)
Broad then distinguishes two possibilities for the type of the laws covered under
clause (b). These laws can be specific to a situation or general. The composition
of Newtonian forces by vector addition was taken as the paradigmatic example of
24In discussing Broad’s views, we will be forced to depart somewhat from our policy of focussing
on emergent properties to the exclusion of emergent laws. Also, there are many points of interest
in his account, discussion of which would take us far from our central parts. A discussion of a
few of the more relevant of these, I have relegated to Appendix A.
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a general law of composition.25 When we want to know how a large number of
forces combine to produce a systemic effect, the rule is the same whether there
are two forces or a thousand: we combine them by the simple rules of vector
addition. Thus, under good conditions, it should be possible for a sufficiently skilful
calculator to derive the systemic properties of such a composite from knowledge
of properties of its components when alone, and in composites other than the one
under study.
In contrast, when the laws of combination are specific, this derivation might
not be possible without study of the system itself. Broad’s favoured examples
were drawn from chemical phenomena: for at the time he wrote, it seemed that
the properties of chemical compounds could not be derived from the properties of
their constituent parts.
... if we want to know the chemical (and many of the physical) prop-
erties of a chemical compound, such as silver-chloride, it is absolutely
necessary to study samples of that particular compound. [...] The
essential point is that it would also be useless to study chemical com-
pounds in general and to compare their properties with those of their
elements in the hope of discovering a general law of composition by
which the properties of any chemical compound could be foretold when
the properties of its separate elements were known. So far as we know,
there is no general law of this kind. It is useless even to study the prop-
erties of other compounds of silver and of other compounds of chlorine
in the hope of discovering one general law by which the properties
of silver-compounds could be predicted from those of elementary silver
and another general law by which the properties of chlorine-compounds
could be predicted from those of elementary chlorine. (Broad, 1925)
Broad’s suggested explanation of this failure was striking — it could be that the
law that determined how the properties of silver and chlorine combine to give the
properties of silver chloride, was a law specific to that situation. Broad’s main
25For simplicity, we can narrow the example to Boscovitchian point particles, interacting via
well-behaved potentials, and ignore esoteric possibilities such as “space-invader” cases. The
non-deterministic aspects of Newtonian mechanics, though fascinating, are not our concern here.
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examples of specific laws were ones specific to a particular configuration of atoms,
which he called ‘configurational laws’.
To emphasise his point, Broad introduced a ‘Mathematical Archangel’, blessed
with both infinite calculational ability, and ‘gifted with the further power of per-
ceiving the microscopic structure of atoms as easily as we can perceive hay-stacks.’
This being ‘could no more predict the behaviour of silver or of chlorine or the
properties of silver-chloride without having observed samples of those substances
than we can at present’ (Broad, 1925, 71). When silver and chlorine formed the
particular configuration which constitutes silver chloride, an entirely new law of
composition “kicked in” to produce the chemical properties. Since one would need
to know this specific configuration law to deduce the systemic properties from
those of the components, and since this law (by assumption) shows no effect ex-
cept in its influence on silver-chloride itself, even the Archangel will fail to deduce
its systemic properties. Broad labelled both the underivable chemical properties,
and the laws that govern them, ‘emergent’.
Broad’s criteria for emergence thus makes precise those central emergentist
intuitions of novelty and unexpectedness. He recognised that the properties of
a composite system are always new in some sense: that is just what we mean
by recognising systemic properties. As we emphasised in §1.2.3, the point is to
make a distinction between a trivial and non-trivial examples. Putting the same
point in a different way, if we follow Wheeler with his slogan that the properties
of the whole are greater than the ‘sum of the parts’, we must distinguish a trivial
from non-trivial “summing” operation. Here we can use common terminology and
refer to a whole system that would be created if we brought together two isolated
systems S1 and S2 into a certain configuration as the composite of S1 and S2. For
Broad, the general laws of composition express trivial “summing” operations, but
when specific laws come into effect the operation is non-trivial, and the resulting
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composite system can then be said to possess emergent properties.
To compare British Emergence to the other conceptions considered here, it is
important to recognise three closely related points. First, there is a clear distinction
between specific laws of composition on one hand, and emergent properties and
laws on the other. A law of composition is a rule for combining properties of
components to give properties of a composite. It is specific if it applies only to
a single configuration, general if it applies to many. When specific laws apply,
the properties of that configuration may be called emergent, as may the laws that
govern them. Thus emergent properties and laws may be derived from the general
and specific laws of composition together, but not from the general laws alone.
A second point is the status of a specific law such as a configurational law.
Certainly it is a physical law, but we might wonder whether to call it microphysical.
On the one hand, it is relevant only to the systemic properties of large systems, so
we might not consider it microphysical. On the other, the law can be expressed
using only microphysical terms. That is: we need not refer to higher-level terms
such as ‘silver chloride’ when we specify the law: we can talk about such-and-such
arrangement of silver atoms and chlorine atoms and their effects,26 likewise in
microphysical terms. So if we added this law to the existing set of microphysical
ones, the augmented theory seems to remain microphysical; yet it could account
for the properties studied in chemistry. Thus there seems an ambiguity in the term
“microphysical”, both when applied to properties and to laws: an issue we shall
return to later.
This leads to a third point: the existence of a specific law of composition, and
thus the idea of British emergentism, can be made either (1) entirely independent
of emergence understood as a failure of inter-theoretic reduction, or (2) equivalent
to it, depending on the properties mentioned by theories TA and TB.
26Or, when the microphysical theory is taken to be the Standard model, we would speak of
arrangements of protons and electrons, or quarks and electrons.
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Systemic properties of a composite
Properties of components in isolation
or in different composites. 
Figure 1.2: A schematic representation of the relationship relevant to Broadian, or
British emergence. The novelty is to come between sets of properties belonging to
two different systems: properties of a composite system, and those of its component
parts separated from that composite.
To see this let us start by considering how we might express British Emergen-
tism in terms of a failure of inter-theoretic reduction. We could dictate that TA be
a theory mentioning only properties obtainable under general laws of composition,
and TB a theory differing from TA only in that it also mentions properties obtain-
able with any specific laws. If a configurational law of composition is in effect, its
effects would be taken into account by TB, but not TA, so reduction would fail.
But these two conceptions of emergence only become equivalent when we en-
gineer them as such. We tend to assume that it must be a microphysical theory
TA that would neglect properties obtainable with the configurational law, for we
tend to associate a theory that describes systems in microphysical terms with a
restriction to the analysis of small systems. But we could just as easily dictate
that it was the macrophysical theory TB that omitted them. Further, if we did
find that neglect of a specific law of composition was the reason for the failure of
reduction, either theory could easily be repaired by adding it to the existing laws.
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Again, TA would handle the addition of the specific law by referring to microphys-
ical properties and relations, TB would use the macrophysical, but this difference
does not affect whether each theory could accommodate it.
An inter-theoretic reduction could also fail for reasons entirely independent
of British Emergentism: due to the set of resources being used to construct the
definitional extensions being inadequate for the task, or any of the general diffi-
culties with inter-theoretic reduction outlined in the last section. So while failure
of inter-theoretic reduction might be taken as evidence for the existence of British
emergence, the diagnosis is just one amongst many possibilities. Reduction can
fail even when only general laws are in effect.
1.5.3 Failure of Mereological Supervenience
Finally, we turn to the third proposal — that a novelty of systemic properties, and
thus emergence, is shown by a failure of mereological supervenience. While this
proposal shares some of the “logical technology” of supervenience, it expresses
a very different condition to the doctrines of physicalism and microphysicalism
discussed in §1.3.1. We look at the relation between parts and wholes by look-
ing whether the properties of wholes supervene on those of their parts. This is
quite different to our previous question: whether a set of properties assigned by a
macrophysical description of a whole supervene on those assigned by a microphys-
ical description, also of the whole.
Don Howard, who judges this conception of emergence the only clear one recog-
nised by modern physics, defines it thus:
Supervenience is an ontic relationship between structures. A structure,
Sx, is a set of entities, Ex, together with their properties and relations,
PRx. A structure, SB, characteristic of one level, B, supervenes on
a structure, SA, characteristic of another level, A, if and only if the
entities of SB are composed out of the entities of SA and the properties
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and relations, PRB, of SB are wholly determined by the properties and
relations, PRA, of SA. (Howard, 2005, 4)
To define microphysical supervenience, we examined a supervenience relation be-
tween all the properties available in a description given by microphysics and all the
other properties. To define mereological supervenience, we take the supervenience
relation as between those properties that can be assigned to the composite system
taken as a whole, and those that can be assigned to the parts of the composite
system (so we can think of structure SA as the parts, and SB as the whole). It
is particularly important to realise that these two sets of properties could be two
sets provided by different theories, or the two sets provided by the same theory
in each case — the difference is simply in that the first set can be meaningfully
ascribed to the system’s parts, the second to the system as a whole.
Howard then argues that there are uncontroversial situations in physics for
which mereological supervenience does fail: when the parts make up an entangled
quantum system (Howard, 2005, 12). Consider two electrons with their pure spin
states representable by vectors in Hilbert spaces H1 and H2 respectively. There
exist entangled states of the compound system of two electrons, which cannot be
written as the simple tensor product of any two pure states from H1 and H2. For
example, ignoring the spatial degrees of freedom, consider the singlet state:
1√
2
|↑1〉 |↓2〉 − 1√
2
|↓1〉 |↑2〉 (1.1)
(where |↑1〉 represents the pure spin-up state for the z-direction, say, and |↓1〉 the
pure spin-down state of electron 1, similarly for electron 2). This state cannot be
written as the tensor product of any pure state in H1, with any pure state in H2.
And if we try to describe the electrons with reduced density matrices (the orthodox
way to express such separated states) we find that the description fails to capture
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(measurable) correlations between the states of electron 1 and 2.27 The state of
the whole (structure SB in Howard’s terminology) is not wholly determined by the
states of the parts (structure SA).
In the case of these entangled quantum systems, mereological supervenience
fails, while microphysical supervenience holds. Mereological supervenience fails
because it restricts its supervenience base to only those properties that we can
fully assign to a part of a system (in our example, density matrices of single elec-
tron systems). The properties assignable to the components of a system are not
sufficiently rich to determine all the properties of the composite. Microphysical su-
pervenience allows as its base the whole range of properties and relations available
in the description used by a microphysical theory, (in our example, elementary
quantum mechanics) and amongst these is the singlet state of Equation 1.1, so
microphysicalism holds.
Opinions differ on how we should interpret the metaphysical significance of
these states. It is especially controversial whether it is possible to separate the
significance of the ‘fused’ states from other issues of the interpretation of quantum
states.28 Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that they bring out fundamentally
non-classical features of composite quantum systems.
In any case, we have here a third possible analysis of emergence. For a systemic
property to be emergent in this sense, we require that microphysical supervenience
to hold, but mereological supervenience to fail.29
27There is a large literature on the failure of mereological supervenience in entangled quantum
systems. Good starting points would be any of the sources in note 28 and those referred to in
Howard’s own discussion.
28Taking a pair of positions from each side of the debate: Maudlin (1998) and Humphreys
(1997) emphasise its significance for a form of holism, regardless of a wider position on the
interpretation of quantum mechanics. In contrast, Healey (1991) and Dickson (1998) hold that
its significance should be interpretation-relative.
29Many authors consider mereological supervenience to be the only context in physical science
for which a clear and physically realised case of ‘emergence’ can be demonstrated. Of those
already mentioned, Silberstein and McGeever (1999) and Howard (2005) are strong advocates of
this position.
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Systemic properties of a composite
Properties of components assignable 
while in that composite. 
}
Figure 1.3: A schematic representation of the relationship relevant to emergence
understood as a failure of mereological supervenience
1.6 Evaluation of the Three Metaphysical Ap-
proaches
The most striking feature of the three conceptions examined is that they judge
emergence as occurring under quite different circumstances. While many differ-
ences have been recognised amongst the senses of ‘emergence’ recognised in the
literature, I am not sure that they bring out the most fundamental distinctions.
In §1.6.1 I shall illustrate the diversity of the criteria, by presenting a variety of
situations for which they disagree as to whether emergent properties appear. In
§1.6.2, I shall present what I take to be the most important difference between
them: the interpretation of what counts as a ‘part’ of a composite system. Finally,
in §1.6.3, I shall argue that none of them can capture the position held by the New
Emergentists.
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1.6.1 Their Diversity
It turns out that the three sets of criteria of emergence discussed in §1.5.1 – §1.5.3
hold in very different situations. In §1.5.2 we saw that while a case of British
Emergence might be seen as a reason for the failure of inter-theoretic reduction,
the two notions can also come apart, simply because we are free to include or omit
specific configuration laws in both the reducing and the reduced theory. Let us
move next to consider a situation in which a failure of mereological supervenience
occurs, but without British Emergence.
When we combine quantum mechanical parts into a composite, such as the
singlet state of Equation 1.1, we do so using a set of general rules of composition
given by the tensor product operation. (Any composite quantum system may
be represented in a Hilbert space formed by taking the tensor product of those
representing the individual parts. And any interaction between the parts can be
described by a Hamiltonian for the whole system, whose eigenstates are in this
larger space.) Whatever the configuration of the parts, this procedure does not
change, and there are no specific rules of composition.30 The fact that we cannot
assign pure states to the individual components of an entangled composite system
(what Humphreys (1997) calls a “fused” system) is irrelevant.
A situation illustrating the converse possibility — mereological supervenience
obtaining, yet British emergence — is provided by Broad’s own favourite example.
His silver chloride exhibits British emergence, due to the presence of a specific
law of composition, but it would satisfy mereological supervenience. Broad wrote
before the logical apparatus of supervenience was brought to bear on the questions
of emergence, but one can infer his position from passages such as the following:
No doubt the properties of silver-chloride are completely determined by
30Although it may be argued that astonishingly novel properties appear when quantum me-
chanical components come together in any configuration covered under the description: “mea-
surement apparatus”.
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those of silver and chlorine; in the sense that whenever you have a whole
composed of these two elements in certain proportions and relations you
have something with the characteristic properties of silver-chloride, and
that nothing has these properties except a whole composed in this way.
(Broad, 1925, 64, italics his)
Leaving aside Broad’s stronger claim of uniqueness (irrelevant to our concerns),
it is clear that he allows that the properties of a composite system exhibiting
“British” emergence could nevertheless supervene on the properties of its parts, in
that it could be ‘completely determined’ by them. His point is just that a specific
law of composition may be involved in this determination.
The most elusive cases are those involving inter-theoretic reduction. In the
main, this is due to the power and flexibility of that framework. In §1.5.2 we
saw that it is possible both to express British Emergence as a particular case of
a failure of inter-theoretic reduction, and as holding under completely different
circumstances; simply by making appropriate choices of the properties allowed in
the reducing theory TA and in the reduced theory TB, or by altering the resources
allowed for the construction of definitional extensions. The same trick can also be
worked to express mereological supervenience as a special case of inter-theoretic
reduction: let TA be a theory mentioning only properties assignable to separate
parts of the system, and let TB also allow properties assignable to the system as a
whole. (Naturally, supervenience will also fail in this case.) The very fact that the
framework of inter-theoretic reduction can be so used, indicates that it will help
little in analysing a detailed notion of emergence.
Undaunted, Howard (2005, 4-6) claims that inter-theoretic reduction and mere-
ological supervenience are totally independent of one another. His examples of
mereological supervenience without reduction are situations with no exceptionless
laws governing the supervening level. Unfortunately, such examples rely on some
fairly contentious additions to the basic framework of definitional extension. In
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particular, Howard requires some unstated standard of what to count as a true
exceptionless law. Otherwise, the fact of mereological supervenience guarantees
that we can always construct laws that are in a sense exceptionless, (they may
contain infinitely long disjunctive statements), along the same lines as outlined in
Note 21.
Howard also gives a rather puzzling set of examples to illustrate the opposite
possibility. He claims that a success in theoretic reduction does not imply mere-
ological supervenience if boundary conditions become important. He mentions as
examples ‘global metrical structure in big-bang cosmology or edge state excitations
in the fractional quantum Hall effect.’ Judging from these examples, Howard seems
to assume that when non-nomic circumstances have to be added to the dynamical
laws in order to give a successful reduction, then mereological supervenience fails.
But the need for some boundary conditions is a fairly general feature of physical
theories which incorporate dynamical laws and one which comes in to play in the
majority of realistic reductions; so by his standards a failure would be endemic.
1.6.2 Properties of Parts — Three Readings
I suggest that the main reason for the diversity of these analyses of emergence
lies not in any fundamental difference as to “novelty”, but in where it is looked
for. For while each of the metaphysical approaches searches for a clear distinction
between novel systemic properties of a large system and the properties of its parts,
they interpret the entities involved in this relationship in three separate ways. We
can sum up these differences as follows (see also Figures 1.1 – 1.3):
Emergence understood as a failure of Inter-Theoretic Reduction is con-
cerned with the relationship between the properties appearing in two different de-
scriptions of the same composite system — one description refers to microphysical
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properties, the other to macrophysical. Thus, when we speak of “properties of
parts” and “properties of wholes” in this sense, we are referring to two different
theoretical descriptions of the same composite system.
British Emergence is concerned with the relationship between the properties
of different systems. On the one hand: the systemic properties of the composite
system; on the other: the properties of their components, in isolation and in other
composites than the one in question. Thus “properties of parts” refers to those
properties that are exhibited by components when separated from their places
in the composite. “Properties of wholes” refers to systemic properties that are
exhibited by the whole composite system.
Emergence understood as a failure of Mereological Supervenience is
concerned with the relationship between the systemic properties of the compos-
ite systems, and those that can be assigned to individual components whilst part
of that composite system. Thus “properties of parts” refers to those that may
be predicated of the components while in their places within the composite sys-
tem. “Properties of wholes” refers to those that may be predicated of the whole
composite.
1.6.3 Their General Unsuitability
It appears that these metaphysical pictures fail not only as an analysis of the
New Emergentist position, but are also inappropriate for anyone with broadly
physicalist outlook who wants to take an emergentist position. The reasons should
have already become clear from the discussion, but a brief summary may be useful.
In regard to inter-theoretic reduction, we have already discussed its sensitive
dependence on the resources that we allow to construct definitional extensions, as
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well as its suspiciously large flexibility. Indeed, it can be used to express almost
any notion of emergence, simply by choosing an appropriate set of properties to
be covered by the “reduced” and “reducing” theories. If any clear conception of
emergence can be made out using the general framework of theory reduction, it
seems that all the work in articulating emergentist criteria will appear in the details
— either in some restriction in the resources allowed for definitional extensions,
or in some addition to those basic requirements. So, as it stands, the general
framework of reduction is too general to be useful to us.
In regard to British Emergence, the difficulty is empirical. Molecular chemistry
has allowed made much progress on the prediction of chemical properties from
general laws of composition which Broad noted to be impossible in his time.31
The motivation for postulating specific laws withered with each new success, and
the attraction of the whole position wilted with it. As McLaughlin argues (1992),
the reasons for the failure of the British Emergentist movement lay not in any
incoherence in Broad’s hypotheses, but in the empirical fact that no specific laws
of composition were found.
Finally, a failure of Mereological Supervenience is both well-defined and empir-
ically realised in many systems. In fact it is realised too frequently. Any everyday
macroscopic system exhibits entanglement, both internally, and with its environ-
ment. On this criterion, all large-scale systemic properties are emergent (with
the possible exception of a few prepared in astonishingly delicate experimental
situations).
More seriously, making out emergence as a failure of mereological supervenience
makes no attempt to capture the emergentist intuitions of novelty or unexpected-
ness between micro- and macro-physical properties.32 The systemic properties can
31The progress has not been so simple nor so successful as may be thought. It has been argued
that many principles taken as basic to chemistry are still underivable from atomic physics, even
today (e.g., Scerri and McIntyre, 1997).
32I would make a similar criticism of many suggestions in the “Complex Adaptive Systems”
52
be entirely predictable and derivable from those of the component parts (as in-
deed they are, in the examples of entangled electrons). Instead, this analysis looks
far closer to the notion of Holism: it formalises the idea that it may be impossi-
ble to capture all the facts about the state of a composite system by considering
properties of parts in isolation from their status as parts of a whole.
So, to summarise a summary: our first criterion is too general, the second never
fulfilled, the third fulfilled too often.
These shortcomings do not just disqualify the three approaches from capturing
the precise notion of emergence that concerns Anderson and his immediate follow-
ers; the failure is more general. Workers across complexity theory, chaos, general
systems theory and even in biology and the social sciences claim that they accept
that laws of microphysics govern all the properties of the systems they study, yet
the ‘higher-level’ properties and laws that they study are importantly novel.
Each area — indeed each author — may well differ on the criteria by which
they mark out this novelty; but however it is made out these three offerings from
metaphysics all appear unsuitable, for the general reasons just listed.
1.7 Applying the Lessons from Metaphysics
Let us review our position. In §1.2 we identified the central doctrines of New Emer-
gentism as microphysicalism, together with the existence and novelty of certain
systemic properties. In §1.3 we tried to fill out microphysicalism in the form of a
clear metaphysical doctrine — microphysical supervenience. We tried to fill out
the distinction of “novelty” in four different ways, first (§1.4) as an epistemologi-
cal or methodological doctrine, and then (§1.5) with three different metaphysical
literature for a firm analysis of emergence: they seem focussed on the idea that ‘emergent’
properties are those that can be possessed by systems, but not by the parts (e.g., Bar-Yam,
2004).
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approaches. Yet each of these senses have proved unsuitable.
Before we are forced to retreat, we should look at the lessons that have arisen
from our metaphysical project, in order to disambiguate the New Emergentist
claims. We claimed in §1.6.2 that the three metaphysical approaches to novelty
came apart due to three different ways of understanding ‘properties of parts’. In
§1.7.1, we shall apply this lesson by making clear which of these senses the New
Emergentists are concerned with.
But the tripartite distinction in the sense of ‘properties of parts’ has reper-
cussions beyond making clear how different senses of emergence can hold under
different circumstances. It can also be applied to distinguish three senses of ‘mi-
crophysical properties’; a term that has been central to our discussion of the New
Emergentists. In §1.7.2, we shall look at how these distinctions might further clar-
ify the New Emergentist position. And in §1.7.3 we shall see how neglecting them
has led to confusion amongst commentators on the New Emergentists’ claims.
1.7.1 Parts and Wholes for the New Emergentists
The New Emergentists are concerned with a relationship between the properties
of parts and wholes. So the question naturally occurs as to which, if any, of the
interpretations separated in §1.6.2 is closest to their understanding. On this point
at least, I believe that the claims of the New Emergentists can be best understood
as an updated variation of British Emergence.
Here is Anderson on the relationship with which he is concerned:
The behaviour of large and complex aggregates of elementary particles,
it turns out, is not to be understood in terms of a simple extrapolation
of the properties of a few particles. Instead, at each level of complexity,
entirely new properties appear, and the understanding of the new be-
haviours requires research which I think is as fundamental in its nature
as any other. (Anderson, 1972, 393)
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Lest we think that Anderson’s focus on “understanding” and “research” means
that he is here making only a subjective point about the methodology of science,
consider this stronger statement from Mayr, who could almost be quoting Broad:
... characteristics of the whole cannot (not even in theory) be deduced
from the most complete knowledge of the components taken separately
or in other partial combinations. This appearance of new characteris-
tics in wholes has been designated as emergence. (Mayr, 1982, 61-3)
It is difficult to read these claims as concerned with either the relationship between
different descriptions of the same composite systems (inter-theoretic reduction) or
with the properties that can be assigned to mereological parts of a composite
system (mereological supervenience). Rather it seems clear that the New Emer-
gentists understand the relation between parts and wholes in a similar way to
Broad: properties of “wholes” are understood as systemic properties of composite
systems, and properties of “parts” as properties exhibited by the components in
isolation or as parts of other composites.
1.7.2 Physicalism and Microphysicalism Revisited
Recall from §1.2.3 that the central claims of New Emergentism both involved an
appeal to microphysical properties. The first was that all properties of systems
were determined by the microphysical; the second that there was a distinction of
novelty between the microphysical properties and those of large systems. After
the discussions of §1.6, the inherent ambiguity should leap out immediately: there
are three possible senses of ‘microphysical’:
Microphysical1 – a sense associated with microphysical supervenience (and with
intertheoretic reduction), which admits as “microphysical” all of those prop-
erties describable under a recognisably microphysical theory — say, the Stan-
dard Model. These may include properties of very large systems.
55
Microphysical2 – a sense associated with British Emergence, which admits as
“microphysical” only those properties of systems below a certain size, which
they display in isolation, or when they are parts of systems other than the
one in question.
Microphysical3 – a sense associated with mereological supervenience, which ad-
mits as “microphysical” only those properties assignable to mereological
parts below a certain size.
In regard to interpreting the New Emergentist’s claims of microphysicalism, we can
immediately dismiss microphysical3 since it is violated by quantum entanglement.
Microphysical1 is the sense captured by microphysical supervenience as we have
understood it, but we can see now that it is too weak a condition to exclude such
positions as British Emergence. And we do wish to exclude them, for in contrast to
Broad, Anderson feels that laws that ‘we know pretty well’ govern all the everyday
properties, including those encountered in condensed matter physics. To make
out their notion of microphysicalism, we must therefore add to the condition of
microphysical1 supervenience, a further hypothesis that there are no specific laws
of composition.33
But for the New Emergentists’ second claim, of novelty, it seems clear that
we are speaking of microphysical2 properties. An emergentist distinction of nov-
elty should be between the properties of small systems and the properties of
large systems, not between the descriptions offered by two different theories (as
microphysicalism1 would have it), nor the holistic sense of microphysicalism3. An-
other way of putting the same points would be to say that whatever the New
33It might be thought that we could do this far more simply, by specifying that only mi-
crophysical laws operate (as we quoted Pettit: back in §1.2.1). My quarrel with this approach
might have become clear in the discussion in §1.5.2 as to whether specific laws of composition are
microphysical or not. Any ambiguity in “microphysical” applies just as much to microphysical
laws as it does to microphysical properties, and even a large-scale specific law of configuration
would be a microphysical1 law.
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Emergentist distinction of novelty may amount to, it is exhibited even amongst
the set of microphysical1 properties. In fact, a simple way to avoid further confu-
sion would be to restrict the whole discussion to this set, and look for our sense of
novelty within these.
1.7.3 Diagnosis
If these suggestions are correct, then we can begin to understand why there
has been confusion when philosophers concerned with metaphysical discussions
of emergence have tried to evaluate the New Emergentist claims. We saw back in
§1.4 that the orthodox interpretation of the New Emergentists is that as a meta-
physical thesis, their claims are simply inconsistent. And now we can see why this
opinion might have arisen. They are explicit about accepting microphysicalism,
but if this is interpreted as microphysicalism2, then this would commit them to
saying that all properties supervene on the properties of very small systems consid-
ered in isolation. And this claim would be inconsistent with their claim of novelty
as we have just interpreted it. Fortunately, they are not committed to holding
microphysicalism2; they are committed to microphysicalism1 and an absence of
specific laws of composition.
Similar confusions between the different senses of parts and wholes can lead
to bewilderment as to what the New Emergentists are claiming. For example,
Don Howard recently attempted to interpret New Emergentism either as a failure
of reduction or as a failure of mereological supervenience, and concluded that
he could not see that it had any relation to either. He finished his paper with
the frank admission that he was puzzled at the phenomenon of condensed matter
physicists believing that their subject could be called “emergent” (Howard, 2005,
17). I suggest that his puzzlement can be explained by the New Emergentists’
understanding of microphysicalism and the relation of parts and wholes in the
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“British” sense. Since it is a distinct relationship to the one at issue in both
reduction and mereological supervenience, it may hold under entirely different
circumstances.
As well as missing the particular parts/wholes distinction that the New Emer-
gentists mean to draw, it is possible to make errors by conflating the three rela-
tionships separated here. Confusing two (or even all three) of the senses, has —
I believe — led to misunderstanding in discussions of emergence. Among those
who I would accuse on these grounds are Kronz and Tiehen (2002), who discuss
the failure of mereological supervenience as a form of British Emergence. They
are commenting on an earlier article by Humphreys (1997), who I think falls into
similar traps.
Humphreys draws a very strong metaphysical conclusion from the failure of
mereological supervenience. His own notation is rather involved, but he intro-
duces a notion of ‘levels’: L1, L2, ...Ln, each the domain of a particular special
science, so in our terms, the “smaller” levels would concern microphysical1 prop-
erties (Humphreys, 1997, 5). But he then claims that ‘microphysical properties’
cease to exist when we have non-separable states. Instead, microphysical properties
become‘absorbed’ into the systemic properties of the whole. This is a conclusion
he judges on criteria related to their causal powers, but still it is clear that the
sense of ‘microphysical’ is now microphysical3. When he moves from the failure of
mereological supervenience to argue that what he calls a ‘fused’ property cannot
be represented at a lower level, the force of his case appears to turn on this equiv-
ocation (Humphreys, 1997, 10-11). (The properties of mereological parts might be
said to be absorbed when they are brought together in a composite, but not the
properties assigned by a theory of microphysics).
When Kronz and Tiehen comment on Humphreys’ article, they repeat his
equivocations in their discussion, and also add a discussion of British Emergence
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(331), taking on the old terminology of ‘emergent’ and ‘resultant’ properties, but
still treating all three positions as if they are concerned with the same relationship
between parts and wholes.34
1.8 Concluding Remarks
We have seen that a variety of claims for the existence of emergent properties and
laws that have been made by physicists can be characterised by a shared acceptance
of physicalism, and a recognition of a distinction of some systemic properties as
importantly “novel” and thus qualifying as emergent.
Filling out these twin doctrines in metaphysical terms has led us to a rather
disappointing conclusion: although there is no shortage of precise distinctions of
novelty, they are not appropriate for the cases that the New Emergentists focus on.
What is more, the orthodox response is to accuse them of a simple confusion; one
which leads them to draw a metaphysical lesson from an epistemological distinc-
tion. Yet in discussing the metaphysical approaches, we have uncovered a series
of ambiguities in the comparison between microphysical and macrophysical prop-
erties. And it seems possible that it is at least partly down to these ambiguities
that the New Emergentist position has been misinterpreted by metaphysicians.
Now that the ambiguities have been recognised, we are left with the New
Emergentist position holding a very similar position to the one occupied by Broad
in the 1920s. They are concerned with the same species of micro-macrophysical
34Kronz and Tiehen introduce further distinctions of their own within the non-separability
of quantum properties (specifically, they argue that the situation where both the unitary evo-
lution and the states of a system are non-separable is more important than a situation with
only non-separable states), but this further technical discussion does not bring them any
closer to the sense of emergence that Broad had in mind. For while he is concerned with
microphysical2, they are examining distinctions as between the various kinds of non-separable
properties (microphysical3), and relating this back to Humphreys’ levels of description by differ-
ent special sciences (microphysical1).
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distinction: between the systemic properties of large systems, and the properties of
their components considered in isolation. And they each believe that certain larger
systems have systemic properties that are importantly novel, compared to those
of these smaller systems. But the New Emergentists also reject specific laws of
composition, and this prevents them from taking Broad’s more detailed position.
Broad himself did try to give a logically exhaustive set of alternatives for an
emergentist position, judging that his own was the only one viable.35 So with their
rejection of configuration laws, it looks as though the New Emergentists might have
run out of metaphysical ground on which to stake their claim. In the final section
of this chapter I would like to look ahead to the next, and consider whether these
various disambiguations leave them any space for manoeuvre at all.
1.8.1 An Inductive Argument
With the New Emergentists’ doctrines of microphysicalism and the novelty of
emergent properties now clear in metaphysical terms, we can see that they have
still managed to paint themselves into a fairly tight corner. For consider the
following argument.
Take two uncontentiously microphysical entities, consider each in isolation, and
list their physical properties. So long as these entities are indeed small enough, it
is uncontentious that each member of this set will be amongst the microphysical2
properties. Now consider S2, the set of microphysical1 properties of the system
formed by the composition of the two entities. According to the New Emergentists,
all the properties in S2 must be derivable from the microphysical2 properties, using
35I have not followed the structure of Broad’s own detailed discussion (Broad, 1925, Ch.2)
because it is not entirely clear that his points translate well to modern physics. In particular, his
‘Ideal of Pure Mechanism’ — supposed to contrast with the Emergentist thesis — is very much
based on turn-of-the-century physics, and is not relevant to modern discussions. In Appendix
A I outline how microphysical supervenience (microphysical1, that is) precludes the existence of
one variety of Broad’s emergent properties (the non-behaviourably analysable), and in the main
text, I have concentrated on his alternative: specific laws of composition.
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only general laws of composition. Thus, there seems no room for novelty to enter
into the properties that are admitted into this new set. Next, consider S3, the
properties of the composition of this joint system with some further microphysical
entity. Again, only general laws of composition can be used, and again, there seems
no room for novelty to enter. Now iterate this process, adding one uncontentiously
microphysical entity at a time, and applying only general laws of composition at
each stage. Since the New Emergentists grant entity microphysicalism, they must
also grant that any physical system of N microphysical parts could be constructed
in N iterations of composition.
But then it is difficult to resist the obvious inductive conclusion that one needs
a merely algorithmic process to obtain the set SN containing all the microphysical1
properties of this system. No novelty in the properties seems to have entered at any
stage. Yet in the last section we concluded that the New Emergentists’ distinction
of novelty should appear amongst this microphysical1 set.
36
There are certainly a number of ways to resist this sort of inductive argument.
For example, it could be pointed out that we will encounter steps where there are
no physically possible systems of the requisite type. Most obviously, if we started
considering the properties of the very smallest entities, we might find ourselves
attempting to list the properties of free quarks — arguably a non-sensical project.
But the New Emergentist case does not seem to turn on these technicalities —
they would make their same claims if our microphysical theory came without such
restrictions.
Another response would be to point out that the form of the argument is very
reminiscent of Sorites reasoning. One could then argue that from accepting that no
novelty enters at any single stage, we cannot infer the conclusion that no novelty
36If we are unhappy with this last step, an alternative would be to appeal directly to micro-
physical supervenience, and conclude that all properties are fixed by the algorithmic procedure
above, since they supervene on the microphysical1.
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enters overall, and argue on analogy with one’s favourite response to that paradox.
But even if we are inclined to resist the argument in these ways, it still looks
as though in principle, one needs no more resources to derive the whole set of
systemic properties of any large concrete system than the resources we use to deal
with small ones. In both cases, we just need microphysical2 properties, and the
same small number of general laws of composition. All that is needed to deal with
larger systems, is an enormous amount of calculating power.
Assuming we accept the force of the inductive argument, our way forward
seems very restricted — but it is also clear. We are searching for a metaphysically
significant distinction of novelty amongst the systemic properties, but we have
established that the membership of the appropriate set of systemic properties for
any entity is fixed by a process that admits of no novelty.
So if there is such novelty, and with metaphysical significance (rather than
being “merely” epistemic) we must look for it in distinctions within the fixed set of
systemic properties. Fortunately, there are many distinctions that metaphysicians
recognise in the status of sets of properties. For example, while the above argument
seems to fix the set of first-order properties, it does not touch certain varieties of
second-order properties, i.e.: properties of properties. It is not clear that it fixes
the division of intrinsic/extrinsic, nor any distinctions of naturalness, nor any
matching with universals. If such distinctions could be shown to change in an
unexpected manner as we consider the systemic properties of larger systems, then
it is possible that some novelty in these characters could mark emergent properties.
The next chapter will look at one approach along these lines which — I shall argue
— is very promising in implementing the themes of the New Emergentists.
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1.8.2 Reasons for Optimism
Given the almost relentlessly negative conclusions from this chapter, one might
wonder whether physicists and metaphysicians are concerned with the same issues
when they speak of emergence, physicalism and microphysicalism. Why should
we reject the orthodox conclusion that the two sides are simply talking past one
another, one addressing practical concerns of physicists, the other more abstract
concerns of philosophers? We close this discussion with some reasons for hope in
this regard.
Metaphysicians have put forward a variety of explanations for the popularity
of physicalism, and specifically of microphysicalism, but by far the most popular
motivation is a desire to adopt a metaphysics that is informed by the success
of physics. Crane and Mellor (1990) sum up this attitude in their discussion
(and criticism) of physicalism. They attribute the ‘now almost orthodox’ belief in
physicalism and microphysicalism to the progress achieved by physical sciences,
this ‘grants physical science a unique ontological authority: the authority to tell
us what there is.’ (394).
I believe that this is a laudable desire, and that it carries across directly to
a need to capture a metaphysical sense of emergence faithful to any that may
have been highlighted by discoveries in physics. The caveat is that we must be
careful to separate the success of physics, and a particular attitude to that success.
In accepting a supervenience on microphysical1 properties and the rejection of
specific laws of composition, we are following the authority of physics, which it has
acquired mainly from to its empirical success. But in according a privileged role to
microphysical2 properties, and to the microphysical laws that explicitly mention
them, we are inspired not directly by the practice and success of physics, but
rather by a particular attitude to that practice and success. This emphasises the
microphysical2 theories such as the Standard Model, and the properties mentioned
63
in them as particularly fundamental. But this attitude by no means shared by all
physicists, it is not supported by the empirical success of physics, and in particular
it is precisely the one which the New Emergentists strongly oppose.
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Chapter 2
Interpreting New Emergentism:
A New Approach
In the last chapter, we looked at the difficulties inherent in relating metaphysical
conceptions of emergence to those claimed by physicists. The claims of Philip
Anderson were taken as representative of a movement dubbed ‘New Emergentism’,
which we tried to characterise in existing metaphysical terms, though with limited
success. In this chapter, we shall try to build on those largely negative conclusions
and construct a metaphysical position that could be occupied by Anderson and
his followers; one which supports a clear conception of emergence founded on well-
understood physical principles.
The main negative conclusion of the last chapter was that existing metaphys-
ical interpretations of emergence were unsuitable to make out the position held
by the New Emergentists. I argued that emergence was best thought of as a dis-
tinction of novelty between microphysical and systemic properties, but that any
such distinction was wracked with ambiguities. Once these were cleared away, I
argued that the most promising place to look for novelty was in distinctions of
metaphysical status within the set of systemic properties. In this chapter, I shall
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propose an interpretation of the New Emergentist claims, along those lines.
In §2.1 & §2.2, I shall look at examples of distinctions of metaphysical status
that might be suitable to make out the New Emergentist thesis. In §2.3, I dis-
cuss how the New and British Emergentist theses can be seen as parallels, the
critical advance being that the New Emergentists look to well-understood physical
theory to produce novel properties, rather than having to appeal to speculative
metaphysics, as did Broad. In §2.4 I present Anderson’s principal example of a
“novelty-producing” process, that of symmetry-breaking. Finally, in §2.5, I ad-
dress the very different interpretations of Anderson’s views that have appeared in
the philosophical literature.
2.1 Intension
In metaphysical terms, not all properties are created equal. There are a variety of
distinctions that can be recognised: intrinsic/extrinsic, determinables/determinates,
fixed degree/multigrade, structured/unstructured and categorical/dispositional are
just some of the best-known divisions. Most relevant to our concerns is a distinction
between the sparse “metaphysically respectable” properties that mark objective
resemblance, and the plentiful gerrymandered properties that may be definable in
a certain language, yet play no significant role in the world.
For example, David Armstrong holds that just because predicate “P” and pred-
icate “Q” each pick out physically significant properties, it does not follow that the
disjunction does so. Some, like Armstrong (1978), make out such distinctions in
terms of universals, others prefer a trope theory or the “naturalness” of properties.
Following the useful, but slightly non-standard terminology of Wilson (1993, 54),
I shall refer to all such distinctions as between the intensional characters amongst
the systemic properties, using the term to cover any consideration that makes a
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distinction of privilege amongst properties, distinguishing those that mark objec-
tive resemblance from “mere” gerrymandered ones; or the physically significant
from the insignificant. The importance of making an intensional distinction was
most famously summed up by David Lewis:
Any class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and miscellaneous and
indescribable in thought and language and be it ever so superfluous in
characterising the world, is nevertheless a property ... Because proper-
ties are so abundant, they are undiscriminating. Any two things share
infinitely many properties, and fail to share infinitely many others ...
Properties carve reality at the joints — and everywhere else as well. If
it’s distinctions we want, too much structure is no better than none. It
would be otherwise if we had not only the countless throng of all prop-
erties, but also an e´lite minority of special properties. (Lewis, 1983,
13)
Lewis counts as ‘adequate’ only those theories of properties that recognise such
a distinction, naming theories due to Armstrong, Quinton, Quine and Bealer as
adequate in this sense (1983, 13n6). But it was Lewis himself who went on to
propose perhaps the most influential scheme of all.
2.1.1 David Lewis’ Natural Properties
Lewis’ famous aim was to vindicate ‘Humean Supervenience’: to show how an
adequate metaphysics can be founded on a particularly sparse supervenience base:
the intrinsic properties of point-like objects, and the spatio-temporal relations
between them.
Lewis begins by dictating that the properties in his supervenience base provide
a standard of perfectly natural properties.1 Other than the aforementioned con-
ditions, he leaves it up to a future physics to determine membership of this set,
1Other influential metaphysicians have constructed similar schemes, and appeal to a hierarchy
of natural properties, though few start from such a sparse supervenience base as does Lewis.
As well as those mentioned by Lewis himself, we can count proposals from Shoemaker (1980),
Putnam (1975b, 305-322) and Armstrong (1978).
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noting only that present theories suggest that charge, spin and quark colour might
be among them.2
He then imagines a restricted language, which contains only predicates that
refer to perfectly natural properties. All other properties can then be arranged on
a descending scale of naturalness, depending on the length and complexity of the
definition needed to specify them in such a language. (Lewis (1983, 14) argues
that a distinction of degree is preferable to a binary one.)
This second-order property of ‘naturalness’ then finds application throughout
his metaphysics. Without going into details (which would be unnecessary for our
discussion) we can summarise by saying that he employs natural properties to
determine duplicates, causal roles and questions of reference.3
When his scheme is worked through, it soon becomes clear that Lewis’ spectrum
of naturalness is often at odds with the physical sciences to which it is supposed to
be faithful.4 As an example, consider an elementary physical system: a single free
classical particle. Since Lewis is taking lessons from physics, its natural properties
should include the particle’s mass, velocity and spatio-temporal position — those
found significant in physical descriptions of the particle, and appearing in the laws
which govern it. Unfortunately, when we move to systems made up from more
than one such particle, agreement between naturalness and physical importance
breaks down.
For consider a system made up from two such particles. Firstly, Lewis’ scheme
appears to pick out the wrong quantities as its natural ones, at least if we are
to be guided by their importance to physical theory. Relativity tells us that the
2Lewis considers three schemes for setting up these perfectly natural properties: in terms of
universals, tropes, or simply taken as a brute fact about certain properties. These schemes are
set out in most detail in Lewis (1983) and updated in Lewis (1986b, 1994).
3Lewis (1983) is the best source for the central roles Lewis assigns to natural properties. It
is also updated in Lewis (1986b, 1994).
4Lewis (1994, 226) makes carefully nuanced claims that his metaphysics is inspired by physics
and aims to accommodate its discoveries.
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physically important total mass is not a simple sum of the masses of the parts, but
must also take into account the energy of any interaction between the two. But
this mass-energy supervenes on Lewis’ completely natural properties in a far more
complex way than the simple sum, since it also involves the interaction between
the two particles.
Secondly, Lewis’ scheme does not privilege those quantities that are physically
significant. For example, in our two-particle system, the centre of mass (r1m1 +
r1m2)/M expresses an extremely important quantity of the system, as does the
angular momentum around this abstract centre. But these are just two among the
bewildering variety of properties that supervene on the microphysical, and there is
nothing to distinguish them from countless others that can be derived with equal
or greater simplicity.
Add more elements, and move beyond simple particles and potential wells, and
the variety of physical properties increases rapidly to bewildering levels. Yet we
know from our very ability to do macroscopic physics that there will often be a
privileged minority of systemic properties: they will be causally potent, important
in physical theory, determining facts such as how a large system vibrates, breaks,
bends or heats up. But these properties will not in general be picked out by the
ease with which they can be defined in terms of the microphysical theory; as such
Lewis does not count them as natural. It is puzzling that while metaphysicians such
as Lewis are often happy to bow to the authority of physics to make intensional
distinctions at small scales, this authority somehow dissolves when we move to
larger, composite systems.5
5Although some authors follow Lewis in tying a naturalness scale to the mereological composi-
tion of large systems, it is worth noting that there are other approaches available, which together
cover many different ways in which we might compose properties together to yield properties
of composite systems. One such possibility is to recognise structural universals, as do writers
such as Forrest (1984), and Bigelow and Pargetter (1989). Lewis (1986a) criticises such schemes,
arguing that mereological analysis is the only metaphysically respectable approach.
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Not nearly enough has been said here to establish that Lewis’ scale of natural-
ness is unsatisfactory, but there exists a fast-growing literature raising very serious
problems (insurmountable, in my view). Some of these arise due to the sparse-
ness of Lewis’ choice of supervenience basis (e.g., Robinson (1989), Zimmerman
(1999)), so they might be accommodated by expanding this basis in a suitable way,
but there are also more general objections, which call into question the tenability
of the whole approach (e.g., Black (2000), Mainwood (2003)). Not least amongst
the more general criticisms are those of Mark Wilson, which we shall look at in
§2.2. But before this, we need to address a danger, brought into sight by schemes
of naturalness such as that of Lewis.
2.1.2 Microphysical Supervenience — Yet Again
In the last chapter, we allowed that the New Emergentists accepted microphysi-
calism, and analysed it using the apparatus of microphysical supervenience. Our
supervenience basis was not quite so rigidly circumscribed as Lewis’, but it con-
sists wholly of microphysical properties, and shares its supervenience physicalism.6
So now there seems to be a problem associated with accepting microphysical su-
pervenience as an analysis of microphysicalism: namely that we might implicitly
assume that microphysical properties are a privileged minority, and the rest less
so, by analogy to the scale accepted explicitly by Lewis.
Let us put this reasoning explicitly: any property that we count as part of the
microphysical supervenience basis qualifies as physical in an elementary, funda-
mental sense. For the thesis of microphysicalism counts them directly as physical.
In contrast, if asked to decide whether a large-scale systemic property is physical,
we decide it by a process that ultimately returns to this same supervenience base.
6As mentioned in §1.3, there are issues of the modal range over which the supervenience
thesis is formulated. Lewis (1983, 25-33) discusses the range of possible worlds that he takes for
supervenience physicalism.
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Thus, the large-scale systemic properties might also be physical, but only qualify
in a derivative way. This makes it look as though microphysical supervenience
has a built-in bias to count microphysical properties as having a higher intensional
status — a clear conflict with the New Emergentist theses.
But this impression is mistaken: not only is there no pressure on the New
Emergentists to adopt such a scheme, they could not do so even if they wanted to.
To see this, take the properties mentioned by the Standard Model as the micro-
physical set, as Anderson suggests. It is natural to think first of examples such as
the “colour”, “charge” and “spin”. But we now need to recognise the distinctions
in the meaning of the term ‘microphysical’ that we drew in Chapter 1. These
most natural examples are all microphysical2: those which can be assigned to lone
particles, or to very small systems in isolation. But these are not the only proper-
ties available in the supervenience base allowed by the New Emergentists. Theirs
is the microphysical1 set, i.e., all the properties that can be accommodated in
the Standard Model, and this includes enormously complicated properties of large
systems, which would qualify as physical just as directly as do the microphysical2.
So one microphysical prejudice — the belief that supervenience physicalism
grants a privileged place to properties of the very small — arises as a result of con-
fusing microphysical1 and microphysical2 properties. Once we look at the scheme
carefully, we see that systemic properties of large systems qualify as physical just
as directly as do those of point-like particles. So even if we do imbue the su-
pervenience basis with some higher intensional status, the systemic properties of
larger systems lose nothing compared to the very smallest. Lewis’ own scheme
only imposes such a promotion because of his commitment to a microphysical2
supervenience basis which forms part of his ‘Humean project’. We could of course
follow him, but we have already seen that this is not the position that the New
Emergentists hold.
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Alternatively, microphysical2 properties might be thought to qualify as having
intensional status on slightly different grounds, namely that they appear directly
in the laws most central to the Standard Model (which is the theory that qualified
them as microphysical in the first place). Of course this is precisely the reverse of
Lewis’ own scheme — for him it is perfect naturalness that qualifies properties to
appear in fundamental laws, not the other way around (Lewis, 1986b, 1994). But
we are free to take such a position, and this would also introduce a bias towards
microphysical properties, and this time towards microphysical2.
But this position is also mistaken, though the confusion is a different one. If
the laws central to the Standard Model distinguish some basic set of properties,
so — equally — does any other physical theory.7 And it is central to the New
Emergentist position that the laws of microphysical theories such as the Standard
Model are not privileged a priori in any such respect. That is, any distinction
of intensionality cannot be decided by their appearance in laws central to micro-
physical theories, as against their appearance in laws central to higher-level ones,
unless we have already rejected the New Emergentists’ position. For handing over
a judgment of a physical property’s intensional status to one particular microphys-
ical theory would be to beg the question against their position before it has even
be made out.
To help dissolve this second form of microphysical prejudice, note first that
the same problem does not arise once we assign properties some other role outside
physics (as biological or chemical properties, say). We may be quite happy to
call a property such as ‘valence’ a fundamental chemical property, because of its
fundamental status within the laws of chemistry, yet also recognise that it has no
fundamental physical status. Indeed, it is a strong advantage which supervenience
7It might be suggested that it is the formulation of a particular physical theory that privileges
a particular set, and that different formulations of the same theory might differ in their choice.
I am happy to accept this, and it does not affect my point.
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formulations hold over rival notions of physicalism: a property can be said to have
a certain status qua physical, and another with respect to other special sciences.8
The science of physics itself appears to be the one exception to this rule. But
this appearance is simply an illusion. If microphysical theories such as the Standard
Model are to confer any higher intensional status, it must be restricted to a status
qua microphysics, not qua physics.9 That is, it might be useful if we want to know
how “microphysically fundamental” is a particular property, and all properties
would (presumably) have such a status; but it must be recognised that other
physical theories might award it differently. Physics is not just microphysics (in
any of our senses). For again, conflation of physics and microphysics is exactly the
sort of picture that the New Emergentists are concerned to deny.
So, while property microphysicalism may be accepted by the New Emergentists,
metaphysicians abuse their acceptance if they think that this implies some pressure
to hand over all authority to that microphysical theories to decide questions of
intensionality.
2.2 Emancipationists and their Enemies
Conflicts with New Emergentism are far from the most serious accusation that
philosophers have made against the traditional ways of drawing intensional dis-
tinctions. In a pair of papers, Mark Wilson (1985, 1993) presents a wide-ranging
critique of the accounts of property physicalism presented by contemporary meta-
physicians, and on the basis of this critique he then puts forward some minimum
standards for any such distinctions between genuine and gerrymandered properties.
8Barry Taylor sets out an explicit proposal of this type with his ‘vegetarian’ alternative to
Lewis’ red-blooded metaphysical distinction of naturalness, judging intensional status as relative
to a theory (Taylor, 1993). In these terms ‘valence’ would be a natural property relative to
chemistry, but not relative to physics.
9I have doubts as to whether such a scale is even useful in these contexts, but it should
certainly have no significance beyond them.
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His standards are relatively generous: any distinctions of intensionality must be at
least minimally informed by physics, in the sense that those considered central to
physical laws must be judged as genuine — i.e., to have a respectable intensional
status, and not judged as just a gerrymandered “quasi-property”.
In §2.2.1 I shall look at Wilson’s own criticisms of the metaphysical schemes
for drawing distinctions of intensionality, and his own minimum standards for any
such distinction. I shall then look at the status these minimum standards should
have, in particular, in regard to how much say physics should have in determining
the metaphysical status of properties (§2.2.2). Finally, in §2.2.3 I shall argue that
if we adopt such a standard, then discovering intensionally important properties
of larger systems from the properties of their parts is a non-trivial procedure.
This looks ahead to §2.3, where I shall argue for an interpretation of the New
Emergentist claims based on this fact.
2.2.1 Wilson against the Emancipationists
Wilson (1993) labels those metaphysicians whose approach he objects to as ‘Prop-
erty Emancipationists’, counting amongst them Lewis, Armstrong, Fodor, Shoe-
maker and Putnam. These Emancipationists hold that properties cannot derive
any metaphysical status they may have from the roles they play in our language,
but must be “freed” to allow their status to be judged on purely metaphysical
grounds. He agrees broadly with the aims of this movement, but not with the
details of their approaches. In particular, he objects to any appeal to ‘basic laws’
of physics, where these are taken to be some unknown set of universally quantified
statements — assumed to pick out predicates referring to ‘natural kinds’, ‘perfectly
natural properties’ or some other set of fundamental physical properties.
Wilson’s papers make a persuasive (and entertaining) case that these modern
metaphysicians appeal to the authority of “science” or “physics” in a piecemeal
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manner, cherry-picking those aspects that that suit the requirements of their meta-
physical systems, and ignoring less welcome lessons. Wilson complains in one of
his memorable lines, that ‘so often the “Science” cited is simply Philosophy in
dark glasses with a phony passport’.
Lewis’ scheme, outlined in the last section, provides a good example of the
sort of practice that Wilson objects to — Lewis appeals to physics to provide a
list of a basic set of properties, expressible in terms of natural kind predicates, on
which his scale of naturalness can be built. And this aspect is shared, at least
to some extent, by all the Emancipationists. Wilson attacks such schemes on the
grounds that they are inadequate to account for the actual practice of physics.
For physicists will happily go ahead and formulate laws that mention a far wider
variety of properties than can be derived in any reasonably restricted sense, from
any set of such basic predicates. What is more, they will consider some amongst
this wider set as amongst the most physically significant for many systems.
To make this case, we will follow Wilson in looking at general frameworks used
in physics to define properties of a wide variety of physical systems. In this chapter
we will concentrate on a fairly simple set of examples, the state spaces of classical
mechanics. (The discussion of Chapter 3 covers other examples of state-spaces
from a rather different point of view.)
The State Space Framework
A state space allows an abstract representation of all possible physical states of
a system: each represented by a single point in a multi-dimensional space. The
number of dimensions of the space is usually determined by the number of degrees
of freedom of the system in question (though it may sometimes be useful to consider
restrictions to certain lower-dimensional subspaces of the full state space, or to
embed it in a higher-dimensional state space, if the problem requires it.)
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As a simple example, let us consider a classical, Newtonian system S made up of
N component particles, each of constant mass m1,m2, ...,mN , perhaps interacting
in some way. There are 3N configurational degrees of freedom: q1,q2,q3...,qN —
where each q is the the Cartesian position 3-vector for each particle. The spatial
configuration of the whole system can thus be represented by a single point in
3N dimensional configuration space. Each of these particles also has its associated
velocity — q˙1, q˙2, q˙3..., q˙N — the derivative of each q with respect to time. In
Newtonian physics, the full physical state of a system is determined by this data,
so the full physical state can be represented by a single point in a 6N dimensional
state space (also called the velocity phase space) coordinatised by the q’s and q˙’s.
And a temporal evolution of the system can be represented by a path in the space,
linking the instantaneous states to one another.
But the very specific situation we have considered here (a particulate system
of constant masses described in 3D Cartesian coordinates) is a necessary condition
neither on the applicability of the state space approach, nor of classical Lagrangian
mechanics. One of the great advantages of the approach is that the q’s can be
generalised coordinates, rather than Cartesian position vectors above and may
represent a variety of degrees of freedom, so long as they and their associated
generalised velocities q˙, completely specify the physical state. Masses can vary,
and we can consider extended bodies.
Beyond the classical Lagrangian scheme, closely-related state space approaches
include the Hamiltonian and Hamilton-Jacobi frameworks. These differ both in
the ways in which the degrees of freedom are represented in a state space, and in
the functions which are defined and extremised to obtain the physical evolution
of the system.10 And it is not just finite-dimensional classical mechanics that can
10An introduction to classical state space techniques requires far more discussion than we
can engage with here. Classic works on the foundations and techniques of analytic mechanics
include Arnold (1989) and Lanczos (1986). Careful discussions from a philosophical standpoint
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be accommodated in the state space framework (at least not in the rather broad
sense that I wish to use the term). Field theories use infinite-dimensional state
spaces to accommodate their continuous degrees of freedom, with a Lagrangian
of the field defined on such a space. And the states of quantum systems are
represented in a space of a very different sort (a complex Hilbert space), with
other important differences, such as observables of the system being represented
by Hermitian operators, rather than real-valued functions on the state-space. I
do not wish to go into the relations between these many powerful frameworks,
but merely to point out that the overall approach of state space methods can be
generalised far beyond our simple example. For the moment, we follow Wilson
in focussing on finite-dimensional classical, Lagrangian mechanics, and focus on
making general philosophical points about the framework.
We are free to define any functions from points of this space to the reals, to
n-tuples of reals, to vectors, tensors or to anything else we desire. Each of these
functions has the potential to represent properties, or qualities of the system.11
Some, such as the function mapping each state to the n-tuple representing the
acceleration of each particle, should be amongst the intensionally significant —
they are important when we seek to characterise the system’s behaviour. At the
other end of the intensional scale, a function that maps all states to a single,
arbitrary imaginary number, seems to have little, if any link to the physics of the
system.
are provided by Butterfield (2003, 2006a).
11Wilson uses such terms quite freely, but we can be a little more careful while trying to
accommodate their usual usage. Recall the distinction of classes of properties as determinate
values of determinables as introduced in §1.2.2. Roughly, a function can be taken to correspond
to a determinable, and a particular value of that function to a determinate value of that deter-
minable. In what follows, I shall refer to the determinables as quantities; and to a particular
determinate value of them, as a property. For example, a determinable such as the velocity of
particle i corresponds to a function from the state space to the vectors: v(i) = (q˙i,x, q˙i,y, q˙i,z).
But a particular velocity — say 10m/s in the x-direction — would be a particular value of that
function. So velocity would be a quantity, and a particular value would be a property: more or
less in keeping with everyday use.
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Familiar examples suggest that we can recognise the intensionality of large-
scale systemic properties through their roles in the physics of the system. A good
example is provided by rigid bodies, where a very short list of properties: its total
mass, velocity, angular momentum and moment of inertia determine the evolution
of a system that may be made up of an extremely large number of interacting
particles. The rigidity of the system provides a constraint, which allows a very
few, very specific, quantities to determine the physical state of the entire system.
Thinking of this in state-space terms, it constrains the system to evolve within
a much lower-dimensional hyper-surface than the full state space, allowing us to
characterise its state with very few coordinates. Or if we are presented with a fluid,
its viscosity and density will be especially significant, and its incompressibility will
act as a similar constraint (though this of course allows far more freedom of the
state space, than would a full rigidity).
Wilson gives a particularly striking set of examples: the Chlandi modes, which
are patterns of vibration exhibited by metal plates when they are held by an edge
and struck. (The craftsman E. F. F. Chlandi first discovered these patterns in
the eighteenth century, by clamping plates in particular positions, and sprinkling
fine sand on them. The areas with the largest motion shook off their sand, the
stationary areas retained it, revealing the modes of vibration.) These modes are
amongst the most physically important properties that the plates possess. They
dictate the sounds that a plate will make when struck gently, and if struck harder,
the places at which it would break.
Wilson emphasises that the set of physically important properties and quan-
tities vary widely from system to system. Different shapes and constitution of
plate will give rise to different modes, and so it is a great advantage of state space
techniques that we can re-coordinatise the state space in terms of those quantities
that express these modes most simply. Expressed in their terms, the evolution
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of the system through different modes looks very simple, so they are often called
‘good coordinates’ for a particular system.
Wilson argues that any proposal for recognising intensional distinctions must
recognise good coordinates such as the Chlandi modes as amongst the physically
significant. Yet he argues that proposals such as Lewis’ will inevitably omit them.
For they base intensional distinctions on the ease by which properties can be
defined in a language that refers directly to some perfectly natural set. But for
any perfectly natural set, we can come up with systems with good coordinates
that are only definable with extreme difficulty — by infinite-length connectives for
example.
Wilson’s Criterion ∃
To demonstrate the poverty of the Emancipationist’s proposals, Wilson presents
an example of a bead sliding without friction on a wire, twisted into an irregular
shape. The position of the bead a along the wire from its starting position is
given by a triple of quantities which we could express as a function Q(t). For
example, this could be expressed fairly straightforwardly in Cartesian coordinates
Q(t) = f(x(t), y(t), z(t)). Wilson objects:
But given any finite language Lm we can choose our shape S so that
the needed f , and consequently Q, will not be definable in Lm, by [...]
cardinality considerations [...]. But in several ways, the undefined Q
will be an important quantity for our system. For example ... Q proves
a natural quantity for predicting a’s future states; a will move around
S with a constant Q-“velocity” The composite quantity P = mQ˙ is
likewise a conserved quantity ... But although Q and P represent some
of S + a’s most important physical properties, they won’t be definable
in Lm. (Wilson, 1993, 231-2)
Wilson’s more general point can be put as follows: It turns out that the specific
features of the problem can make the most ostensibly arcane functions on state
space express important quantities, even those that could not be simply defined
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from any “basic” set of properties. Accordingly physicists have placed some prop-
erties centrally in physical laws that would be judged overwhelmingly “unnatural”
from any Emancipationist standpoint.
Anything similar to Lewis’ scale of ‘naturalness’ is especially vulnerable to
such objections, since he draws distinctions based on the length of the logical
connectives needed to define them, and Q and P ’s definitions will be infinitely long.
Nevertheless, the quantities Q and P are central to the physics of the system.12
Certainly, there are responses available for Emancipationists in general, and for
Lewis in particular. We could devise a more sophisticated approach for judging
‘complexity’ than a simple counting of logical connectives in a privileged language.
And for the specific example of the bead, Lewis could reply that he means for all
spatio-temporal properties to be perfectly natural, even those difficult to define
from some original Cartesian system. However, we shall not pursue a detailed
analysis of the validity of Wilson’s criticisms, nor whether each of the Emancipa-
tionist authors would be able to make adjustments to accommodate them. Instead,
we shall look at the minimal standards that Wilson sets for property physicalism
as informed by physics; for these are of interest whether or not we believe that the
Emancipationists can satisfy them.
Wilson argues that to take account of a realistic physics, any real-valued func-
tion on the state space must be considered a physical property. Accordingly, he
suggests a minimum standard for the properties, or traits of a system, which he
calls ‘criterion ∃’. (A similar criterion is discussed in Wilson (1993)).
Criterion ∃: For any system S with Lagrangian L and any real-valued
mathematical relation13 r, there is a physical trait φ such that φ(S, t) if
12Note that the microphysicalism accepted by the New Emergentists does not fall foul of this
argument. Supervenience formulations of both physicalism and microphysicalism may include
values of Q and P as physical properties since it is permissible for a physical property to be
definable from a (finite) basis set only in terms of an infinitely long disjuction in Lm (as we saw
in §1.5.1).
13Wilson uses the terms ‘relation’ and ‘function’ quite freely (and as far as I can see, inter-
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and only if r(q(S, t), q˙(S, t), t) where the q represent Cartesian location
coordinates for the members of S and the q˙ are the corresponding
velocities. (Wilson, 1985, 232)
But Wilson goes further: each of the quantities counted by ∃ must also have
potential to be judged amongst the sparse, intensionally significant set.
For virtually any of (∃)’s postulated traits, no matter how convoluted,
one can concoct a system for which it proves a good coordinate, a fact
which helps explain (∃)’s great ontological generosity. (Wilson, 1985,
237)
Wilson is thus attracted to ∃ since it provides a suitably wide-ranging set of
physical quantities and properties, suitable to circumvent his objections to the
Emancipationists. The physical traits (= quantities for Wilson) are as various as
real-valued functions, which is to say all the mappings from points in the state
space to the real numbers. He does not even impose minimal conditions of conti-
nuity or smoothness (though he admits that in this he differs from some physicists
Wilson (1993, 75-80)).14 Wilson holds that metaphysical theories should be held
to a minimum standard: to admit the range of properties recognised by physics,
and claims that the Emancipationists’ approaches fail to meet this standard.
2.2.2 The Hempelian Dilemma
Before we go on to apply our new conceptions of physicalism to the New Emer-
gentist thesis, there is an important objection to be addressed. Nelson (1985)
charges Wilson with letting concerns from physics encroach illegitimately upon
metaphysics. Nelson claims that there are certain issues of physicalism that can
changeably) in his discussion.
14Once we move beyond classical, Lagrangian, finitistic mechanics, even Wilson’s conditions
must be relaxed. Certainly, we may wish to generalise beyond the reals to consider vectors or
tensors as physical. When we quantize a system, we replace functions by Hermitian operators,
and it is a question central to the interpretation of quantum mechanics if these operators can be
understood as representing physical properties.
81
be recognised as distinctly ‘physicist’s inssues’ and others ‘philosophers’ issues’,
and that there is no reason to think that approaches to one set should have any
bearing on approaches to the other. He explicitly includes amongst the latter the
question of which are the fundamental properties of the world, as well as how
to re-identify properties over time (Nelson, 1985, 279). According to Nelson, the
state-space approach is only of help in addressing questions of ‘physicists’ physi-
calism’, such as how to express their equations of motion in tractable form, and
Wilson is mistaken to think that they should form any kind of standard for answers
to the philosophical questions.
Ross (1999) replies to Nelson on Wilson’s behalf, arguing that Nelson’s attack
is question-begging. The issues he identifies with the ‘philosophers’ physicalism’
are just those that can be addressed by a logical analysis of a basic set of predicates
in a privileged language. Yet whether this Emancipationist approach is valid, is
precisely the question at issue. Ross argues that Nelson has not realised the signif-
icance of Wilson’s proposals. According to her, Wilson’s project is to restructure
the whole issue of physicalism, rejecting traditional metaphysical approaches to
defining physical properties, and replacing them with methods faithful to physical
practice.
I believe that Ross is largely correct in her criticism of Nelson — his criteria for
judging an issue a ‘philosophical’ one simply precludes any approach other than
the Emancipationist one. But in defending Wilson, she overstates the scope of
his project. Wilson himself does not claim that his criterion ∃ is meant to be a
general criterion for property physicalism. Rather, his attitude is better expressed
as the claim that ∃ expresses the range of a general framework now used to discuss
physical laws. He does not claim that the framework is maximally general, even
for present physics, much less than it will continue to be in the future. And he does
not claim approaches from outside physics cannot accommodate the set delimited
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by ∃. His criticism is that the present Emancipationist approaches cannot even
meet the present standards.
Indeed, if we follow Ross’ example, ignore Wilson’s own caution, and put for-
ward ∃ itself as a naturalistic criterion for physicalism, and the ‘good coordinates’
as naturalistic criteria for an intensional distinction, we run straight into a ver-
sion of the ‘Hempelian Dilemma’ that we mentioned in §1.3.1. There we saw that
any naturalistic approach of physicalism faces the choice between restricting any
future physics, and making a trivial definition of physical properties. And this
applys equally to any intensional distinction: either we restrict how future physics
judges such a distinction, or our criterion is trivial.
Yet this “Ross-Wilson approach” navigates the Hempelian Dilemma with re-
markable success.15 It is true that most physical theories were not originally for-
mulated in a state-space approach, but I do not know of a modern successful theory
that cannot be expressed in its terms or in the terms of some close relative. The
principles on which it is based: The Principle of Least Action and its variants,
appear remarkably general elements of physical law.16 Yet it is also difficult to
see how non-physicalist theories can be placed in such a framework — for exam-
ple, it is very hard to see how primitive mental properties can be governed by a
least-action principle.
Despite this unexpected success, it is perhaps wiser to take Wilson’s modest
path. We require that any definition of physicalism, and any intensional distinc-
15Ross (1999, 100) suggests that the particular state space approach is not essential to Wilson’s
proposals, but any future physics could be expected to yield a modified version of ∃. I am not
sure that Wilson would agree — it seems to trap the approach on the “trivial” horn of the
Hempelian dilemma.
16Claims are sometimes made that the roots of classical physics in quantum mechanics explains
why the least action principle holds so widely across physics. Taylor (2001, 179-182) is typical
in holding up Feynman’s ‘sum-over-histories’ approach as showing how the quantum mechanical
paths that extremise action will be the classical ones. As far as I can see, such explanations
make no suggestion of why similar principles hold in QM itself, nor in areas well away from these
considerations, such as general relativity.
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tions must accommodate the quantities picked out by good co-ordinates, for we
know that they are important in today’s physics. It also appears inevitable that
state-space approaches will continue to be useful in future physics, but to rely on
it seems a risk without reward. If we take a modest approach we can impose a
necessary condition that good coordinates must be recognised in any set of priv-
ileged natural properties. We can safely leave aside the questions over whether
they could also constitute a sufficient criterion.
2.2.3 The Elusive “Good Coordinates”
To give an intuitive idea of how state space methods can help discover good coor-
dinates, Wilson considers the path traced out in state space by the evolution of a
system over a certain period of time. Suppose that we write this path in terms of
Cartesian coordinates: q(x, y, z) and q˙(x, y, z) which track the position and veloc-
ity of each of the particles. If we were given a list of how these (microphysical1)
quantities change with time, their significance would be opaque, and in general
the evolution would not look at all regular.
But now introduce a quantity u, supplying the path the system is on,
and a quantity v marking the system’s current place around that path,
measured as an angle. That is, the trajectory travels on a level sur-
face for u. Viewed from u and v’s perspective, the motion looks very
regular. (Wilson, 1993, 77)
In this example, u is called a constant of motion of the system, since its value
does not change as the system evolves through time. Wilson emphasises that if
there exists a quantity which “slices” the state space into such level surfaces, along
which a system evolves (a foliation of the state space) we may be able to specify a
system’s state in terms of a smaller set of parameters. One subset specifies which
amongst a certain class of ‘orbits’ the system follows, another subset serves to
specify its place along that orbit.
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This leads to several obvious questions: given a physical system, are there al-
ways good coordinates? And if there are, how are they to be discovered? These
questions turn out to have no straightforward answers. One approach to the first is
summed up in the local existence and uniqueness theorem for systems of ordinary
differential equations17 which, under a wide range of conditions, guarantee the ex-
istence of a local set of good coordinates on state space; i.e., a neighbourhood in
which the solution to the equations of motion (expressed as differential equations)
will be trivial. But this startling result has two important caveats: first, such a
coordinatisation cannot always be extended outside the local state space neigh-
bourhood; second, any guarantee that a coordinatisation exists is no guarantee
that it can be easily discovered.18
Certain methods do exist for uncovering these coordinatisations. One is to
exploit any constraints on a system, such as the rigidity of a body, or incompress-
ibility of a fluid, as mentioned above. It is often possible to incorporate these
constraints into a judicious selection of good coordinates which can lead to a great
simplification of the problem with a significant reduction of the number of degrees
of freedom.
Another approach which may be applied more generally, is to discover symme-
tries of the dynamics of a system. By exploiting certain dynamical symmetries we
can discover associated good coordinates by a variety of methods. Amongst the
most powerful results is Noether’s theorem: which relates a variational symmetry
of the Lagrangian L to a conserved quantity in the motion of the system. This
theorem becomes even more powerful when translated into the Hamiltonian ap-
proach, where the conserved quantity gives an immediate reduction in the number
of linked equations that need to be solved. Also within the Hamiltonian approach,
17For a detailed treatment of this theorem see e.g., Olver (2000, Prop. 1.29).
18There will also exist local constants of the motion, though sadly, for most problems they
will only exist locally. Butterfield (2006a) discusses the limited sense in which this theorem
guarantees a ‘solution’ to all problems in classical mechanics.
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the powerful modern techniques of symplectic reduction can be used to generalise
the techniques associated with Noether’s theorem even further.19
We now find an unexpected consequence of adopting a physicalism sufficiently
broad to accommodate the properties recognised by physical science. With the
enormous range of physical properties provided by ∃, we will have no problem
in algorthimically discovering many physical properties of a large system, indeed
we are overwhelmed with them. But somewhere amongst this multitude lurk the
good coordinates which represent the few, simple characteristics that dictate the
important features of the system’s behaviour. But the good coordinates are not
at all linked to the simplicity with which they are definable from microphysical
properties. In particular, there is no general algorithm to discover them from the
good coordinates of smaller parts.
2.3 New Emergentism and British Emergentism
In the last chapter, we concluded that the contrast between the properties of
parts and of wholes that concerned the New Emergentists, was identical — or
at least very close — to the contrast which concerned Broad and the British
Emergentists. But we were puzzled as to where the novelty could come from for
the New Emergentists, since Broad’s proposal of specific laws of composition had
been, in effect, empirically refuted.
In adopting an intensional distinction, we have come to demand more than
Broad. He was concerned with being able to derive the set of physical properties of
a composite system from the physical properties of its parts. We further demand
that we be able to distinguish natural properties from amongst the vast set of
19Sussman and Wisdom (2001, 208-220) gives a full discussion of the advantages of the Hamil-
tonian and Lagrangian approaches in exploiting conserved quantities. A detailed discussion of
these techniques from a philosophical point of view, without any sacrifice of rigour, is given in
(Butterfield, 2006b).
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physical properties of a composite system. And we have just seen that it is not
easy at all to discover these from the properties of their parts.
Except in the very simplest cases, there are no general algorithms into which
we can feed the “good coordinates” for systems made up of parts in isolation, and
obtain the good coordinates for the whole system. In this sense, a clear analogue
of Broadian emergence could be said to be endemic in physics. Uncovering the
good coordinates is a task specific to each system (or small classes of systems)
requiring creativity, insight — or, putting it in tendentious terms —‘research as
fundamental as any other.’
With these elements in place, we can see our way to a surprisingly straightfor-
ward interpretation of the New Emergentist claims, which I shall present in this
section and the next. First, in §2.3.1 I shall argue that both Broad and Anderson
follow a strategy of first exhibiting evidence for emergence: the novel and unex-
pected character of certain systemic properties, and only then presenting a physical
process — a “mechanism” — that explains how such novelty can arise. Then, in
§2.3.2 I shall bring out the ways in which methodological differences might provide
evidence for a metaphysical distinction behind them, in the writings of both Broad
and the New Emergentists. In §2.3.3 I shall bring out and answer a serious objec-
tion to the interpretation, before moving to look at the metaphysical mechanism
that the New Emergentists suggest, in §2.4.
2.3.1 Emergence: Evidence vs. Mechanisms
Let us return to the New Emergentist claim of ‘anti-constructivism’ which we first
met in §1.7. This is the claim that although we know the microphysical laws
that govern the interactions of the parts, it is impossible in practice to use these
to derive the significant properties of large systems. Nonetheless, they continue,
fields such as condensed matter physics have discovered laws which govern the
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properties of these larger systems, though these laws are often qualitatively very
different than those that govern the interactions of the parts.
This situation can be compared directly with the earlier distinction we made
between Broad’s evidence for emergence, and the mechanism for it (§1.5.2). In
chemical phenomena, Broad recognised a qualitative difference between the dy-
namical laws that successfully describe the properties of composite systems, and
the dynamical laws that successfully describe the properties of their components.
He also noted that it seemed impossible to derive the systemic properties from the
components: his observations could be said to be the anti-constructivism of his
time.
But if this analogy is a faithful one, then the modern observation of anti-
constructivism is only evidence for the existence of emergence,20 but it cannot
constitute it. This is in opposition to the orthodox line discussed in §1.4: that
it is the practical difficulty of derivation that constitutes and defines emergent
properties.
Broad’s own next move was to put forward a bold metaphysical hypothesis to
explain his methodological evidence: specific laws of composition. But here the
New Emergentists part company with Broad. One of the central themes of More
is Different and its follow-up articles is to show how an appeal to modern physical
theory can make such speculative moves redundant. The qualitative differences
between the laws governing the systemic properties and the microphysical laws are
shown to be explicable by a well-understood physical process, without any appeal
to Broad-style configurational laws.
Recognising this distinction between evidence for emergence and a constitutive
mechanism, is central to the reading of New Emergentism that I shall present.
20There is a separate class of evidence as well as anti-constructivism: the apparent irrelevance
of many microphysical details to certain large-scale physical properties. Laughlin and Pines con-
centrate more on this class, and call such properties protected. Their claims, and the arguments
that they build upon them, I shall consider in Chapter 5.
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Unfortunately, the distinction is not made explicit in Anderson’s original paper,
nor is it emphasised particularly strongly in later writings. Accordingly, there exist
several alternative readings of the New Emergentist claims, which I shall postpone
to a later section (§2.5).
2.3.2 Parallels — Useful and Misleading
I feel that the parallels between British and New Emergentist approaches extend
beyond the evidence/mechanism distinction I have just drawn. Indeed, the char-
acterisation of the main claims of the New Emergentists, back in §1.2.3, could
equally be a characterisation of those of the British Emergentists.
Both the British and the New Emergentists start from the observation that the
natural sciences appear to be split into distinct “layers” or “levels” of description,
roughly corresponding to the domains of the particular special sciences. These are
purely methodological observations: the systemic properties of larger, more com-
plex systems are studied using very different techniques from those that are used to
study the smaller ones. And in general, the systemic properties of larger systems
appear qualitatively different from those of smaller ones. Further, the science at
each level appears to involve a great deal of research which is largely uninformed
by the research going on at any other level — in particular, it is uninformed by the
study of the properties of smaller systems. For Broad, the principal example of a
distinct higher level was chemistry; for Anderson it is condensed matter physics.
This methodological separation is contrasted with their shared belief that all
of the entities studied in any of the levels are all composed from microphysical
parts, and interact according to general laws, which completely determine all their
systemic properties. Both the British and New Emergentists want to discover how
this striking separation comes about. How do the systemic properties of larger
systems appear so different from the properties of the smaller ones, when they are
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composed from them, and obey the same laws?
In the separation of chemistry and physics, Broad was presented with such a
methodological division, and was led to postulate a metaphysical mechanism which
explained it: his specific laws of composition. The laws also formed the barrier for
mechanically deriving the properties of wholes from the properties of the parts.
The New Emergentists do not think there is such a barrier to Broad’s procedure:
all of the properties of the systems which we considered in §2.4 could have been
derived from the properties of the parts that made it up, so long as we had the
resources of Broad’s Mathematical Archangel. But they do think that there is
a barrier to something else: to mechanically derive the intensionally significant
properties of large systems, from those of their parts.
Following Wilson’s suggestions, we have assumed that this set must include
those represented by the ‘good coordinates’ of the state space of each system in
question. So, the suggestion is now obvious: if the set of good coordinates can
be specific to a system (or a class of systems) this has the potential to explain
the qualitative difference in the most important properties and laws used in par-
ticle physics, and those used in condensed matter physics. Accordingly, the New
Emergentists must follow Broad in proposing a mechanism, by which the good
coordinates of large systems in certain configurations could be radically different
to those of their component parts. This mechanism would then possess both meta-
physical and physical significance, but there is no suggestion either that it need
contravene microphysical supervenience, nor need it be as speculative as Broad’s
specific laws of composition. But if this interpretation is correct, the mechanism
must be one that switches the good coordinates of large systems away from those
of other systems made up from the very same constituent parts.
Though I have been pushing these parallels hard, at this point they abruptly
come apart: British Emergence seems not to be realised empirically, and the New
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Emergentists claim that their mechanism does not share this drawback. But before
looking in detail at the mechanism that the New Emergentists propose (in §2.4) we
should address a very direct objection. The microphysicalist can plausibly claim
that whatever mechanism the New Emergentists present, so long as they grant
microphysicalism and deny specific laws of composition, there will be a general
method of deriving the good coordinates of a large system from those of their
components.
2.3.3 General Laws After All?
The New Emergentists grant that is possible to use the general laws of composition
to construct all the physical systemic properties. But then, given this (enormous)
set, and contrary to what I have suggested, Reductionist opponents can point to
a totally general procedure for discovering the good coordinates. The general laws
of composition allow them (or at least Broad’s Archangel) to trace the physical
evolution of the system through state space, even if it is coordinatised with the
very complex “microphysical” coordinates. But then they can simply define a
set of good coordinates from this coordinatisation. Wilson gives an explanation
of how this might be done very simply (which, strictly, ignores various issues of
continuity and smoothness). If we take the path representing the actual evolution
of the system in state space, and define a vector u as the tangent to this path at
every point, this will let us define a set of good coordinates, a further parameter
giving the position along the path, constructed in a similar way to Wilson’s ‘action-
angle’ coordinates of §2.2.3. True, the definitions may be extremely complicated
(indeed they may be infinitely long), but it is still a general algorithm to obtain
good coordinates. So if we put this together with the procedure for obtaining
all the systemic properties, we have a direct analogue of Broad’s general laws of
compositon: a procedure which starts from the properties of the parts of a system
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and produces the good coordinates of any system composed from them, using only
laws that apply generally.
There are two clear answers we could make to such a challenge. The first is that
by defining them in such a way, we risk trivialising the notion of good coordinates
and of associated constants of motion. Nontrivial definitions of the constants of
motion of a system should include certain restrictions (e.g., of differentiability)
since the trajectory of any n-dimensional system will have co-dimension one and
thus there will always exist n−1 “trivialised” constants of motion. I am somewhat
suspicious of this argument, since although there is no guarantee that the constants
of motion and good coordinates discovered by this method will be differentiable,
they may well be. That is, if there are suitable constants of motion, according to
whatever criteria we choose to avoid triviality, there is nothing to stop us discov-
ering them by this method. (Of course, trivial ones may be discovered as well, but
we can discard them.)
Fortunately, we need not head off our reductionist at that point. We can admit
the objection, for it says nothing against the central New Emergentist case. For
she has shown, first that she is able to define the good coordinates in terms of
microphysical properties; and second, that she has a very complex, but general
procedure for doing so. Broad himself may have been disappointed by this second
point, but the New Emergentists can accept it. There is still no practical general
method, and there is a metaphysically important mechanism behind this practical
impossibility — a switch from one set of good coordinates to a completely different
set. This is not the sense of novelty in the specific sense of underivability that we
were surveyed earlier §1.4, but it remains a metaphysically important distinction
of novelty.
It is here that a spurious parallel between New Emergentism and British Emer-
gence might have led us astray. For Broad believed that the practical failure of
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deriving chemical properties from the general laws of composition and atomic
physics, was evidence for a mechanism that played two roles. First, it explained
how the failure came about, though the science of chemistry was still possible.
Simply, chemistry takes into account the effects of specific laws of composition,
while atomic physics does not. Second, the same mechanism also showed that the
practical failure would also be a failure in principle. The New Emergentists think
that their corresponding practical failure shows up a mechanism that plays only
the first of Broad’s roles. It explains why there is a practical barrier to derivation,
yet condensed matter physics is still practically possible, since we can take advan-
tage of the simplifications provided by the new set of good coordinates. It does not
show that our failure of microphysical practice is also a failure in principle, but
we do not need this to establish that the mechanism in question is both physically
and metaphysically significant.
2.4 A Mechanism — Symmetry-Breaking
The New Emergentists stress that there is no single mechanism lying behind all in-
stances of anti-constructivism nor behind all emergent properties and laws. Those
mentioned by Laughlin, Pines and Anderson include: (1) Renormalisation, espe-
cially in association with the properties of ‘soft modes’ that occur near quantum
and classical phase transitions; (2) both fractional and integer Quantum Hall Ef-
fects ; and (3) Anderson’s own principle of Localisation which appears in certain
types of superconductivity and superfluidity. (The mechanism lying behind high-
temperature superconductivity, they admit, remains elusive.) However, there is
one class of mechanisms which they judge to be particularly basic, important, and
which may provide the basis for a widely generalisable framework — symmetry-
breaking.
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In the introduction to the collection of his most important papers, Anderson
identifies symmetry-breaking as ‘the clearest instance of the process of emergence
which lies behind More is different ’ (Anderson, 2005, vii) a judgment which already
appears in that paper itself:
In my own field of many-body physics, we are, perhaps, closer to our
fundamental, intensive underpinnings than any other science in which
non-trivial complexities occur, and as a result we have begun to formu-
late a general theory of just how this shift from quantitative to qualita-
tive differentiation takes place. This formulation, called the theory of
“broken symmetry”, may be of help in making more generally clear the
breakdown of the constructivist converse of reductionism. (Anderson,
1972, 393)
So, to understand the claims of the New Emergentists, it seems worth examining
the theories associated with symmetry-breaking. In §2.4.1, we will narrow our fo-
cus to a particular kind of symmetry-breaking, in which it is the size and stability
of the system that is responsible for the breakdown of the symmetries. This gives
a clear connection to the mechanism that the New Emergentists are searching for,
which is responsible for a “switch” in good coordinates when the system takes on
certain configurations. Then in §2.4.2, we move to consider some concepts associ-
ated with symmetry-breaking states, using the example of a classical ferromagnet
passing through its Curie point.
2.4.1 Varieties of Symmetry-Breaking
A word of caution before we engage with more general examples of broken symme-
try. The New Emergentists are looking for a distinction between the intensionally
significant properties of individual parts and those of the whole. From our discus-
sion of §2.2, we might suggest that this will happen when the good coordinates of
larger systems are very different from those of their parts. And we saw in §2.2.3 the
strong links between symmetries of the dynamics and the good coordinates. Thus,
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changes in these symmetries sound as they could bring about such a distinction.
But to find a suitable mechanism for emergence, we must pay careful attention
both to the particular symmetries that are at issue, and how they are broken. We
need the symmetries broken to be those that determine the good coordinates of
each system, and we need them to be broken by some aspect of the size or arrange-
ment of the system in question. But these are not the only distinctions covered
by the textbook definitions of ‘symmetry-breaking’. Rather, these definitions refer
to a situation in which there exist states of a system with lower symmetry than
the dynamical laws whose solutions they are. And these are indeed the situations
that are discussed in both the most elementary examples, such as a bead spinning
on a vertical loop of wire (Greenberger, 1978); as well as the most advanced, such
as vacuum states in quantum field theories. But this distinction between laws
and their solutions is not directly related to the emergentist distinction between
large and small systems: Anderson called his 1972 paper ‘More is different’, not
‘Solutions are different’.
We can move to the variety of symmetry-breaking relevant to emergence, in two
stages. First, we narrow down our concerns to spontaneous symmetry-breaking,
which Anderson defines as follows:
Spontaneously broken symmetry. Definition: Although the equations
describing the state of a natural system are symmetric, the state it-
self is not, because the symmetric state can become unstable towards
the formation of special relationships among the atoms, molecules, or
electrons it consists of. (Anderson, 1984, 265)
This is meant to contrast with explicitly broken symmetry, where some symmetry-
breaking term is inserted into the equations describing the state (for example,
by introducing an external field term with a particular spatial direction).21 So
21The application of terminology varies in different areas. Particle theorists recognise further
distinctions such as dynamical symmetry breaking. A discussion is given in Castellani (2005).
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Anderson is concerned with a variety of symmetry-breaking where it is the stability
of the state of the system that leads to the breaking of symmetry.
This situation, where the energetic stability of the states leads to symmetry-
breaking, is particularly associated with large systems at low energies. Perhaps
the most familiar example are the regular periodic crystals. For a wide variety of
forms of interaction amongst a large set of atoms or molecules, the most energet-
ically favourable arrangement is some regular lattice-like configuration. And so,
at the relatively low temperatures of our everyday experience, regular, rigid, lat-
tice configurations are extremely familiar. These low-energy states are symmetry-
breaking, in that they are not symmetric under continuous translations or rota-
tions, though the Hamiltonian of the interaction between the parts do have such
symmetries. At higher temperatures, the stable states (liquids, gases) tend to take
on the full symmetry of the Hamiltonian, with no regular spatial arrangements.
This exemplifies a general rule that large and cold systems, with low-energy states
tend to break symmetries, though small and hot systems, with high-energy states
do not.
Another familiar example is the phenomenon of ferromagnetism, a simple clas-
sical model of which we shall look at in the next section. Here, the symmetry
broken is one of spatial orientation. At low temperatures, there are stable states
with spins all aligned along a particular direction, but above the Curie temperature
the states are unmagnetised, sharing the symmetry of the Lagrangian.
But we still need a second step to complete a link between this sort of symmetry-
breaking and emergence: we need to relate the symmetries of the states with the
symmetries that govern the properties of large systems. Here we must distinguish
between low and high-energy processes, for the former are governed by the broken
symmetries, the latter by the unbroken symmetries of the original Hamiltonian.
The properties of large and cold systems are dominated by low-energy dynam-
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ics, which are by definition small deviations from their ground, or stable state
(i.e., a state that may be symmetry-breaking). The good coordinates for these
low-energy dynamical properties are not determined from the symmetries of the
original Hamiltonian, if these have been broken. So we obtain exactly the contrast
we need for symmetry-breaking to be a mechanism for emergence — in our sense
of producing novel good coordinates for the system. Small systems have dynamics
determined by the original set of symmetries of the interaction Hamiltonian, larger
systems have a very different set specific to their state, which may not be shared
by others made up from the same components.
Summing up, the symmetries of a large system are often not the same as the
symmetries of the interaction Hamiltonian. And for the lower-energy processes
that dominate the properties of these systems, the good coordinates will be deter-
mined by the broken symmetries, which can be utterly different to those exhibited
by some different arrangement of the same microphysical components. Thus the
most significant properties of a large system can be qualitatively different from
those of a different system made up from the same parts — exactly what we are
looking for, to understand the New Emergentist claims.
There is plenty of textual support from the New Emergentists for this being
an appropriate way to understand the importance of symmetry-breaking:
The Hamiltonian describing the internal interactions in our macro-
scopic system still obeys the initial symmetry group, whatever it may
have been; the state of the matter involved does not, in some sense, at
low enough temperatures; do any consequences flow from that? The
answer is that some of the most important and interesting properties
of matter flow from precisely this fact. (Anderson, 1984, 30)
And though Wilson does not identify himself as one of the New Emergentists, he
sometimes speaks in very similar terms. Here he is outlining the surprising ways
“good coordinates” may be found anywhere amongst the physical properties of a
large system. This passage is important to what follows and is worth quoting in
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full:
The fact that “good coordinates” may potentially lurk anywhere within
the bounds [allowed by criterion ∃] may be understood as follows: as
one forms a system out of a collection of component molecules, their
interactions may lead various sorts of “ordering” to lock in among
them. Analogy: if one assembles complex shapes by hinging together
triangles along their edges, certain configurations (e.g., Buckminster
Fuller’s famous “geodesic domes”) will “lock in” a rigidity absent in
most of the otherwise floppy complexes that one builds. Similarly,
the intermolecular ties within Chlandi’s plates manage to “freeze in”
patterns of cooperation extending across all the molecules of the plate.
This cooperation allows us to meaningfully ask how much energy is
stored in each mode, giving rise to a set of good coordinates for the
system. The “locking in” of a good coordinate can be so startling that
physicists are sometimes tempted to speak of “the emergence of traits”.
Wilson (1993, 79)
Not only are physicists tempted; but I believe that they do so, at least in the
case of the New Emergentists. Wilson’s “locking in” of good coordinates can take
place under many circumstances, but one of the most striking is when symmetry
breaking states of matter are formed. The metallic crystalline solid which make
up Chlandi’s plates is just one example of such a state.
Anderson separates the most striking ‘novel’ properties of symmetry-breaking
states into four classes: the discreteness of phase transitions and physical phases,
the development of collective excitations (of which Chlandi’s modes are an exam-
ple), his own ‘generalised rigidity’, and the structure of defects in large systems
(Anderson, 1984, 18-19). He goes on to examine each in some detail, but in this
chapter we shall look only at the development of collective excitations, with a brief
discussion in the next section. The discreteness of phase transitions is a tricky sub-
ject that forms part of the topic of Chapter 4, and we will say little further about
the ‘static’ properties, such as the defect structure of solids. But it is important
to realize that there are theoretical treatments available from physics for a wide
range of both dynamic and static systemic properties, and in each case we can
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trace their ‘novel’ nature back to the symmetry-breaking of the state concerned.
2.4.2 Order Parameters, Collective Excitations and Good
Coordinates
Unfortunately, Anderson’s 1972 claim that condensed matter physics was ap-
proaching a general theoretical understanding of the mechanism behind emergent
properties, was rather premature. In particular, Anderson’s own choice of exam-
ples in More is Different turned out to be slightly unfortunate. They concerned
molecules, such as ammonia, which we observe in stable dipole-possessing states
(Anderson (1972, 394-5), see also (1984, 27-30). As Joos (1996, 89-96) makes clear,
the issue of why we observe dipole-possessing states of large molecules, rather than
their non-symmetry-breaking superpositions is rather more complicated than An-
derson suggests. Environmentally induced decoherence may be relevant, and this
involves an appeal to an external system which distracts from the main points that
Anderson wanted to illustrate.
It seems fair to say that the general framework which Anderson anticipated in
the quotes above, does not yet exist, despite theoretical progress on many phenom-
ena associated with symmetry breaking. That said, some steps have been made
in such a direction, and here we can mention a few examples. First, in his own
discussions Anderson focusses on extending Landau’s concept of an order parame-
ter characterising a phase of condensed matter system. Second, one of his original
contributions is an associated concept of generalised rigidity, which aids general
discussion of elementary excitations in condensed matter systems.22 We could also
mention the very different approach of the algebraic framework for quantum sta-
tistical mechanics, in which clear distinctions can be made between global, local
22For more details on his suggestions, see especially Anderson (1981, 1984, 1989).
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and quasi-local observables, each relevant to different levels of description.23
Anderson’s own discussions give some impression that symmetry-breaking can
be discussed within a single theoretical framework. However, he moves very quickly
between cases of quantum and classical symmetry-breaking, which are handled in
rather different ways; indeed most of his case studies, as well as his suggestions for
general frameworks are specific to the quantum context.
I feel it may not be helpful to complicate general points about emergent prop-
erties, with the inevitable questions that arise when we ask how to understand
any properties of a quantum system. Therefore, I shall not follow Anderson’s
own case studies, nor his discussions of more general frameworks for symmetry-
breaking since, despite their promise, they raise controversy that does not affect
the philosophical points we will need. I shall rest satisfied with a brief discussion
of a classical case. This should serve to give a qualitative idea of how a large
(classical) system may acquire good coordinates which would not be suspected
from examination of the interactions of its parts.24 And I hope that it will provide
a clear example of the mechanism for emergence which Anderson has in mind,
without bringing in too many extraneous complications.
Order Parameters and Order Parameter Fields
One of the simplest models of a ferromagnet is known as the classical Heisenberg
model. Let us consider the two dimensional version: an infinite lattice of sites, on
23Algebraic QSM is perhaps not what Anderson had in mind when he suggested an emerg-
ing general approach, since it developed independently of his ideas. However, it is of much
interpretative interest of its own, and we shall discuss some issues in §4.5.
24It could be argued that in taking this path, we will miss the trees while in search of the wood.
It is characteristic of the New Emergentists that they concentrate on technical examples such as
many-body quantum systems, which require second-quantization to make precise such concepts
as quasi-particles or localization. In ignoring the specifics of these examples, it may well be that
we miss important lessons. Certainly, we shall miss much of interest. However, given that they
repeatedly stress that their general metaphysical points extend beyond their specific examples
to properties in classical physics, chemistry, and biology, I think our course is a reasonable one.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: Heisenberg spins in a disordered phase (a) and ordered phase (b). In
the disordered phase (a) the mean magnetisation is zero, in the ordered phase
(b) it is a non-zero-vector pointing upwards, and as such is not invariant under
a rotational transformation. There are are continuum of distinct ordered phases
with the mean magnetisation pointing in each of the directions in the x− y plane.
each of which is defined a “spin” vector si, of unit length, but free to point in any
direction in the x − y plane. Without an external magnetic field, the interaction
energy of the model can be written:
V = −J
∑
<ij>
si.sj (2.1)
where the sum is taken over nearest-neighbour pairs of sites. J is a parameter
expressing the strength of interaction, positive values giving an energetic advantage
to aligned spins. Note that this potential is symmetric under an overall rotation.
Also, since we are neglecting the mass of any bearers of spins, the potential term
is the only one in the Lagrangian and in the Hamiltonian of the system.
The Hamiltonian is thus invariant under rotations in the x − y plane, the
orthogonal group O2. And in the higher-energy phase, the disordered states have
spins pointing in all directions, as illustrated in Figure 2.1 (a), so they share the
rotational symmetry of the Hamiltonian. This is the general case for condensed
matter systems. But the lower energy, ordered states, as illustrated in 2.1 (b) are
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not invariant under rotations.25
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Figure 2.2: The free energy plotted against the x and y components of the mean
magnetisation m. The ‘rut’ of lowest energy is that of the stable degenerate ground
states, which display broken symmetry.
To illustrate the low-energy ordered states, Figure 2.2 shows the free energy of
the system, a form often referred to as a ‘wine bottle’ or ‘mexican hat’ potential
for obvious reasons. The minima of the free energy, which characterise the stable
states, describe a circle, the radius of which gives the magnitude of the mean
magnetisation of such states. The mean magnetisation m = −J∑i si is the order
parameter for a low-temperature state of the Heisenberg model. Two useful ways
of expressing it are as a 2-dimensional vector with a magnitude and direction:
m = m(cos θ, sin θ); and as a complex number, with a magnitude and phase:
meiθ. Its suitability as an order parameter is suggested by the fact that it is not
25N.B.: A difference in symmetry is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for phase
difference. For example, liquids and gases are different phases, but share symmetries. The order
parameter concept can be extended to these cases too, where it is connected to the density
of the matter. However, we shall not discuss examples of phase transitions in the absence of
symmetry-breaking.
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invariant under the symmetries of the full Hamiltonian, its value distinguishes the
different ordered phases, and its magnitude quantifies the degree of ordering of
each state.26
Another way of looking at broken symmetry is as the operation that maps one
ordered state to another one in a different ordered phase but with the same free
energy. That is, the rotations of the order parameter represent transformations
between different equilibrium phases. In the two-dimensional ferromagnetic case,
the symmetry broken is the O(2) rotation group of the spins, isomorphic to the
U(1) group of transformations of the phase of a complex number. We can also
introduce the space in which the order parameter can be represented: the order
parameter space, which in the case of the 2D ferromagnet is the unit circle S1. For
3D ferromagnets, the space is the surface of a unit sphere: S2.
A few other examples may be useful to illustrate these ideas. Nematic liquid
crystals are made up from long crystals which can align along particular axes.
The symmetry broken is again a rotational one, but because parallel and anti-
parallel alignment give the same energy expression, we identify antipodal points in
order parameter space. This yields a space of a hemisphere rather than a sphere
(RP 2). The order parameter concept also extends to quantum systems, where the
symmetries broken can be local, as well as global (i.e., the Hamiltonian is invariant
under local applications of the operation in question). The most notable example
is the local gauge symmetry of the superconductor.
This simple view of an order parameter as spatially constant over the system
is already useful to characterise some of the large-scale static properties of the
system, such as its heat capacity, electrical conductivity, and many of the defects
that may form in it. But we are more concerned with dynamics, for which it
26For some suggested requirements for quantities to qualify as order parameters, see Anderson
(1981) and Chaikin and Lubensky (1995, §3.6). In general, the complete description of ordered
states require a full description of how the order parameter transforms under the action of the
symmetry group of the original Hamiltonian.
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is helpful to extend the order parameter concept, and allow m to vary spatially,
giving us an order parameter field. So the order parameter field is a mapping from
each point of physical space of the material, to its order parameter space. So for
magnets, the order parameter field is given by the local magnetisation at each
point: m(x); for nematic crystals it is given by the local alignment to the axes.
The order parameters of crystals are slightly harder to think about. As a
state crystallises from the higher temperature liquid or gaseous states, it breaks
a translational symmetry. As an example, take the lowest-energy states to be a
regular square lattice arrangement. Now consider any more complicated state of
a crystal as a possible deformation from this lattice to the actual one. We can
then define an order parameter “vector” field, with u(x), defined at each point in
the crystal, as the displacement from their equilibrium position. Of course, this
u(x) is not a true vector, since once the real atoms move a distance comparable
to the lattice spacing from their ideal placings, there is an ambiguity as to which
ideal atom they should be associated with. When we choose a different reference
atom, u(x) changes by a multiple of the lattice spacing a. Therefore, the order
parameter space is a square with periodic boundary conditions, T2, most easily
thought of as the surface of a torus.
Collective Excitations
Let us consider the physical properties of a large system after a perturbation, say
the physical properties of a two-dimensional crystal after it has been struck. Often,
the most fruitful method is often to consider the stable states, discover the lowest
energy variations from that state and analyse the effects of any perturbation in
terms of a decomposition into these elementary excitations.
Stable states tend to be those with a uniform order-parameter field,27 and
27The interesting cases of frustrated equilibrium, such as those found in the spin glasses are
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elementary excitations can be characterised as variations in this field. We can see
why they are so important for the dynamical properties of a symmetry-breaking
state if we consider the energy cost associated with changing the order parameter
field. Return to the Heisenberg magnet and consider a local variation of spins,
i.e., a local change in m(x). Because of the underlying rotational symmetry of the
interaction, the energy of such a variation can depend only on spatial derivatives
of the order parameter field. That is, while a rotation of all the spins by the
same amount would cost no energy, a local variation may. In ferromagnets local
variations of this sort are called ‘spin waves’: excitations due to local changes
in spin direction. Thus as we consider a less and less local variation, (i.e., as the
wavelength of the spin-wave goes to infinity) the energy cost must go to zero. Thus
the elementary excitations, costing the least energy, have very long wavelengths,
and there will be a spectrum of higher-energy excitations with shorter wavelengths.
Similarly, long-variations of the order parameter of the nematic crystal are known
as ‘rotational waves’, and the square lattice system has sound waves (or phonons)
which are local spatial variations from the equilibrium positions. Each of these
are transmitted through the system with a dynamics which is highly dependent
on the nature of the order parameter of the state.
One can gain insight into the physics by considering again the free energy of
the system. It is easy to see that a spatially uniform change in the order parameter
does not lead to an energy change (it is clear from Figure 2.2, for example). But
it is also clear that spatially non-uniform changes will result in an energy change,
since neighbouring spins must take up configurations other than fully aligned.
Let us assume that the free energy of the system with an elementary excitation:
Fel = F [m(x)]− F [m(x = const)], is analytic in ∇m. We require that a uniform
state is minimal with respect to all possible variations in the order parameter, so
ignored here.
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there are no linear terms in the expansion of Fel around this uniform state in terms
of ∇m. The simplest form which is consistent with such requirements is:
Fel =
1
2
∫
d2ρs[∇m(x)]2 (2.2)
where ρs is called the spin-wave stiffness, and is an instance of what Anderson
calls generalised rigidity. This value is dependent on the strength of the interac-
tion, the dimensionality of the lattice, and our chosen temperature. In our model
ρs = m
2Jz/8 at T = 0, where z is the co-ordination number ; the number of oth-
ers that each spin interacts with, so z = 4 for a square-lattice two-dimensional
Heisenberg model. Observe that the energy cost vanishes with the magnitude of
this gradient. This feature suggests that small disturbances away from the sta-
ble state will typically manifest themselves as long-wavelength fluctuations in the
order parameter. And this is indeed the case; this rough sketch of an argument
can be made precise and generalised as Goldstone’s Theorem. Roughly speaking,
this states that any state that breaks a continuous symmetry (i.e., a group of
symmetry transformations which has an uncountable continuum of elements) will
exhibit long-wavelength excitations. (In the quantum field context, a version of
Goldstone’s result was very important, since the absence of the predicted massless
spin-zero particles led to the prediction of the Higgs boson — yet another case of
parallel developments in high-energy and condensed matter physics).
Good Coordinates
These elementary excitations, or ‘soft’ long-wavelength modes, dominate the low-
energy dynamics of symmetry-broken states. At higher energies, excitations of
shorter wavelength become important, and we view them as superpositions of
higher modes of vibration. Thus these modes provide a means of discovering good
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coordinates for the physical evolution of the system; that is, to recoordinatise the
state space of a crystal in such a way that its physical evolution looks simple.28
In fact, Wilson’s own examples of good coordinates — the Chlandi modes of
crystalline plates — are examples of elementary excitations (though to be more
precise, the Chlandi modes are standing waves, and the boundary conditions pro-
vided by the shape of the plate must also be taken into account). So here we have
an example of how good coordinates can be derived from the nature of the order
parameter, which sums up how the state has broken the original symmetries. The
claim of the New Emergentists is that in the phenomenon of symmetry-breaking
we have a mechanism by which the set of “good coordinates” of the whole can
be entirely different from the sets of good coordinates which apply to the con-
stituent parts when in isolation or in other wholes. When we find a system such
as a Chlandi plate in a symmetry-breaking state, we can guarantee that many
of the most significant properties of the system, such as the Chlandi modes, will
be entirely different from the significant properties of smaller systems, even if
they are made up from the same components. The phenomenon we called ‘anti-
constructivism’ comes about (at least in these cases) because it is not possible to
discover the good coordinates needed to describe the physics of large symmetry-
breaking states from the good coordinates of other systems made up from similar
components, for they may have a very different order parameter.
Naturally, symmetry-breaking is only one example of such a mechanism by
28It is important to notice that there need be nothing approximate or non-exact about a
decomposition into elementary modes, or excitations. It is true in many cases, that we are par-
ticularly interested in small variations, and so we are satisfied with a Taylor expansion around
the stable state, cutting off terms above a certain order. But this is not intrinsic to the approach:
we can continue any such series to higher orders, or we can consider exact expressions. For if
we consider the variation of the order parameter as a field on space, decomposing any variation
in terms of the elementary excitations is analogous to the decomposability of any field variation
into its Fourier components. In practice, continuing to higher orders turns out to become mathe-
matically intractable, but then so does consideration of the interactions of all the smallest parts,
and this approach usually allows us a great deal more accuracy while remaining tractable.
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which we can explain a striking separation between the good coordinates associated
with large systems and those associated with smaller ones. Even the general theory
of symmetry-breaking that Anderson hoped for would not be a general theory of
emergence.
Even in condensed matter physics, symmetry-breaking is not the only mecha-
nism that the New Emergentists appeal to. Perhaps the most significant change
since Anderson’s 1972 article is the development of understanding of renormali-
sation techniques.29 I shall postpone a discussion of renormalisation techniques
to Chapter 3, where I shall make some comments about its relevance to the New
Emergentist’s themes. But for the moment, suffice it to repeat that broken sym-
metry is only a single example of various mechanisms that are understood to give
rise to emergent properties: the New Emergentists never claim that it is the whole
story.
2.5 Alternative Readings
As we saw in §1.4, it is orthodox for philosophers to dismiss the New Emergentists
as simply confused between practical, “epistemological” issues and “ontological”
issues. It has been one of my aims to call into question these quick dismissals, and
to try to suggest some possible sources of the misunderstanding. But there are also
some more careful metaphysical analyses of their writings, and none of them (as
far as I am aware) has suggested any connection between New Emergentist claims,
and the difficulty of searching for good coordinates. So, it would be remiss not to
look at some of these interpretations, and contrast them with the one presented
here.
29A development that Anderson foresaw. He justified his inclusion of a discussion in his 1984
book by suggesting that ‘the renormalization group has the potential of providing an even more
complete conceptual unification of the science of complex systems than has yet been realized.’
(Anderson, 1984, 5).
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2.5.1 Liu — Infinite Systems mark Emergence
Here we follow an observation of Liu (1999), that many theories of condensed mat-
ter physics require the infinite limit of a large system to be taken. Liu concludes
that when such phenomena appear in finite systems, they should be called emer-
gent, since even a calculator with the abilities of Broad’s Archangel would miss
them.30 For such a being would have no reason to consider an infinite system,
nor any reason to apply an analysis of an infinite system to the finite ones under
consideration. Thus Liu defends the ‘emergence’ in question as ontological rather
than epistemological, since these symmetry-broken properties are not derivable
from microphysical theories, even in principle.
Liu’s interpretation has points in its favour. It explains the New Emergentists’
fascination with symmetry-breaking, and it is supported to some extent by Ander-
son’s own comments. We have already quoted Anderson as identifying ‘our own
macroscopic scale’ with the ‘N → ∞ limit of large systems’ (§1.4.2). And when
discussing the practical difficulties in deriving the behaviour of large symmetry-
broken states, he emphasises that it would be impossible to use the microphysical
laws, since:
Starting with the fundamental laws and a computer we would have
to do two impossible things — solve a problem with infinitely many
bodies, and then apply the result to a finite system — before we syn-
thesized this behaviour. (Anderson, 1972, 395)
He returns to the topic in his later book, where he points out some major confusions
that can result if we do not take account of the discontinuities and ‘attempt to
calculate the properties of one state of matter by methods suitable to another.’
Anderson (1984, 29).
30In fact, Liu worked with a conception of emergence as a failure of inter-theoretic reduc-
tion, but his suggestion is not dependent on this, and can be easily adapted to circumvent the
ambiguities discussed in §1.7.
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But all of these are strictly methodological points, concerned with the proper
theoretical treatment of different phases. For any systemic properties of a state,
even those associated with phase transitions and symmetry-breaking, are deriv-
able in a finite model, at least if we substitute Broad’s Archangel for Anderson’s
computer. We have no reason to think that such a being would need to take a
diversion through the N →∞ limit, even if we do. That is, it would not have to
run through the two impossible stages that Anderson mentions to derive the be-
haviour of such a system in any particular configuration. Instead, it would “just”
have to run through a boring (and practically impossible) mathematical task of
combining all the microphysical interactions.
It is true that Broad’s Archangel would not discover those theoretical features
that we use to model phenomena such as phase transitions and symmetry breaking.
For rather than considering a realistic, finite system, theoreticians look to its
infinite analogue and define phase transitions in terms of features that only appear
there. They do this for reasons of mathematical power and convenience, as well
as to isolate the large scale ‘bulk effects’ from spurious finite size effects.
In Chapter 4 I will expand on these themes, and on the larger debate on
the nature of the idealisations involved in an appeal to the infinite limit. There, I
shall argue that phenomena such as phase transitions, though requiring the infinite
limit for their theoretical treatment, can nonetheless be recognised and defined as
properties exhibited by finite systems. I suggest there that although some care
needs to be taken due to the startling nature of the infinite idealisation, this is a
matter of defining the relationship between physical phase transitions and their
theoretical treatment. This is entirely separate from the metaphysical question of
whether the associated properties are emergent.
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2.5.2 Schweber — Emergent Properties are Properties of
Solutions
Following a distinguished career as a quantum field theorist, Silvan Schweber has
carried out extensive research into the history of field theory and the development
of the Standard Model. In the course of his work, he wrote an article expressing
the view that the New Reductionism/Emergentism debate was a symptom of a
crisis amongst physicists. They had yet to confront conceptual developments that
‘revealed a hierarchical structure of the physical world. Each layer of the hierarchy
is successfully represented while remaining largely decoupled from other layers’
(Schweber, 1993, 35). He feels that Anderson’s main message is the following:
... it is not enough to know the “fundamental” laws at a given level. It
is the solutions to equations, not the equations themselves, that provide
a mathematical description of the physical phenomena. “Emergence”
refers to properties of the solutions — in particular, the properties that
are not readily apparent from the equations. (Schweber, 1993, 36)
This thought is certainly present in some of the early New Emergentist work,
though it is defended more explicitly by other authors. Michael Polanyi, for exam-
ple, emphasises that boundary conditions are needed to provide solutions, as well
as the ‘fundamental’ laws, and that this provides a powerful barrier to the scope
of ‘unfettered reductionism’.
A Laplacean knowledge which merely predicts what will happen under
any given conditions cannot tell us what conditions should be given;
these conditions are determined by the technical skill and peculiar in-
terests of chemists and hence cannot be worked out on paper. There-
fore, while quantum mechanics can explain in principle all chemical
reactions, it cannot replace, even in principle, our knowledge of chem-
istry. (Polanyi, 1964)
However, it is a general feature of dynamical theories that boundary conditions
are needed as well as the dynamical laws if we are to produce a full description
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of the physical phenomena. Some solutions exhibit properties which are easily
derived from the equations, others are not so easily derived. The whole point in
coming up with a definition of emergence is to propose some way of distinguishing
between trivial and non-trivial examples. Schweber and Polyanyi’s conception of
emergence provides no way of distinguishing ‘trivial’ solutions, whose properties
are apparent from the laws, and ‘non-trivial’ ones.
In fact, Schweber seems to concede this point. Late in his article he interprets
Anderson’s title More is Different as the claim that there is novelty at each level
of composition, which comes about in such a way that effective laws of properties
at each level may be considered ‘fundamental’. He suggests that the challenge is
to conceptualise this novelty. I agree that this is indeed the challenge, but that
Anderson has at least an example of how it may be achieved: namely: in his
example of symmetry-breaking.
2.5.3 Cat — Intertheoretic Reduction
The issues addressed by Anderson in 1972 are deep, and it is startling to discover
how differently careful interpreters can read his text. While Jordi Cat (1998)
admits that Schweber’s interpretation is in ‘contrast’ to his own, their discussions
could almost be of two different articles.
In a long historical study of the circumstances surrounding the debate between
Anderson and Weinberg, Cat offers an insightful analysis of the changes in atti-
tude in different branches of physics that occurred at the end of the twentieth
century. He reads Anderson as holding two separate positions: one a thesis about
the methodology of physics, which he judges to be fairly clear; and one a set of
metaphysical and ontological claims, which he argues is less so.
As to the former, he reads Anderson as recommending that we take very seri-
ously the various viewpoints provided by the special sciences, on the grounds that
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‘the proliferation of new descriptions and their empirical adequacy would lead to
potentially more fruitful lines of research’ (Cat, 1998, 264). Particle physics is
doubtless a creative and interesting subject, but new ideas crop up in the higher-
level sciences: condensed matter physics, chemistry, biology and further up in scale.
Cat claims that Anderson’s More is Different is in part a critique of Kuhn’s the-
sis of incommensurability, holding that cross-fertilisation between areas of science
is a source not of misinterpretations, but of creativity and progress. In support,
he points out that Anderson explicitly addresses Kuhnian themes in his article
attacking large particle accelerator projects (Anderson, 1971, 515).
This reading of Anderson as putting forward heuristic recommendations to gen-
erate creativity in research, looks a good distance away from the main themes we
have drawn from his discussion. I feel that Cat’s interpretation focusses on a sin-
gle point raised by Anderson as an argument for spreading government resources
amongst areas in physics, rather than concentrating them to build a single expen-
sive particle accelerator. But these are issues specifically to do with funding and
status in the physics community, and are separate from his position on emergence.
Cat’s discussion of Anderson’s more explicitly metaphysical claims leads him
to share with other commentators, the conclusion that ‘Anderson’s ontological
reductionism is not clear’ though he does recognise that his argument ‘rests on one
explicit ontological assumption, namely that composite systems present emergent
properties.’ But in developing his reading, Cat makes an interesting claim about
where Anderson locates ‘truly fundamental’ laws and properties of physics:
Anderson is ultimately concerned with the sort of epistemological rele-
vance involved in “law-enforcement”, a representation relation between
levels of description and reality, between the most elementary laws and
their concepts, on the one hand, and more complex systems and their
properties, on the other. (Cat, 1998, 265)
Cat goes on to argue that these principles of “law-enforcement” have an element
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of what he calls ‘necessity’, or ‘non-derivativeness’ in them, in that they are at
least partially independent of the microphysical details of the system in question.
He argues that this independence is sufficient to imbue the principles with a priv-
ileged status. ‘Being “necessary”, they cannot be derivative. It is precisely this
unavoidable character that imbues them with the sort of fundamentality that An-
derson stresses’ (Cat, 1998, 265). He then goes on to mention symmetry-breaking
as an example of such a set of ‘fundamental principles’.31 But regardless of his
specific examples, Cat’s suggestion is clear: it is not any set of microphysical
properties that are fundamental or have a privileged intensional status. Rather,
principles that constitute emergent mechanisms and bring about the appearance
of emergent properties that are “fundamental”. Symmetry-breaking is presumably
amongst these.
This theme which Cat draws from Anderson is an extremely interesting one,
but I cannot anywhere find Anderson explicitly defending such principles of ‘law
enforcement’, as replacing microphysics in a privileged position. Instead, he re-
peats over and again that he judges the laws, principles and properties of each new
emerging level as equally important. It is the role of principles and theories such
as symmetry-breaking to show how novelty can come about at each level, not to
constitute some alternative fundamental level themselves.
However, it is at least in the spirit of the New Emergentist movement to claim
that ‘higher-level principles’ are as good candidates for some privileged status as
are any other. Principles such as symmetry-breaking crop up across very different
areas of physics: in the Standard Model of particle physics, in many-body quantum
mechanics and in large-scale classical and celestial mechanics. Such principles that
apply across physics of very different scales, give a sense of unity to physics, which
31Cat may be referring to ‘protected’ properties, despite the fact that Anderson does not
mention them in More is Different, and they come to the fore only in later New Emergentist
writings. I postpone discussion of this to Chapter 5.
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implies no prejudice in favour of microphysics.32
Indeed, in a recent popular book Laughlin (2005) explicitly proposed that all
presently known physical laws will turn out to arise due to ‘large-scale collective
principles’ (amongst which he includes symmetry-breaking). He holds as a con-
sequence that those entities currently treated as elementary, such as electrons,
the other “elementary” particles, space and time will all turn out to have further
structure.
But this position goes well beyond the core New Emergentist position. For as
reported in §1.1.2, the New Emergentists have been willing to set aside this issue
of entity reductionism, and grant the possibility that an ultimate micro-level may
exist, governed by laws which could not arise due to the interaction of smaller
parts. Cat’s thesis may find some support from Laughlin’s hypothesis: but both
are separate, and far stronger doctrines than the central arguments of the New
Emergentists.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
In the first chapter, I argued for two main conclusions. First: the New Emergentists
have a consistent, but oft-misinterpreted position. I compared it to three well-
established philosophical approaches to emergence, and argued that they shared
32Weinberg (1994) contains an interesting hint that he might be moving to embrace this
alternative picture of the unity of science. For he distinguishes between ‘Grand’ and ‘Petty’
reductionism, where the former is the only one worth defending, it being: ‘the view that all of
nature is the way it is (with certain qualifications about initial conditions and historical accidents)
because of simple universal laws, to which all other scientific laws may in some sense be reduced’.
There is no mention in this statement that the laws must be those of the very small. Indeed,
this is identified more easily with ‘Petty reductionism ... the much less interesting doctrine that
things behave the way they do because of the properties of their constituents’. And later in the
same article (28), he again speaks of his arrows of explanation, repeating his earlier assertion
that they end up at a common source, but with no suggestion that this source is the laws of the
very small. Comparing these statements with, e.g., Weinberg (1987) suggests a substantial shift
in his position.
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many claims with the British Emergentists. But the philosophically orthodox
reasons for rejecting their conclusions are valid only if we interpret them as claiming
one of the other positions, and some commentators are also guilty of confusing
the three. But we saw that in both accepting microphysical supervenience, and
rejecting the existence of specific laws of composition, the New Emergentists do
not take the exact position of Broad and his followers.33
In this chapter, we have explored the possibility that the New Emergentists are
concerned with metaphysically significant distinctions amongst systemic proper-
ties. And while Broad’s specific laws of composition are not recognised in modern
physics, there is a close relative which could be said to be endemic. Thus we
have arrived at an interpretation of the New Emergentist position which I believe
metaphysically consistent, physically informed and to be faithful to their claims
for the strong methodological differences between the various “levels” of physical
science.
We have left various loose ends. One is the possibility of other mechanisms for
emergence apart from symmetry-breaking. The only one that I shall discuss in this
thesis is the phenomenon called “protection” by Laughlin and Pines. The rough
idea is that while the systemic properties of larger systems are sometimes qualita-
tively “different” to those of smaller ones, they also exhibit eerie similarities across
these larger systems, irrespective of their respective microphysical constitutions. I
have already made a few remarks about these issues, which come to the fore in the
Anderson-Weinberg debate and later writings of the other New Emergentists, but
a full discussion requires the technical apparatus of the Renormalisation Group. I
shall return to these and related issues after the discussion of renormalisation in
Chapter 3.
33In fact, the reasons for their rejection decompose neatly into the two possibilities considered
by Broad. As outlined in Appendix A, emergence1 is excluded by accepting microphysical
supervenience, and emergence2 is excluded by rejecting specific laws of composition
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Second, we have endeavoured to find a position for the New Emergentists
while committing them as little as possible to specific metaphysical doctrines.
We have found no outright contradiction while viewing matters from our rather
high level of generality; but it is possible that if we attempted to construct a
detailed metaphysical position, we might run into problems. In particular, we have
remained almost silent on issues relating to laws of nature. The strictly Humean
position of Lewis is the only one that has been mentioned, and that amounts a
direct rejection of the New Emergentist position. Naturally, there are many others
available, but we have not examined how a necessitarian view — say — would
cohere with the rest of the New Emergentist doctrines.
Finally, the whole project has been to try to interpret and defend a rather
narrowly-defined position, based on some very specific physical examples. Yet
Anderson has been cited as inspiring a small intellectual revolution which has given
rise to a renaissance in the physics of larger, more complex systems. (Indeed the
very term ‘complex systems’ has become the label for some of the most fashionable
research.) Do any of the interpretative issues we have been concerned with relate
to these exciting areas? I shall take up these issues in Chapter 5. But whether
there are uniting themes to this ‘New Kind of Science’, in particular, whether the
mechanisms of symmetry-breaking have the claimed implications for biology and
chemistry is, as always, down to the ultimate success of the physicists, not to the
dictates of metaphysicians.
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Chapter 3
Universality, Multiple
Realisability and Renormalisation
Over the last decades, renormalisation techniques have become central to many
areas of moden physics, a development not yet matched by attention from philoso-
phers. Following the historico-philosophical study by Cao and Schweber (1993)
and Teller’s ground-breaking book (1995) the commentary that does exist, has
been centred on the significance of the Renormalisation Group (henceforth, RG)
to quantum field theories.1
Perhaps surprisingly, there has been less attention paid to the area in which the
modern understanding of the RG was originally developed, viz. in condensed mat-
ter physics. Yet it may be that the philosophical significance of the technique is as
striking in this context as when it is applied to quantum field theories. An excep-
tion to this lack of philosophical attention has been the work of Robert Batterman,
who has made several bold claims about the significance of renormalisation as a
strategy for explanation. In this chapter, I shall discuss and criticise Batterman’s
1A valuable cross-section of the current philosophical debate is available in the collection of
Kuhlmann et al. (2002), and other notable commentaries have come from Huggett and Weingard
(1995), Hartmann (2001) and Castellani (2002).
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claims, using them as a foil to bring out what I feel are the most philosophically
interesting aspects of renormalisation techniques.
The discussion is structured as follows: In the first section I will introduce Bat-
terman’s theses about renormalisation; in particular, his claims that it provides a
strikingly original explanation of the phenomenon that physicists call universality,
and that similar strategies might explain the metaphysicians’ problem of multiple
realisability. Batterman’s discussion is based upon a commitment to firm criteria
by which an account could provide a satisfactory explanation of universality. The
explanatory strategy of RG is supposed to be original in being able to satisfy these
criteria.
To examine these claims in more detail, I introduce the work-horse example
of condensed matter physics in §3.2: the Ising Model, and discuss how the phe-
nomenon of universality is exhibited there. In §3.3, I look at two older approaches
to explaining universality, and show how they fail to satisfy Batterman’s explana-
tory criteria — as indeed he claims they should. In §3.4 and §3.5, I distinguish two
varieties of renormalisation: the first one used by most authors (including Batter-
man) to explain the concept in qualitative terms; but the second a more significant
advance in explaining universality. I argue that neither of them can satisfy Bat-
terman’s criteria for a satisfactory explanation of universality. In §3.6, I identify
several different attitudes to the significance of the RG, and suggest that they are
focussing on the significance of its applications and aims, not on the technique
itself. Finally, in §3.7, I show that clarity with regard to the points highlighted in
the preceding sections is crucial to evaluate the significance of renormalisation.
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3.1 Introduction — Batterman’s Thesis
Batterman holds that renormalisation exemplifies a form of scientific explanation
unappreciated by philosophers of science, and that its differences from standard ac-
counts are important for a variety of philosophical issues, including inter-theoretic
reduction, emergence and the nature of scientific explanation. He puts his case in
several articles (Batterman, 1992, 2000, 2002b, 2004) and in his book: The Devil
in the Details (2002a).
Each of Batterman’s theses are stimulating and controversial, inspiring com-
mentary and criticism from several authors.2 Perhaps most comprehensive is the
survey given by Hooker (2004), who dissects a wide variety of his claims, especially
focussing on those which impact on approaches to inter-theoretic reduction. My
range will be a great deal narrower; I want to focus on a very specific set of his
claims about the significance of the RG, which — if valid — would have profound
implications for debates central to metaphysics and the philosophy of mind.
Batterman argues that the phenomenon much-discussed in metaphysical circles
as multiple realisability, is best understood as an instance of a phenomenon closely
studied in physics, where it is known as universality.3 Batterman goes on to
claim that the RG explains the physicist’s universality with a profoundly original
strategy that has not been considered by metaphysicians or philosophers of science,
and that a similar strategy can be reasonably expected to explain all instances of
multiple realisability.
2Belot (2005) and Redhead (2004) both concentrate their criticism on Batterman’s conclusions
about inter-theoretic reduction, questioning the significance that Batterman sees in singular
limits. Batterman (2005) gives a response to these and related issues.
3Batterman writes as though it is clear that universality is the broader notion, encompassing
multiple realisability, so that ‘the phenomenon of multiple realisability is itself an instance of
universality’ (Batterman, 2000, 116-117). It is not clear to me that the former encompasses the
latter, rather than vice versa. But in the present discussion, we can ignore the issue, for we
will concentrate only on the domain of critical phenomena, where the two are claimed to be
coextensive.
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The existence of a profoundly new account of multiple realisability might have
vast implications. For over thirty years, the “Multiple Realisability Thesis” — that
homogeneous macroscopic properties can be realised by heterogeneous microscopic
properties — has played a prominent role in debates in the philosophy of mind and
science. It is often identified as the principal argument in favour of a functionalist
attitude to mental properties (e.g., Putnam, 1975a) and invoked for debates on
the autonomy of the special sciences (e.g., Fodor, 1974). Claims with such striking
implications should invite close scrutiny.
Batterman’s case that the strategy of renormalisation can help explain multiple
realisability can be split into two claims, here paraphrased from Batterman (2000,
116-7):
(i) The phenomenon of multiple realisability is itself an instance of universality.
(ii) The explanatory strategy of the Renormalisation Group (though likely not
the very same explanatory apparatus) can be extended to explain the meta-
physical mysteries surrounding multiple realisability.
Hooker’s commentary dissects each of these claims, arguing with respect to (i):
that on the contrary, universality only captures part of the phenomenon of mul-
tiple realisability; and therefore to (ii): that any explanatory strategy capable of
accounting for universality cannot provide a full account of multiple realisability
(though he grants that it may go some of the way).
Though I am sympathetic to many of Hooker’s claims, I shall not challenge
Batterman’s claims (i) & (ii) directly. Instead, I shall challenge two presuppositions
that lie behind them:
(1) The Renormalisation Group explains the phenomenon of universality.
(2) The explanatory strategy of the Renormalisation Group is an original one,
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profoundly different to the old and more familiar attempts to explain either
multiple realisability or universality.
Batterman defends both of these claims, going into some detail as to the explana-
tory success of renormalisation, and making explicit proposals as to those aspects
in which the strategy is original. But before looking in detail at the explanation,
we must first take a look at the phenomena that are to be explained: multiple
realisability and universality.
3.1.1 Introduction to Multiple Realisability
The principal reason that multiple realisability is of interest in the philosophy of
mind, is the claim that any satisfactory account of mental properties must allow
that they can be multiply realised by physical properties. This claim is often put
at the basis of an argument for a functionalist theory of mental properties.4 But
it is helpful to start by considering simpler cases that do not immediately involve
us in controversies as to the nature of the mental. Such a “clean” introduction is
provided by the famous example of the mineral jade, which can be realised by two
compounds: jadeite and nephrite, each a distinct chemical kind.5
But we shall not be concerned with arguments that are built upon the multiple
realisability thesis, but with the thesis itself. For, as Jerry Fodor puts it, whatever
conclusions we draw from the existence of multiple realisability, the phenomenon
itself presents ‘a metaphysical mystery’:
Damn near everything we know about the world suggests that unimag-
inably complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces at the extreme
4The most prominent of these arguments are those of Putnam in a series of papers through
the 1960s, reprinted in his 1975a collection. Other influential examples of arguments based upon
multiple realisability include those of Kim (1992), who argues that multiply realised properties
cannot be true natural kinds.
5In order to continue to speak of properties rather than entities, we shall treat the example
as that of the higher-level mineralogical property: “being jade”, multiply realised by more than
one lower-level chemical property: “being jadeite” and “being nephrite”.
122
microlevel manage somehow to converge on stable macrolevel proper-
ties. (Fodor, 1997, 161)
Fodor confesses that the phenomenon of a truly heterogenous set of microlevel
properties giving rise to a stable homogeneous set of macrolevel properties is one
he does not even ‘know how to think about’. Batterman suggests that physicists
do know how to think about it, for multiple realisability is an instance of the
physicist’s phenomenon of universality, and Fodor’s mystery can be explained by
the Renormalisation Group.
Before moving to see how multiple realisability might be related to universality,
we must mention that many commentators do not think it as mysterious as do Kim,
Fodor and Batterman. Sceptics argue that most, or even all, proposed instances
of multiple realisability fail to concern a truly homogeneous set of higher-level
properties realised by a truly heterogeneous set of lower-level ones. As such, they
can be explained by strategies that are in no way exotic or original. I shall mention
just two such criticisms here: they are particularly relevant to universality, but by
no means exhaust the concerns that have been raised about multiple realisability.
First, it has been pointed out that certain forms of multiple realisability are
ubiquitous, so common that we hardly notice them. Crane and Mellor (1990)
see the phenomenon everywhere, noting that properties such as ‘masses, volumes,
and temperatures’ can be realised by almost any system, implying a vast range
of microphysical realisers. Such widespread examples have led some to write of
a ‘trivial’ sense of multiple realisability, when lower-level realiser properties are
distinct only due to differences manifestly irrelevant to the higher-level properties
they realise. Some, like Bechtel and Mundale (1999) argue that all instances of
multiple realisability are trivial in this sense, and arise from confounding of ‘broad-
grained’6 and ‘fine-grained’ criteria for distinguishing properties. Others, such as
6‘Coarse-grained’ is a more usual term than ‘broad-grained’, but I shall follow Bechtel and
Mundale’s terminology.
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Shapiro (2000) grant that there may be both trivial and non-trivial cases and
search for criteria to separate them.
Shapiro puts forward a causal criterion, suggesting that multiple realisability is
non-trivial only when realisers differ in an aspect ‘causally relevant’ to the aspects
that define the higher-level properties. So a case in which pain were realised in both
ordinary neurons and in neurons that were stained purple, Shapiro would judge
as trivial, since colour is not causally relevant to the higher-level property of pain.
Shapiro doubts that many famous cases pass his test, arguing that the realisation
of pain both in neurons and in silicon is also trivial, since the causally relevant
aspects of electrical activity are present in both cases.7 And the jade example
seems vulnerable also. For we can argue that when we pick out the mineralogical
properties, we abstract from chemical differences that are causally irrelevant to
that level. At the lower chemical level we do not, and so judge that there are two
properties instantiated.
Somewhat related to this first distinction is the observation that there is more
than one way in which a property might be said to be multiply realised. First, we
could look at the model provided by the determinate-determinable relation, and
identify a sense in which a determinable property can be multiply realised by its
determinate instances. In this sense, the property of blueness can be said to be
multiply realised by the properties of being various shades of blue: aquamarine,
azure, turquoise or cornflower. But there is a second sense in which even a maxi-
mally specified shade of blue may be realised in different ways. A shade of cobalt
blue could be realised by the element cobalt, by cobalt-coloured paint or by a pixel
in a computer screen — all exactly that same shade of cobalt. Once we have made
this distinction, it is clear that the former ‘determinate-determinable’ sense should
7Shapiro’s specific case-study rests upon patterns of electrical activity being the causal ground
of pain, and common to both silicon and neural realisation, and it thus looks vulnerable to
strengthened examples; but his distinction stands nonetheless.
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also be counted a ‘trivial’ sense of multiple realisability since there is no mystery
of how to explain it. We simply point out that we employ different standards
of accuracy to distinguish properties on the higher and lower level, so it is not
surprising that we see heterogeneous properties on one level and homogeneity on
another.
The explanations of these ‘trivial’ cases of multiple realisability could be called
‘trivial’ themselves, for they involve discovering a sense in which the lower-level
realisers were not heterogeneous after all. Batterman is clear that we are concerned
with a sense of multiple realisability, and an explanation of it, that is not ‘trivial’
in either of the senses mentioned here.
3.1.2 Introduction to Universal Properties: Critical Expo-
nents
The most striking examples of universal properties are observed near a certain
type of phase transition, known as second-order, continuous or critical transitions.
These critical phenomena can be observed near the Curie point of a ferromagnet.
Consider a large sample of ferromagnetic material with average magnetisation
M per unit volume. In an experiment or simulation, we usually control two inde-
pendent variables: a temperature T and an applied external magnetic field H, both
of which affect the magnetisation. Typical results are represented qualitatively in
Figure 3.1.
It is clear from the diagram that the magnetisation M of a ferromagnet may
change with H in very different ways, depending on its temperature T . If we keep
it at a low temperature T < Tc and vary H, from positive to negative values, we
observe a discontinuous ‘jump’ in M at H = 0, as the ordered state switches from
a magnetisation in one direction to another. This is an example of a first order
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phase transition;8 other familiar examples include the abrupt liquid/vapour tran-
sition, boiling, where the density jumps suddenly with a small change of applied
temperature or pressure. These transitions are usually associated with a radical re-
ordering of the structure of the material and the transfer of some non-zero quantity
of latent heat. But while they are both theoretically interesting and challenging,
there are no universal properties associated with first-order phase transitions.
H
M
T
1 2
Tc
Figure 3.1: Phase diagram for a Ferromagnet. Path 1, with T < Tc exhibits a
first-order phase transition, Path 2, goes through a continuous phase transition at
H = 0, T = Tc (often called the Curie temperature).
At T ≥ Tc the first order phase transition disappears, so at the Curie temper-
ature T = Tc and zero external field, we say that a continuous phase transition
occurs, and the system is at its critical point.9 The behaviour of the thermody-
namic variables near the critical point is strikingly different from elsewhere. If we
define a reduced temperature t = T−Tc
Tc
(the dimensionless temperature difference
from Tc) we find that the magnetization M goes as a power law with t, with a
certain critical exponent β. M also goes as a power law when t = 0 and H is
8The classification of phase transitions is troublesome. The ‘Ehrenfest’ classification and
its descendants are outlined in §4.1.1, but briefly: we call a phase transition ‘first order’ if
the free energy is discontinuous in the first derivative of the free energy with respect to any
thermodynamic variable, and ‘continuous’ if the non-analyticity is of any other form. Further
classification is usually made on the basis of symmetry considerations.
9This example also exhibits symmetry-breaking at the critical point. Symmetry breaking,
a central theme of §sec:breaking, is closely associated with critical phenomena but I shall not
discuss it further here.
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varied, with a different critical exponent δ. Other thermodynamic properties such
as the magnetic susceptibility at constant temperature: χ = ∂M
∂H
∣∣
T
, and the heat
capacity at constant field: CH = T
∂S
∂T
∣∣
H
, also exhibit power-law behaviour in the
region and have the exponents α and γ respectively. These four critical exponents
are defined as follows:
CH ∼ |t|α (3.1)
M(T,H → 0+) ∼ |t|β (for T < Tc) (3.2)
χT (T,H → 0+) ∼ |t|−γ (3.3)
M(T = Tc, H) ∼ H 1δ . (3.4)
The values of these exponents are found to stand in certain simple relations to one
another, the Rushbrooke and Griffiths Equalities:10
α + 2β + γ = 2 (Rushbrooke) (3.5)
δ − 1 = γ
β
(Griffiths) (3.6)
It is striking that similar behaviour appears in other systems that appear to share
very little structure with ferromagnets. A clear example comes from experimental
studies of liquids as they make the transition through their fluid phase. Here the
independent variables are the pressure P and temperature T , which determine the
density ρ of the fluid at equilibrium. Again, there is a first order phase transition
(boiling) which disappears at a continuous phase transition, where P = Pc and
T = Tc, and the thermodynamic variables of the fluid again display power-law
behaviour. Consider thermodynamic quantities: again CV = T
∂S
∂T
, the heat capac-
10Rushbrooke (1963) and Griffiths (1965) themselves first postulated inequalities on purely
thermodynamical grounds. The limiting equalities of Equations 3.5 & 3.6 come from experimental
evidence, and later, the scaling hypotheses introduced in §3.2.2.
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ity; ρl, the liquid density; ρg, the gas density; and κT =
1
V
∂V
∂P
, the compressibility.
Compare these critical exponents defined for a fluid system with Equations 3.1 -
3.4:
CV ∼ |t|α (3.7)
(ρl − ρg)(T, P → PC) ∼ |t|β (for T < Tc) (3.8)
κ(T, P → PC) ∼ |t|−γ (3.9)
P − PC(T = Tc, ρ) ∼ |ρl − ρg| 1δ (3.10)
The truly astonishing experimental discovery was that the values of the critical
exponents α, β, γ and δ are numerically identical in the case of the fluid and the
ferromagnet. What is more, these are not the only systems for which these values
appear. In the formation of long-chain polymers, in percolating systems, and in
the critical behaviour of beta-brass, the systems all exhibit a continuous phase
transition, and near it, their analogous macroscopic quantities also obey power
laws, with exactly the same numerical values of the critical exponents.
Because the nature of the transition is very different in each case, these large-
scale properties can be thermodynamic, mechanical, magnetic, electrical, or chem-
ical; but still, their quantitative behaviour near phase transitions shows this re-
markable similarity — the values of the exponents are identical. Yet there is no
suggestion that the microphysical structures of these various systems have much
in common with one another; and their behaviour away from Tc is as different as
could be expected. We call these critical exponents universal properties.
Further investigation suggests that all systems that exhibit continuous phase
transitions fall into one of a small number of universality classes, defined by sharing
the same values of the critical exponents. Each universality class may contain
systems as different from one another as fluids, magnets or percolating systems,
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which appear to share none of their behaviour away from their critical points,
nor anything much in their microscopic constitution (so far as we know). We
find that all they appear to have in common is their spatial dimensionality, and
some general symmetry properties associated with the phases either side of the
phase transition (more exactly, the symmetry of the order parameter of Landau,
introduced in §3.3.2).11
3.1.3 Multiple Realisability as Universality
To understand how Batterman connects the phenomena of multiple realisability
and universality, we must be clear as to exactly which of the properties associated
with phase transitions are to count as the higher-level, macrophysical properties,
i.e. as candidates for properties to be multiply realised, and which as lower-level
properties, which are to realise them. In these central cases, this seems fairly clear:
those dependent on the experimental variables are the higher-level set: M , T and
H for the ferromagnet; P , T , and ρ for the fluid. The lower-level properties are
the microscopic details: the very different microphysical structure of the fluid and
ferromagnet.
But it is only a few of the higher-level properties that are candidates for multiple
realisability. Specifically, the universal critical exponents appear to be multiply re-
alised; for example, the higher-level property of having a critical exponent β = 0.31
is realised by the heterogeneous microstructures both of fluids and of ferromagnets,
as well as the microstructures of the other substances in that universality class.
(More exactly, we should say that the lower-level properties of these microstruc-
tures realise the higher-level properties). But away from the critical point, wide
differences in the lower-level properties are reflected in wide differences in higher-
11Lavis and Bell (1999, 22) follow Kadanoff (1976) in hedging their bets, quoting three prop-
erties that may influence the universality class a system falls into: a) the physical dimension of
the system, b) the symmetry group of the order parameter, c) perhaps other criteria.
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level properties. And even near the critical point, there are a large number of
higher-level properties that are not universal and so not multiply realised. For ex-
ample, the critical temperature Tc is different for each system within a universality
class.
Let us test universality as a case of ‘true’ multiple realisability, against the two
‘trivial’ senses highlighted in §3.1.1. It is certainly difficult to see it as trivial in the
first sense: that the different realisations of critical exponents within a universality
class are distinguished only by differences manifestly irrelevant to the higher level.
In particular, Shapiro’s criterion of causality makes this look untenable, for the
only properties in common between the various microstructures are dimensionality
and symmetry, which surely cannot be enough to provide any meaningful causal
basis for the critical exponents. Just as challenging would be to follow Bechtel and
Mundale, for we would have to explain why (almost) every microphysical difference
between fluids and magnets would be irrelevant to the higher-level properties, and
thus that our apparent instance of multiple realisability is nothing more than a
mismatch between grades of discrimination between realised and realiser.
To claim that the cases are trivial in the second sense would be to claim that
are dealing with a simple case of a determinate-determinable relation. And this
seems just as implausible as the first sense. For the value of the critical exponent
appears to be maximally determinate — a specification of its exact value is limited
only by experimental technique (or lack of computational power when it comes to
numerical simulations).
One further comment should be made, before we move to consider Batterman’s
thesis. The appeal to ‘microphysical’ or ‘lower-level’ properties might lead us to re-
call the distinctions drawn back in the first chapter, where we distinguished several
different senses of these terms. The ambiguity most relevant to the present situa-
tion is between what we called there microphysical1 and microphysical2 properties,
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for these give us two different versions of the Multiple Realisability thesis. In the
first sense — microphysical1 — the thesis would be that two properties, described
as heterogeneous by a microphysical theory, each would provide a supervenience
base for a single macrophysical property, as described by a macrophysical theory.
But in its second sense — microphysical2 — the thesis would be the following, very
different claim: that there are large systems which have properties identical (or at
least very similar) to one another, but whose respective parts have very different
properties when alone, or when formed into different systems than those two in
question.
In the discussions of Putnam, Kim and Fodor, we are clearly meant to think of
multiple realisability in the first sense. For they are concerned with issues of inter-
theoretic reduction, and especially with the autonomy of special science theories
from one another. And in §1.5.1, we saw that it was microphysical1 properties
that was associated with these questions of reduction. Our examples bear this
out, for it is not just the microphysical2 properties of a fluid and a ferromag-
net that will be heterogeneous, but the microphysical1 properties as well. Fluids
and magnets have a diverse microstructure, and different interaction potentials
between their component parts. It is not just that their components are heteroge-
neous while separated, they interact according to entirely different laws and have
different properties when within the larger systems as well. So, we need not be
concerned with the ambiguous sense of ‘microphysical’; in this chapter I shall use
the terms ‘lower-level’ and ‘microphysical’ to mean microphysical1, without any
further specification.
So let us grant that judged on these considerations, the universal properties
exhibited by values of critical exponents appear as non-trivial examples of multiple
realisability, and thus as among the most interesting cases of Fodor’s ‘metaphys-
ical mystery’. Let us now move to look at Batterman’s alleged ‘new explanatory
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strategy’ that physicists have developed to explain the universality of critical ex-
ponents.
3.1.4 Desiderata for a New Explanatory Strategy
Batterman holds that the explanatory strategy of the Renormalisation Group
(henceforth RG) is a new one to both philosophers of science and to metaphysi-
cians. In fact, he believes that the mainstream models of scientific explanation are
powerless to explain universality. Therefore, it is not surprising that the RG pro-
vides a mode of explanation new to the philosophy of science, for any satisfactory
explanation of universality must be new in this sense.
However, any claims of limits to the potential of scientific explanation are sure
to be controversial, and indeed Batterman’s argument for the inadequacy of the
existing models appears to be far from conclusive. I shall argue that his views on
the original nature of the explanatory strategy of renormalisation can be separated
from his (controversial) views and criticisms of existing strategies.
Nonetheless, it is worth reporting Batterman’s objections to two classes of or-
thodox explanatory strategies, since they help illuminate his criteria for a good
explanation of universality.12 He follows a fairly standard practice in discus-
sions of scientific explanation by dividing contemporary approaches into Causal-
Mechanical and Unificatory accounts.
The former class include the explicitly causal approaches of Salmon (1984), as
well as the probabilistic models such as Railton’s ‘D-N-P’ account (Railton, 1981).
They share the aim of giving what Batterman calls a “local” account: ‘they explain
particular phenomena in terms of collections of particular causal processes and
interactions — or, perhaps, in terms of noncausal mechanisms, if there are such
12The brief remarks below are taken from (Batterman, 2002a, Ch. 3). Further discussion
of Hempelian deductive-nomological and inductive-statistical accounts is given in Batterman
(1992).
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things.’ (Salmon, 1989, 182). And Batterman’s problem with Causal-Mechanical
accounts is simply this “local” aspect, for he argues there will be a mismatch
between what a causal-mechanical approach can explain — a particular instance,
or event; and the explanandum of universality, which is by its nature, a uniformity
across many instances. The approach of the Causal-Mechanical theorist must be to
examine every system within the universality class and identify some microphysical
mechanism by which the critical indices take the values that they do — i.e., they
will give a separate account for each microphysical realiser. Since these realisers
are, by hypothesis, heterogeneous, we cannot explain why they are the same across
the many different systems by giving a Causal-Mechanical account — this must
be left a mystery.
This leads Batterman to one of his criteria for a satisfactory explanation of
universality: it cannot merely provide a list of lower-level properties that would
be sufficient to realise the higher-level properties (2000, 135-6).13 Instead, a sat-
isfactory account such as RG, must ‘depend upon a demonstration that from the
point of the lower level theory many of the microstructurally relevant details are
irrelevant for the upper level phenomenology of interest’ (ibid, 136).
This criterion also precludes the situation in which the list of lower level proper-
ties can be shown to have something in common, as in the first of the ‘trivial’ senses
of Multiple Realisability, in §3.1.1. An example of an explanation that Batterman
dismisses on these grounds is the account of multiple realisations of temperatures
by their shared mean kinetic energy — a lower-level property they have in common
(ibid, 134-135). But this must be qualified: Batterman accepts Ned Block’s ‘Dis-
ney Principle’: the lower-level theory must impose some constraints on what can
13In the context of his discussion, Batterman is concerned with opposing a very specific view,
expressed in (Papineau, 1993, Ch.2), which demands a list of lower-level properties sufficient and
necessary to realise a higher level one. His defense is the failure of sufficiency, so that is the
criterion I have focussed on here.
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realise a higher-level property.14 Indeed, he feels that this principle stands in need
of ‘explanation and justification’ (119), but this explanation cannot be provided
simply by listing the elements we find in all the realisers.
Batterman’s objection to Unificatory accounts (Kitcher, 1989; Friedman, 1974)
is a little harder to pin down. A unificatory explanation is one which shows how
the phenomena to be explained fall under a unifying, or covering law, and so can
be shown to be specific instances of a more general physical process. Batterman
argues that any unifying law that could cover all the instances of universality would
amount to a stipulation that the regularity must occur. This law would not be an
explanation, but simply a restatement of the fact of universality. Batterman holds
that any unificatory account leaves out the explanation for why such a statistical
law holds; this can only be given in terms of a ‘fundamental theory’. While it
is not entirely clear as to what qualifies as a ‘fundamental theory’ in general,
Batterman gives explicit criteria for in the specific case of critical phenomena. He
demands an account of the higher-level regularity, made in terms of the lower-level
microphysical realisers, and it is just this account that he argues the unificatory
accounts cannot provide (Batterman, 2002a, 30-36). This leads Batterman to his
second criterion: a satisfactory explanation for universality must be ‘completely
grounded in the lower level theory’ (Batterman, 2000, 136).
Thus Batterman looks on the explanatory strategy provided by the RG as being
original, and distinct from orthodox explanations of multiple realisability, in that
it succeeds in fulfilling the following two desiderata, both taken from Batterman
(2000, 136):
14The name is an odd one. Block explains it as follows: ‘In Walt Disney movies, teacups think
and talk, but in the real world, anything that can do those things needs more structure than a
teacup. We might call this the Disney Principle: that laws of nature impose constraints on ways
of making something that satisfies a certain description.’ (Block, 1997, 123). Since the principle
asserts that such constraints of microphysical detail do exist, the name ‘Anti-Disney Principle’
seems more appropriate.
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(A) The explanation must be ‘completely grounded in the lower-level theory’.
(B) The explanation is not dependent on identifying a list of microphysical prop-
erties sufficient to realise the higher-level ones.
It is these two conditions that we shall focus on in what follows: we leave aside any
further differences from orthodox accounts of explanation. In the next section, we
will look at a particular condensed matter system which exhibits universality, and
then look at how both pre-RG and RG approaches aim to explain the phenomenon,
concentrating on the ways in which they might contravene one or the other of
Batterman’s conditions.
3.2 The Ising Model
The Ising Model has been called the Drosophila of condensed matter physics: a
simple and well understood case on which the phenomena associated with phase
transitions can be studied. More properly, it should perhaps be named the Lenz-
Ising model, since Lenz proposed the lattice of two-state spins as a model of
ferromagnets in 1920. His student Ernst Ising solved the one-dimensional version
in his doctoral dissertation, finding that it does not exhibit a phase transition,
but remains in a paramagnetic phase (except at T = 0). He conjectured that this
would also hold true in higher dimensions. With such a dismal outlook, the model
then fell into obscurity, until Rudolf Peierls realised that Ising’s conjecture might
be mistaken. He gave an argument that seemed to show that transitions would
occur in two dimensions and higher.15 In 1944 Lars Onsager analysed the two-
dimensional Ising model in the absence of an external field, and managed to solve
it exactly (i.e., he provided an analytic expression for the partition function) and
15Later, some minor flaws in Peierls’ argument were found and the argument was made rigorous
by Griffiths (1964).
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showed explicity that it had a finite temperature phase transition. To date, the
three dimensional model has resisted all attempts to discover an exact solution.
Where the model cannot be solved exactly, there are a wide variety of tech-
niques available to give approximate results. Series expansions about the high and
low temperature limits are surprisingly powerful; and Monte Carlo and other nu-
merical methods can be implemented on powerful computers, giving results that
are believed accurate to several decimal places.
Despite its simplicity, the Ising model provides a rather versatile framework
that can be applied to many physical systems, with little or no modification: as
well as the original purpose of modelling (suitably anisotropic) ferromagnets, we
can interpret the spins to represent occupied and unoccupied sites in lattice gas
models and configurations of atoms in binary alloys, such as beta-brass.16 Since
experimental data on these systems are available, and they also easily modelled on
computers, the theoretical results can be tested against a variety of benchmarks.
3.2.1 The Model
Consider a large lattice of sites, indexed by an integer variable i. On each of there
is defined a variable we call a spin, which can take one of two values: si = ±1.
Each interacts pairwise with its neighbours through an exchange interaction J2ij,
triplewise with the interaction J3ijk, etc. There may also be an external field, J
1
i ,
that couples to all the spins individually. The Hamiltonian of such a system can
be written as follows:
−H =
∑
i
Jisi +
∑
ij
J2ijsisj +
∑
ijk
J3ijksisjsk + ... (3.11)
16It should be emphasised that an Ising model is not versatile in the sense that it could be
reinterpreted as a model of all systems in its universality class, and thus provide an alternative
explanation for universality.
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which allows for interactions between an external field and each spin, interactions
between pairs, between triples and so on. In what follows we shall concentrate on
a well-known special case, and the one that Ising himself studied — the nearest-
neighbour Ising Model. Here, the interactions are non-zero only between adjacent
pairs of spins, so using the more common notation J ≡ J2ij and H ≡ Ji, the
Hamiltonian can be written:
−H = J
∑
<ij>
sisj +H
∑
i
si (3.12)
where < ij > means the sum is taken over nearest neighbours, and J is positive so
as to favour parallel alignment of spins. However, we will sometimes find it useful
in what follows to retain Equation 3.11, since the RG technique often generates
effective Hamiltonians of a more general form than Equation 3.12.
We assume the validity of orthodox classical Gibbsian statistical mechanics, so
the thermodynamical variables and associated quantities can all be derived from
the canonical partition function:
Z(T,H) =
∑
r
e−βH (3.13)
where the sum is taken over all the possible spin configurations, each of which give
a different value for the Hamiltonian H. We also define the free energy:
F(T,H) = − 1
β
lnZ(T,H) (3.14)
which we extremise to find any thermodynamically stable states. It is possible to
calculate macroscopic quantities such as magnetisation, specific heat capacity, and
magnetic susceptibility from Z or F and their derivatives, and we shall introduce
these quantities as needed.
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As well as these thermodynamical variables, we can also consider further prop-
erties associated with the Ising system. These may be obtained from correlation
functions on the spins. For example, the spin-spin correlation function measures
the correlation between spins on sites i and j (with position vectors ri and rj)
away from their mean value:
Γ(ri, rj) = 〈(si − 〈si〉)(sj − 〈sj〉)〉 . (3.15)
(Here, the triangular brackets indicate a mean taken over the spin configurations.)
For a translationally invariant system, 〈si〉 = 〈sj〉 ≡ 〈s〉, and Γ(ri, rj) depends
only on the separation r between the spins i and j. That is, we can show that:
Γ(r) = 〈sisj〉 − 〈s〉 . (3.16)
For the Ising model with short-range interactions (a class which includes, but is
not limited to, nearest-neighbour models) it can be shown that the spins become
uncorrelated as r →∞, the function Γ(r) dropping off exponentially with distance.
From this property we can define one of the most important properties for the
discussion that follows, the correlation length, ξ:
Γ(r) ∼ r−τe− rξ (3.17)
(where τ is a constant that becomes unimportant as r becomes large). Near the
critical point it can be shown that both ξ and Γ also go as power laws, and define
two additional critical exponents ν and η. They also display universality, within
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the same universality classes as did α, β, γ and δ.
ξ ∼ t−ν , as t→ 0; (3.18)
Γ(r) ∼ 1
rd−2+η
. (3.19)
As usually defined (see note 8) a phase transition is a discontinuity in the free
energy or any of its derivatives with respect to the thermodynamical variables. At
first sight it is difficult to see how such a discontinuity could occur in the Ising
model as defined here, since any finite sum of analytic functions is also analytic,
and looking at the sums involved in constructing Z and F , it appears there is
nowhere a discontinuity could occur. We shall look at how this “paradox” is
resolved in Chapter 4, but briefly: the usual method of studying phase transitions
in statistical mechanics is to take the thermodynamic limit. This is an idealisation
which carefully extends the number of spins to the infinite limit, while keeping
relevant quantities such as their volume density at a constant value. The subtlety
is that a discontinuity can appear in an infinite sum of analytic functions. The use
of the thermodynamic limit brings up various philosophical worries, but I shall
postpone consideration of these to the later discussion. Here it should just be
noted that each of the approaches we shall meet, both RG and non-RG, make use
of it.
So consider a large Ising system with average magnetisation M per unit volume.
(M may be derived directly from the microphysical spins: M = 1
V
∑N
i=1 si, but
can also be defined from the free energy: M = − 1
V
(
∂F
∂H
)
T
.) We can then define
the rest of the critical exponents, in the same way as we did in §3.1.2.
To make contact with the issue of multiple realisability, it is again important to
separate the microphysical from the macrophysical properties associated with the
Ising Model. The interaction Hamiltonian H specifies a detailed model in terms of
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its microphysical properties and the function encodes all of the microphysical inter-
actions involved in the system. This model and its associated coupling interactions
corresponds to Batterman’s talk of a ‘lower-level theory’ — a mathematical ex-
pression governing the microphysical properties directly. In contrast, the partition
function and free energy are obtained from weighted sums over all possible spin
configurations. The thermodynamic quantities (i.e.: all those derivable from the
partition function Z) may be taken as corresponding to Batterman’s higher-level,
macrophysical properties. Amongst these, the critical exponents form a further
subset that are held to be universal and therefore multiply realised.17
3.2.2 The Widom Scaling Hypothesis
The variety of universal phenomena, as outlined in the last section, were originally
discovered through experiment, along with the few isolated theoretical successes
such as the Onsager solution. In response to the discoveries, a new framework
of experimentally successful, but theoretically unmotivated conjectures began to
grow up around the new results. One of the great triumphs of the RG methods was
to derive these conjectures from physically plausible principles, and place them on
a firm theoretical footing.
In the 1960s, several workers18 independently suggested that the universality
of critical phenomena might arise if, as they neared the critical point, the ther-
modynamic functions for disparate systems took on a particular form, that of a
generalized homogeneous function. One way of putting the conjecture is to propose
that the singular part of the free energy per spin, call it gs, obeys the following
17It may be that all the macrophysical quantities are multiply realisable in one or more of the
‘trivial’ senses identified in §3.1.1. What we are concerned with are those that are genuinely
universal, and so guaranteed to be multiply realisable in an interesting sense.
18These included Widom, Domb, Kadanoff and Fisher. An authoritative review is given by
Kadanoff (1966).
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equation as the critical point is neared:
gs(t,H) = t
1
yψ
(
H
t
x
y
)
(3.20)
where x and y are parameters to be determined. This is called the Widom Scaling
Hypothesis, and the function ψ is called a scaling function. From it, we can cal-
culate the critical exponents in terms of x and y. For example, near the critical
point the zero-field magnetisation becomes:
mH=0 = −
(
∂gs
∂H
)
t
= −
(
t
1
y
t
x
y
)
ψ′(0) , so β =
1− x
y
. (3.21)
Similarly:
α = 2− 1
y
, γ =
2x− 1
y
and δ =
x
1− x. (3.22)
Eliminating the parameters x and y then leads immediately to the Rushbrooke
and Griffiths’ equalities.19
On its own, the Widom scaling hypothesis is not even close to providing a
satisfactory explanation of universality. It is a hypothesis stated wholly in terms
of the thermodynamic quantities, with no basis in microphysical details, no ex-
planation of why the scaling form should appear near the critical point, and no
indication of how to derive values for x and y. In practical terms, this means
that we neither have predictions for the values of the critical exponents, nor any
indication of why they should be the same for all realisers in a universality class.
So even if we accept Widom’s scaling hypothesis, it does not give any account of
19There are two further equalities associated with critical exponents, the Fisher and Josephson
laws, which involve the exponents η and ν. They can be derived from a compatible but distinct
scaling hypothesis which imposes a form on the correlation function (Kadanoff, 1966). But in
this chapter, I shall focus on the Widom hypothesis.
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universality — it takes it as given, and uses it to make further conjectures about
the macrophysical properties of near-critical systems.
That said, the Widom hypothesis might provide a step towards an explanation
of universality, since it transforms our original problem to a different one. If we
can explain why near-critical systems might have thermodynamic functions of the
form of Equation 3.20, and why those belonging to the same universality class
share values of the parameters x and y, we shall have secured an explanation for
universality.
3.3 Universality and Scaling — Two Classical
Approaches
In this section, I shall present two theoretical approaches to critical phenomena,
and discuss how they can be related to the Widom Scaling hypothesis. These are
both non-RG, ‘classical’ approaches,20 one based upon the idealisations of mean
field theories, the other on a set of arguments due to Lev Landau.
Anachronisms abound, for both Landau’s theory and the general ideas behind
mean field theories had been around for several decades before Widom put forward
his scaling hypothesis. Nevertheless, it is illuminating for our discussion to exam-
ine how classical approaches account for universality via scaling. For Batterman
judges that no classical approach is able to provide a satisfactory explanation of
universality. Thus, contrasting their deficiencies with renormalisation techniques,
may give a clearer idea of what he holds to be original to the latter.
20In the context of theories of critical phenomena, ‘classical’ simply means an approach not
based on renormalisation techniques; there is no implied contrast with quantum physics. For
example: ‘classical’ mean field theories can be successfully applied to fully quantum-mechanical
models. However, it must be noted that a surprising number of successful models are also
‘classical’ in the non-quantum sense, even when it is known that the underlying interactions
must be quantum mechanical in nature.
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We start with an example from the wide variety of mean field theories (hence-
forth MFTs). Far more sophisticated varieties are, even today, at the theoretical
cutting edge, but a simple case suffices to exhibit the idealisations that are essential
to the general mean field approach.
3.3.1 Mean Field Theory
It has been said that there are as many ways of approaching Mean Field Theories as
there are authors writing on them, and this is probably a reasonable lower bound.
The idea common to all is to model each spin as interacting with an external field
chosen to summarise the effects of all the other spins that interact with it. So
rather than attempting to calculate the partition function based on the original
Ising Hamiltonian (Equation 3.12), we replace it with a mean field form, which
couples each spin to a field term, which may be as simple or as intricate as the
theoretician wishes. We shall consider a MFT for the Ising model with a fairly
transparent physical motivation.
The Bogoliubov Inequality
We start from the following inequality, which follows from a result known as the
Bogoliubov theorem:21
F ≤ F0 + 〈H −H0〉0 (3.23)
where F is the true free energy of the system with Hamiltonian H, H0 is a trial
Hamiltonian, F0 its free energy, and 〈x〉0 = tr
[
xe−βH0
]
/tr
[
e−βH0
]
, the ground
state expectation value of x. Now for any Hamiltonian of a given form, Equation
3.23 can be used to obtain the best possible estimate of the true free energy. For
21A proof of the inequality is given in most textbooks on condensed matter physics. For
example, see McComb (2004, 163).
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we simply write a trial Hamiltonian in the fixed form, with variable parameters,
and then adjust them to minimise the right-hand side of Equation 3.23.
So consider again the Ising model, which has the Hamiltonian:22
H = −J
∑
<ij>
sisj (3.24)
and consider a trial Hamiltonian of the very simple form:
H0 = −H0
∑
i
si (3.25)
where the adjustable parameter H0 gives the strength of the mean field. This gives
us:
F0 = −NkT ln(2 cosh βH0) (3.26)
〈s〉0 = tanh βH0 (3.27)
〈H −H0〉0 = −J
∑
<ij>
〈si〉0 〈sj〉0 +H0
∑
i
〈si〉0 (3.28)
For a translationally invariant system 〈si〉0 = 〈sj〉0 ≡ 〈s〉0. Substituting these into
Equation 3.23 and minimising with respect to H0 gives us:
H0 = Jz tanh βH0 (3.29)
〈s〉0 = tanh βJz 〈s〉0 (3.30)
Fmf = −NkT ln(2 cosh βJz 〈s〉0) +
NJz
2
〈s〉20 (3.31)
where z is the number of directly interacting spins (so z = 2d for a d-dimensional,
nearest-neighbour Ising model on a square lattice). In some respects, these three
22For simplicity, we consider a model without an external magnetic field.
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expressions appear good qualitative descriptions for the Ising model. For above
a certain temperature the equations have only one solution 〈s〉0 = 0, but below
it, another pair of finite solutions for 〈s〉0 appears. We identify this temperature
with the critical temperature Tc and the two new solutions as representing the two
ordered, magnetised states. But the equations also lead to an expression for the
critical temperature: kTc = Jz, which is erroneous: and not only quantitatively,
for it implies a finite temperature phase transition for the one-dimensional model,
the non-existence of which was demonstrated by Ising himself.
Mean Field Exponents
If we ignore these deficiencies then it is simple to use the framework of MFTs to
calculate the critical exponents. For example, we can define the reduced temper-
ature t ≡ T−Tc
Tc
and Equation 3.30 becomes:
〈s〉0 = tanh
〈s〉0
1 + t
. (3.32)
Expanding for small values of 〈s〉0 and t gives:
〈s〉0 = 〈s〉0 (1− t)−
〈s〉30
3
+O(〈s〉0 t2, 〈s〉30 t, 〈s〉50) (3.33)
Assuming that the system is sufficiently close to the critical point, we can ignore
the higher terms and obtain:
〈s〉0 ∼ (−t)
1
2 . (3.34)
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This gives a value for one of the critical exponents, β = 1
2
. The others can be
obtained similarly,23 and we derive the following values for the whole set: α = 0,
β = 1
2
, γ = 1, δ = 3, ν = 1
2
, η = 0. I omit the full details of the derivation, but
the important point to realise is that these values are foisted upon us as soon as
we adopt a mean-field form for the Hamiltonian. That is, the exact details of the
mean field H0 is irrelevant — our choice to use the idealisations inherent to mean
field theory, fixes those values for the exponents.
The Ginzburg Criterion
The most important idealisation involved in MFTs comes with imposing a partic-
ular form of Hamiltonian: that of Equation 3.25. This is a fairly radical simplifica-
tion, replacing all the interactions between the different spins, by a coupling to a
single field. Choosing a mean field value that saturates the Bogoliubov inequality
will mean that we select the best possible value of H0, but we must recognise that
it may not be good enough. The form of Equation 3.25 can be too restrictive if the
fluctuations away from the mean field contribute significantly to the free energy.
We can use MFT itself to give a self-consistent estimate as to the circumstances
under which which this will occur — an estimate known as the Ginzburg Criterion.
Again, I shall not give a full derivation here,24 but since the energy of a typical
fluctuation is of order kT , and its size is determined by the correlation length, we
can estimate the size of the free energy due to the fluctuations to be:
Ffluc ∼ kT
ξd
(3.35)
23To derive some further exponents (η and ν, in particular), it is necessary to use a rather
more sophisticated version of MFT, which allows magnetisation to vary smoothly with position.
See for example (McComb, 2004, 171-176).
24Once again, proofs can be found in most textbooks, e.g., Chaikin and Lubensky (1995,
214-217).
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which we need to be small compared to Fmf . Near the critical point, as t→ 0 we
can use the MFT values of the critical exponents to estimate when this will be so:
Fmf ∼ |t|2−α and ξ ∼ |t|−ν , so dν > 2− α (3.36)
With the MFT values ν = 1
2
and α = 0, this implies that MFT will fail in less
than four dimensions, since the correlation length ξ will diverge near the critical
point and the fluctuations away from mean field values can no longer be neglected.
But the Ginzburg Criterion is just a test of self-consistency: it neither implies that
MFT will be empirically successful while it remains self-consistent, nor that it will
be unsuccessful even when it is inconsistent. Besides, as we see in the following
section, there was an independent line of argument that seemed to suggest that
— at least as regards the critical exponents — the MFT values were correct for
systems of every dimensionality.
3.3.2 Landau Theory
The Landau theory of phase transitions was one of most successful approaches to
critical phenomena until the advent of renormalisation methods.25 It is based on
very plausible, general principles, which makes it all the more surprising to find
that it is in conflict with the exact results of Onsager, and with experiment.
Landau’s starting point was to identify an order parameter for each system, a
quantity chosen to characterise the collective order of the state.26 For the Ising
model, and in real ferromagnets, the appropriate choice is the magnetisation M :
zero in the disordered high-temperature states, and rising smoothly to non-zero
25The canonical exposition of Landau’s theory is in the textbook of Landau and Lifshitz (1959),
where various refinements are also discussed.
26I discuss order parameters in a little more detail in §2.4. The original discussions are in
Landau and Lifshitz (1959, 446-516), and illuminating ideas of how to formalise and extend the
concept into areas where it is less clearly defined, are discussed in Anderson (1989, 16-19).
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values as the system makes the transition to ordered states. Landau’s idea was
that if we restricted ourselves to spin configurations with a given large-scale order
(a given phase), the free energy would be analytic in M . It is only if we average
over a set of configurations belonging to more than one phase that we encounter
the singularities associated with a phase transition. He assumed that close to
T = Tc it is possible to Taylor-expand the free energy F(T,M) in powers of M .
F(T,M) = a0(T ) + a1(T )M2 + a2(T )M4 + ... (3.37)
where the odd powers vanish, due to an assumed symmetry under the flip transfor-
mation M → −M . We impose the condition that a2(T ) must always be positive,
since otherwise the free energy would fall with increasing M , giving an unstable
system.27 The critical point is then recognised by solving for the stationary point
of F , and by demanding non-trivial solutions, (i.e., that a2(T ) and a1(T ) have
opposite signs):
∂F
∂M
= 0 = 2a1(T )M + 4a2M
3 (3.38)
so that, neglecting the trivial solutions:
M = −
√
− a1
2a2
. (3.39)
27Recall that a minimum in the free energy gives thermodynamically stable states.
148
Assuming that a1 and a2 are also analytic in T , we obtain to a first approximation
that a1 = At, and a2 = B where A and B are constants, and t is the reduced
temperature. Substituting this back into Equation 3.37 gives us the non trivial
minima:
M± = ±
√
B
2C
t , for T < TC ; (3.40)
and by comparing this to Equation 3.2 we can see that the critical exponent β
is predicted to be 1
2
. A similar analysis lets us read off the Landau values of
all the critical exponents as: α = 0, β = 1
2
, γ = 1, δ = 3, i.e., exactly the
same as we obtained from Mean Field Theory.28 So Landau theory also predicts
universality. Indeed like MFT it goes too far: not only are values of the critical
exponents independent of the microphysical details, they do not even depend on
the dimensionality of the system.
But in the case of MFT, the Ginzburg Criterion has cautioned us that the
technique was not to be trusted for systems with d ≤ 4. Here there are no obvi-
ous caveats or alternatives to Landau’s analysis that would give rise to different
values for the exponents.29 It is possible to extend Landau’s theory by allowing
the order parameter to be a smoothly varying function in space, which gives a
far more realistic picture of the situation (recall the exponential drop-off of the
correlation function we saw in §3.2.1), but this still does not change the values
of the exponents, nor does it make them dependent on the dimensionality of the
system.
It was therefore a great theoretical puzzle that the exponents observed in ex-
periment, and those obtained from the Onsager exact solution, agreed in showing
28Again, we need to extend this simplest version of Landau’s theory in order to obtain predic-
tions for ν and η, but we shall not consider these elaborations here.
29Indeed Goldenfeld (1992, §7) provides a discussion of how dimensional analysis suggests that
the Landau values for the critical exponents are the only ones possible.
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Values of selected Critical Exponents
Exponent Variable Landau Values Ising d = 2 Ising d = 3
α Heat Capacity 0 0 0.12
β Order Parameter 1
2
1
8
0.31
γ Response Function 1 7
4
1.25
δ Critical Isotherm 3 15 5.20
ν Correlation Length 1
2
1 0.64
η Pair correlation at Tc 0
1
4
0.06
Table 3.1: A selection of critical exponents, comparing the Landau values, with
values from the Ising Model in two and three dimensions. For d = 2, the values
are taken from Onsager’s exact solution. For d = 3 they are obtained by numerical
simulation.
significant deviations from the Landau values. In fact, the Ginzburg Criterion of
MFT turns out to be a remarkably good guide to their range of validity. Above
the d = 4 upper critical dimension, numerical simulations of Ising models start
giving critical exponents in good agreement with the Landau values. But below
it, they diverge sharply from Landau’s predictions.30 In particular, experimental
values show a strong dependence on symmetry and dimensionality which neither
Landau theory nor MFT can account for (see Table 3.1). Thus, one could even
say that these approaches fail by predicting too much universality, for the results
suggest that the same values of the critical exponents will appear in an even wider
range of systems than actually do realise them.
But it is worth focussing on the fact that both of the classical approaches
do give correct predictions above four dimensions. There, the critical exponents
cease to have a dependence on dimensionality, and the Landau values become
completely universal. Thus, Landau and Mean Field theory are by no means
lacking in empirical success, albeit under a limited set of circumstances. It appears
30For certain cases, such as tricritical points and other varieties of ferromagnet, the upper
critical dimension can be three or lower, and Landau’s values for the critical exponents can be
observed in the real world.
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rather bad luck that the dimensions we are most interested in (two and three) are
not within this domain.
3.3.3 A Classical Explanation for Universality?
The partial empirical success of the classical theories in predicting universality
might lead us to ask whether either MFT or Landau theory could count as a
satisfactory explanatory strategy for multiple realisability on Batterman’s criteria.
I shall discuss this question further in §§3.4 & 3.5 when we can make a comparison
with the RG techniques, but I hope it is already clear that they are both deficient,
though they fall down on different points.
The universality predicted by Landau’s theory is very wide-ranging, but it
arises only because we imposed a form for the free energy on all near-critical
systems. This fixed form of free energy also determines the critical exponents, so a
prediction of universality is hardly surprising. It cannot fulfil Batterman’s criteria,
since is is not an explanation ‘completely grounded in the lower-level theory’, as
he demands. Rather, Landau’s theory ignores the details of the Ising Hamiltonian
altogether.
When we turn to the MFT approaches, we do take account of the microphysical
Hamiltonian, but only insofar as we replace it with one of Mean Field form. In cer-
tain circumstances this replacement might be justified, in others it might not. But
by imposing it in all cases, we are imposing properties in common between all the
ostensibly heterogeneous lower-level sets of properties: each Hamiltonian is judged
to be idealisable to a common mean-field form. And so we would contravene Bat-
terman’s restriction that we cannot explain universality by simply identifing a set
of lower-level properties sufficient to realise the higher-level properties. Imposing
a Hamiltonian of Mean Field form would amount to such a set of properties, since
it is sufficient to give us critical indices with a single set of values.
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To conclude: Landau’s approach violates Batterman’s criterion (A), since it
looks to the higher-level properties (i.e., those derived from the free energy F) and
imposes a common form upon these, giving an explanation which is not wholly
(nor even slightly) grounded in a lower-level theory. In contrast, Mean Field theory
violates his criterion (B), since it replaces each of the microphysical Hamiltonians
by one with a common form — a form sufficient to determine universal values for
the critical exponents.
Of course, this failure is to be expected once we read Batterman’s main claims,
since he holds that classical approaches fail to explain universality in a satisfactory
manner. It is the new strategies of renormalisation that he thinks do better, and
we turn now to those.
3.4 Kadanoff’s Approach: Real-Space Renormal-
isation
Soon after Widom postulated his scaling relations, Leo Kadanoff put forward a
very original approach to explain how they might arise, and to calculate values of
the critical exponents for the Ising model. His first paper on the subject (Kadanoff,
1966) is often seen as the first application of renormalisation techniques to critical
phenomena, though not yet as part of a comprehensive theory of critical phenom-
ena (nor did he link it to the techniques in field theory). Kadanoff suggested that
one could think of the effects of several spins, as combined into ‘blocks’, each of
which could be thought of having a single magnetic moment, and a simple nearest-
neighbour interaction. He then showed that this new block-model could also be
modelled as an Ising system, with a different effective temperature and magnetic
field. By applying these ideas, he was able to derive the Widom Scaling Laws (as
well as the further scaling laws of Fisher and Wilson).
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Kadanoff’s ideas contained much insight, but they were not entirely correct in
their assumptions. With no apparent malice, Wilson described his scheme as ‘ab-
surd, though leading to generalizations that are not absurd’ (Wilson, 1971b). The
scheme’s modern descendants are now called real-space renormalisation schemes,
which vary in their sophistication and empirical success, but all share the spirit of
Kadanoff’s original ideas. While they are relatively easy to understand, and usu-
ally provide the pedagogical introduction to renormalisation, they are not always
the best approach to give accurate predictions. Our physical example is again
the two-dimensional nearest-neighbour Ising model, with the Hamiltonian given
in Equation 3.12. (The following discussion draws on those of Maris and Kadanoff
(1978), Cardy (1996, §3), Goldenfeld (1992, §9) and Yeomans (1992, §8)).
3.4.1 A Real-Space Recursion Relation
The central idea of the Kadanoff approach is that if we can apply some transfor-
mation that maps an original problem to another at a different scale, we might
be able to compensate for this reduction by altering (renormalising) the param-
eters appearing in the Hamiltonian or Lagrangian of the system, in a way that
preserves all its large-scale properties. In a real-space approach to the Ising model
this approach can be implemented by taking the original lattice of spins, and
coarse-graining it according to some rule, to produce a new lattice that contains
fewer spins. We then rescale so that the the new lattice can be compared to the
old, and change the interaction parameters, to reproduce the large-scale proper-
ties. A transformation that changes the interactions in such a way, is known as a
recursion relation.
It is useful to consider reduced interaction couplings rather than the general
interaction parameters of Equation 3.11: J1i , J
2
ij, J
3
ijk, etc. We define K
a
ijk... ≡
Jaijk.../kT , and denote the whole set as [K]. Also, though a system is usually
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considered in the thermodynamic limit, it is conceptually useful to consider a finite
system. We can then think of the recursion relation as relating our original problem
involving N spins to one involving N ′ ≡ N/bd, thus reducing the degrees of freedom
by a factor bd, (where b is the spatial scaling factor, and d the dimensionality of
the lattice) described by new spin variables {s′I}, I = 1, ..., N ′, and a new set
of coupling constants [K ′]. We can write a recursion relation for the coupling
constants:31
[K ′] = Rb[K] where b > 1. (3.41)
We can divide the action of a general recursion relation into three stages:
1. Reduce the degrees of freedom — in this case, collect the spins into ‘block
spins’.
2. Rescale — in this case, shrink all the lengths to recover the original lattice
spacing.
3. Renormalise — readjust the interaction parameters on the new lattice so
that the higher-level properties are the same as the original.
One possible procedure of implementing stage 1 is illustrated in Figure 3.2. It is
a particularly crude reduction method that collects spins into blocks, by simply
throwing out half of them, a procedure known as decimation. In the notation used
above, we can implement the rule with the specifications: s′i ≡ s2i and N ′ ≡ N2 .
Another well-known procedure for reducing the degrees of freedom is known as
blocking, where we take the majority “vote” of several spins, and replace the block
with a single spin in the direction voted for (see Figure 3.3). More sophisticated
procedures can involve taking a transformation rule with several adjustable pa-
rameters, and tuning the values of these parameters to match experiment.
31Despite being called the Real-Space Renormalisation Group, the transformation need not
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√2a
a
Figure 3.2: An arrangement of spins on a lattice, before and after a decimation
transformation, which simply removes every other spin to produce a lattice which
must be rescaled by a factor of b =
√
2 to be comparable to the original.
How we implement the rescaling of stage 2 then depends on the details of the
first stage. For the decimation procedure illustrated in Figure 3.2 we just rescale
all the lengths associated with the problem by a factor b =
√
2, since this is the
factor by which all lengths have to be shrunk to reproduce the original lattice. For
the blocking procedure of Figure 3.3, it is equally clear that b = 3. And the more
sophisticated rules give rise to their own rescaling factors.
Stage 3 is usually the most difficult to implement. The aim is to transform
the parameter values such that the large scale properties are preserved. As before,
we take these to be the thermodynamic quantities obtainable from the partition
function Z, and the free energy F (though it is easier to work with the free energy
per spin g). So given the “block spins” s′i produced in the first step, we look for
have an inverse (since b > 1 always). However, it is transitive: Rb1b2 [K] = Rb1 · Rb2 [K], and
does have an identity R1 = e; so it is a semi-group, or monoid.
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a 3a
Figure 3.3: An arrangement of spins before and after a majority-rule transforma-
tion, which groups the spins into blocks of nine, prodoucing a lattice which must
be scaled by a factor of b = 3 to be comparable to the original.
new parameter values K ′ that preserve these functions, i.e. those such that:
ZN [K] = ZN ′ [K
′] (3.42)
g[K] = b−dg[K ′] (3.43)
(the factor of b−d appears in the free energy per spin because of the reduction in
the number of spins after the blocking). If we were to impose these conditions
exactly, they would almost determine K ′ in terms of K. For consider P ({si}), the
probability that the original spins take the set of values {si}. This means that,
considering the reduced Hamiltonian H as a function of these spins {si}:
P ({si}) = 1
Z
e−H{si} (3.44)
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But our chosen blocking rule has already told us how to obtain the set {s′j} from
{si}, so the condition becomes:
P ′({si}) = P ′({s′j}) =
1
Z ′
e−H
′{s′j} (3.45)
where Z ′ =
∑
s′j
e−H
′{s′j} (3.46)
This constrains H to within an additive constant which can be fixed by some
normalisation condition.
However, imposing the conditions of Equations 3.42 and 3.43 exactly must be
seen as an ideal. Some very artificial models, such as the heirarchical Dyson model,
allow it: given a suitable reduction rule, there is an effective Hamiltonian for the
reduced system that preserves Z exactly, and is of the same form as the original
Hamiltonian. But this is not so for the Ising model, nor for any other realistic ones.
If we are to faithfully reproduce the physics of the original lattice, our effective
Hamiltonian would have to include not only nearest-neighbour interactions, but
also the next-nearest neighbour, and introduce four-spin terms (since the nearest-
neighbour interactions in the original lattice would have to be allowed for). This
means that even if we start with the simple nearest-neighbour form of Equation
3.12, a single application of the recursion relation will immediately generate more
complex terms, and repeated applications will quickly lead us to unmanageable
Hamiltonians.
There are many different ways of making a compromise. We might cut off all
interactions above a certain order, or design the recursion relation such that it
does not generate higher-order terms. The design of real-space transformations
can sometimes seem more than an art than a science. To quote Kadanoff: ‘if we
know the answer, we can always invent a renormalization transformation to find
it’.
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The question is whether these approximations that we are forced to make can
be controlled and justified. The answer depends on both the model considered
and the quantities we are attempting to calculate. And it is surprising how often
reasonable results can be derived from fairly crude approximations. But whether
the transformations are exact, or approximate, the crucial point is that the details
of the procedure must be tailored for each model we consider. That is, to construct
a real-space recursion relation we need to pay close attention to the microphysics of
the system, and a recursion relation appropriate for one model will not in general
be appropriate for another, and may give spurious results.
3.4.2 Parameter Space
Let us assume for the moment that an appropriate recursion relation has been
constructed for our model. Now consider the high-dimensional space co-ordinatised
by the set of parameters [K]. We call this a parameter space and can think of each
point as directly representing a possible interaction Hamiltonian (though we can
also think of each point as corresponding to the equilibrium state(s) of the system
with that interaction Hamiltonian).
We can separate two mechanisms which would be represented by “motion” in
parameter space. The more obvious one is an experimental operation by which we
can physically alter some of the parameter values. The set of parameters [K] rep-
resent both easily adjustable parameters such as temperature or external magnetic
field, and less easily adjustable ones such as the the nearest-neighbour interaction
strengths. When movement is along directions representing only changes the easily
adjustable parameters, it is natural to associate the region covered by that move-
ment with a single physical system. For example, a line could represent a single
system at a range of temperatures; a plane, a system at different temperatures
and magnetic fields. It is perhaps less natural to think of a single system in other
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cases; for example, the most practical way of changing interaction strengths is
to substitute a system composed of one material with another. However, we will
consider an idealised experimental set-up and treat the two cases alike. As any
parameter is varied, we can think of a single system as tracing out a path in the
parameter space.
A second mechanism that could be represented as motion is the action of the
recursion relation we considered in the last section. Each application of Rb maps
a point [K] to point [K ′], thus moving from a point representing one Hamiltonian
(and thus one equilibrium state) to another. Owing to the nature of the ‘major-
ity rule’ and ‘decimation’ procedures, we have been considering discrete recursion
relations; each application would be represented by a discrete ‘hop’ in the space.
But it is usual to generalise the idea of recursion relations to include continuous
versions, parameterised by the length rescaling parameter b. We call the paths
traced by the action of the recursion relation, flows in the parameter space. Our
conditions on designing an appropriate recursion relation should ensure that we
shall never find ourselves leaving the original space (since the transformed Hamil-
tonian remains constrained to the original form), and that the large-scale physics
is preserved along the whole flow (since the partition function and the free energy
are suitably scaled and expressed in terms of new variables by equations 3.42 and
3.43).
If we think of each point in parameter space as representing an equilibrium state
of the physical system with the corresponding interaction Hamiltonian, we expect
that some will be tractable using the orthodox methods of statistical mechanics,
and some will not. (In particular those systems which are near their critical points
and have large values of ξ are amongst the intractable). But tractable or not, we
can be sure that if two states are related by a suitable recursion relation, their
higher-level, thermodynamic properties will be the same. Kadanoff’s original idea
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was that if one could not analyse systems at, or near to their critical states, it might
be possible to transform them to ones that were further away from criticality, and
that could be analyzed by orthodox techniques.
But this is not quite how the modern procedure for calculating critical expo-
nents works. Instead of looking directly at the systems related by the recursion
relation, we look at the flows it induces. The fixed points : systems whose parame-
ters are unchanged by Rb, turn out to play a critical role (pun intended). At these
points we have:
[K∗] = Rb[K∗]. (3.47)
Now consider the correlation length ξ as a function of [K]. At a fixed point it
will have a single definite value, since it is a function of K∗, but we also know
that applying the recursion relation shrinks all lengths by a factor of b. So we can
write:
ξ[K∗] =
1
b
ξ[K∗] (3.48)
Therefore, ξ[K∗] = 0 or ∞. We call these trivial and critical fixed points, respec-
tively. We assume that R is analytic32 at [K∗] and linearise parameter values close
to this fixed point:
Kn = K
∗
n + δKn. (3.49)
Applying the recursion relation [K ′] = Rb[K] we obtain:
K ′n = K
∗
n +
∑
m
TnmδKm +O[(δK)
2], where Tnm =
∂K ′n
∂Km
∣∣∣∣
Km=K∗m
. (3.50)
32This is a strong assumption, since we know that the free energy itself is not analytic at the
fixed point. See Wilson (1971a) for a discussion.
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We now examine the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of this matrix T. We can write
each of the left eigenvalues33 in terms of the length scaling factor b to a certain
power yi. We call these left eigenvalues the RG eigenvalues :
∑
n
φinTnm = b
yiφim (3.51)
where φim are the left eigenvectors. The sign of the exponents yi give us the stability
properties of the fixed points. This can be seen by defining scaling variables :
ui ≡
∑
m φ
i
mδKm, which are linear combinations of deviations away from the fixed
point. Their significance comes from the fact that they transform linearly under
Rb near the fixed point:
u′i =
∑
m
φimδK
′
m =
∑
mn
φimTmnδKn =
∑
n
byiφinδKn = b
yiui. (3.52)
It is useful to classify the eigenvectors according to the signs of their eigenvalues:
• yi > 0: Iterating the RG increases ui away from the fixed point, and we have
a relevant eigenvalue, direction and scaling variable.
• yi < 0: Iterating the RG decreases ui towards the fixed point, and we have
an irrelevant eigenvalue, direction and scaling variable.
• yi = 0: We cannot tell from the linearised equations where ui will move, and
we have a marginal eigenvalue, direction and scaling variable. Higher order
terms may be needed to analyse these further.
The direction of the flows near the fixed point are determined by these distinctions.
Let us call the set of initial parameters that flow to a particular fixed point, the
basin of attraction of that point. (At present, we can only identify basins within
33The matrix T is not in general symmetric, so the left and right eigenvalues may not be the
same. In the cases we are dealing with, the left eigenvalues will be real.
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Classification of Fixed Points (FP)
Relevant ξ Name Physical Domain
0 0 Sink Bulk Phase
1 0 Discontinuous FP Plane of coexistence
1 0 Continuous FP Bulk Phase
2 0 Triple Point Triple Point
2 ∞ Critical Fixed Point Critical Manifold
>2 ∞ Multicritical point Multicritical point
>2 0 Multi-coexistence FP Multi-coexistence FP
Table 3.2: A selection of fixed points, and the phases associated with them (taken
from Goldenfeld (1992))
the immediate region around each fixed point, but by linearity we expect the basins
to extend outside these regions.)
There are two main properties by which we can categorise the fixed points (see
Table 3.2). The first is their codimension, which is (here) defined as the number
of relevant eigenvalues of the fixed point. This is important, because it determines
the dimensionality of the space of nearby flows which will be “attracted” by that
point. For example, if the fixed point has no relevant eigenvalues, it is said to
have a co-dimension zero; these points are called sinks, since all nearby flows
head towards them as the recursion relation is iterated. (This is what typically
happens at high and low temperature limits.) The dimensionality of their basins
of attraction is equal to the total dimensionality of the parameter space.
The significance of sinks can be understood by considering a nearby point falling
within their basin of attraction. Since iteration of the recursion relation will bring
any flow closer to the fixed point, changing its parameter values, but not the nature
of its free energy or partition function, we might expect it to share the thermody-
namic characteristics of that fixed point. And this is indeed the case (assuming
that the fixed point is a simple attractor). Fixed points with codimension zero
indicate bulk phases of a substance, and in a ferromagnetic system, the points
162
in these basins of attraction will be the directionally magnetised low-temperature
phases, and the unmagnetised high-temperature phase. In a fluid system, they
might include the gaseous phase and the liquid phase. Note that because of their
codimensionality, these bulk phases are very easy to find, we do not need to ‘tune’
our parameter values finely in order to put the system in the basins of attraction
of their fixed points — accordingly, these are the phases of systems that we will
observe, unless we prepare our experiments very carefully indeed.
Consider a fixed point in parameter space with a non-zero number of relevant
scaling directions. This number n is the codimension of the fixed point, and our
basin of attraction will be (N − n)-dimensional, where N is the total number of
parameters.34 So we must ‘tune’ n parameters to locate a state in the basin of
attraction of a fixed point of codimension n. Accordingly, these states will be
much harder to explore than those of a bulk phase. If these subspaces are not
reachable by adjusting the experimentally controllable parameters, it is possible
that the corresponding phases might not physically appear in certain systems.
Given that the high and low temperature phases of the ferromagnet both con-
tain sinks, this suggests that there may be a ‘watershed’ in the parameter space
between points that flow to the high and low temperature fixed points. And this
is so; the “watershed” hypersurface contains a fixed point of codimension two. All
flows within the surface are attracted to this fixed point, but those outside it end
up in high or low temperature phases.
The second property useful for the categorisation of fixed points is the value of
the correlation length ξ. As suggested in Equation 3.48, at a fixed point ξ can only
take the values 0 — a trivial fixed point, (such as high and low temperature) and
∞— a critical fixed point. This is important, because as we saw in §3.3.1, classical
methods tend to fail as ξ becomes very large. But here, a word of warning: due
34We ignore the fact that in realistic cases, the parameter space may be infinite-dimensional.
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to this failure of classical methods, the analysis of systems nearing critical points
is particularly associated with renormalisation techniques. But this particularly
fruitful application of RG techniques must be distinguished from the techniques
themselves, and it is important to emphasise these techniques have no intrinsic
restriction to critical phenomena. It is just that other methods tend to fail in
those regions.35
At a critical fixed point, the correlation length ξ is infinite. As suggested by
Equation 3.48, ξ must also be infinite at all points within the basin of attraction
of such a fixed point, a sub-space which we call the critical surface. Our watershed
hypersurface is such a critical surface, for its fixed point turns out to be a critical
fixed point, and as such, all points within the surface have infinite correlation
length, suggesting that they are associated with systems reaching their respective
critical points.
3.4.3 Near-Critical Systems
Consider the three dimensional parameter space represented in Figure 3.4, which
contains a fixed point K∗ with one relevant and two irrelevant eigenvalues. From
the discussion of codimension in the last section, we see that we need to adjust
only one parameter of the system to end up in this two dimensional critical surface.
Let us assume that this is easily adjustable — temperature, for example — such
that our system’s states are represented by a path such as the one illustrated in
the diagram, passing through the critical surface at some point Kc. It is here that
the system reaches its critical point. (In contrast, the Ising model has two relevant
eigenvalues, so we need to adjust two parameters, usually the external magnetic
35An example of applying RG techniques to non-critical phenomena is the Nienhuis-Nauenberg
criterion, which can be used to determine the existence of first-order phase transitions (Nienhuis
and Nauenberg, 1975). The low-temperature fixed point must display one eigenvalue of bd if a
plane of coexistence is to appear (Goldenfeld, 1992, 268-9). The correlation length ξ remains
small throughout this analysis, but it is an RG analysis nonetheless.
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Critical
Surface
K*
Kc
Kn
Figure 3.4: A critical surface in parameter space with a fixed point K∗, which
has two irrelevant and one relevant eigenvector. The bold curved line represents
a system passing through criticality at Kc, with the effect of four iterations of
the recursion relation marked by the square boxes, remaining within the critical
surface. Kn is close to, but not on the critical surface, and the effect of six iterations
of the RG are shown as the diamond-shaped boxes, at first approaching the critical
point along the irrelevant eigenvector, and then veering away along the relevant
one.
field and the temperature, to reach criticality).
First let us take the case of a system which comes to criticality in the imme-
diate vicinity of K∗, where the linearised equation 3.50 is valid, and consider the
effect of the recursion relation on the scaling variables. The distinction between
the relevant and irrelevant eigenvalues becomes crucial, since as we iterate the
recursion relation, the relevant components grow, while the irrelevant ones shrink.
Any quantity that can be expressed in terms of the scaling variables will thereby
become dominated by the small number of relevant ones as we approach the critical
point.
Now consider a system at criticality, such as the one marked as Kc in Figure
3.4, but far enough from the fixed point K∗ that the linearised equations are not
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valid. From Equation 3.48, we can expect R to transform systems at criticality
to systems at criticality, always keeping ξ = ∞, and thus remaining within the
critical manifold. Both the system illustrated in Figure 3.4, and the simplest
ferromagnetic systems have only a single fixed point within the critical surface,
and so ignoring any strange limiting behaviour of the fixed point Kc will flow
towards K∗ by iteration of R and thus within the linearised regime.36
Most importantly, those systems that are near, but not at criticality also flow
towards the fixed point, by continuity with those in the critical surface. If they are
brought close enough to their critical points, the flow from states representing many
realistic systems can be expected to pass within the linearised region near the fixed
point. (Again, we ignore complications such as ‘dangerous’ irrelevant eigenvalues,
cross-over behaviour, surface effects, etc.). Figure 3.4 shows this behaviour for our
case of one relevant eigenvalue. Kn is not within the linearised region of the fixed
point nor is it actually within the critical surface, but the flow is still influenced
by the critical fixed point. As shown in the diagram, under iterations of R, the
flow follows one of the irrelevant (attractive) eigenvectors to within the regime
where the linearised equations become valid — then veers away along the relevant
(repulsive) eigenvector.
3.4.4 Calculating the Critical Exponents
It is possible to use Kadanoff’s insights to derive the Widom Scaling hypothesis for
an Ising-like system with two scaling variables. We have to adjust two parameter
values: the external magnetic field h and the (reduced) temperature t, to arrive at
the critical point, and so we expect there to be two relevant scaling variables, which
36The simplifying assumptions of there being only one fixed point within the critical surface,
and the exclusion of odd limiting behaviour, disqualifies most of the more fascinating work on
critical phenomena: cross-over effects and ‘dangerous’ irrelevant variables are just two important
effects which are examples of exactly such behaviour.
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we identify as relating to each of these parameters. From Equation 3.43, we have
a rule for how the singular part of g transforms homogeneously: g[K] = b−dg[K ′]
under the recursion relation (or at least an ideal one).37 Near the fixed point, we
can write this as depending on the relevant scaling variables ut, and uh, ignoring
the irrelevant ones for the moment:
g[ut, uh] = b
−dg[bytut, byhuh] = b−ndg[bnytut, bnyhuh] (3.53)
where we have iterated the recursion relation n times in the last step. This cannot
be too large, or the linearity assumption will break down; so we must halt the
iteration at some arbitrary point which is still within the region of linearity. If we
make a suitable choice of scaling factors t0 and h0 we can solve for n to obtain:
g[t, h] =
∣∣∣∣ tt0
∣∣∣∣d/yt Φ( h/h0|t/t0|yh/yt
)
(3.54)
where Φ is a scaling function, depending on the scaling variables alone. This
form of the free energy is of the form postulated by Widom (compare to equation
3.20), and so the Griffiths and Rushbrooke equalities follow directly. But now the
parameters are not arbitrary, but determined by the eigenvalues associated with
37We ignore any terms of g that remain analytic at the critical point, since they play no part
in the critical behaviour.
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the fixed point:
Specific heat C:
∂2g
∂t2
∣∣∣∣
h=0
∼ |t|d/yt−2 , so α = 2− d
yt
(3.55)
Magnetisation M :
∂g
∂h
∣∣∣∣
h=0
∼ (−t)
d−yh
yt , so β =
d− yh
yt
(3.56)
Susceptibility χ:
∂2g
∂h2
∣∣∣∣
h=0
∼ |t|d/yt−2 , so γ = 2yh − d
yt
(3.57)
Magnetisation (as t→ 0): ∂g
∂h
∣∣∣∣
t→0
∼ hd/yh−1 , so δ = yh
d− yh (3.58)
So if we have chosen an explicit form for the recursion relation, we can insert values
for yt and yh, and calculate the critical exponents.
Some further details must be mentioned. We ignored the irrelevant scaling
variables in the analysis above, because the iterated action of R shrinks them
down so that they become insignificant compared to the relevant ones. But it
turns out they are not completely irrelevant: they provide small corrections to the
values of the critical exponents. One can see that this is plausible by looking again
at Figure 3.4. The irrelevant directions are those two on the critical surface that
‘attract’ the flow in towards the fixed point, and though their contributions are
suppressed by the iteration of the recursion relation, the outward flow exits near
the relevant direction, not quite on it. The amount of this deviation is controlled
by the irrelevant scaling variables, so we require a skilled experimentalist to drive
the system very close to the critical point, if we are to obtain accurate values for
the critical exponents.
There are also situations in which dangerous irrelevant variables appear (i.e.,
those that are not expandable as a Taylor series around the critical point), and
these can affect the critical free energy in more dramatic ways. Fixed points in
the same parameter space can also interfere with one another, and “cross-over”
behaviour can be predicted and analysed. But these can be accommodated only
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in more sophisticated approaches to RG analysis, and quickly become technically
challenging. We are still in search of the explanatory strategy itself, so will ignore
all of these more interesting possibilities to concentrate on the simplest cases.
3.4.5 An RG Explanation for Universality?
With these results, it looks as though Kadanoff’s method has allowed us to achieve
the aims set out in §3.2.2, to derive the Widom scaling hypothesis, and to provide
a method of calculating the critical exponents. At this point in introductory
physics textbooks and philosophical discussions, it is usual to state that we have
an explanation of universality, which proceeds along the lines of the discussion in
the last few sections: since the critical exponents are determined by the features of
the critical fixed point, and many different critical systems across the parameter
space lie in the basin of attraction of the same fixed point under the recursion
relation, these exponents will be universal. This certainly seems to be Batterman’s
own position:
It turns out that different physical Hamiltonians can flow to the same
fixed point. Thus, their critical behaviours are characterized by the
same critical exponents. This is the essence of the explanation for the
universality of critical behaviour. Hamiltonians describing different
physical systems fall into the basin of attraction of the same renormal-
ization group fixed point. (Batterman, 2000, 127)
Similar statements can be found throughout the literature on RG techniques and
critical phenomena.38
But the Kadanoff real-space RG approach seems to me to fail to provide an
explanation of universality — and also to fail in fulfilling Batterman’s criteria.
38For the physics textbooks, see for example: Cardy (1996, Ch.3), Yeomans (1992) and Binney
et al. (1992, Ch.5) (though the latter does offer a comparison with the explanation offered by
other theories). For the philosophical discussions, see for example: Liu (2001), Yi (2000), Huggett
(2002, 270n), Hughes (1999), Batterman (2002a, §4.1) and (1998, §5) as well as the work quoted
above.
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Further, I think that these faults goes deeper than a reliance on any over-simplified
exposition of Kadanoff’s methods.
Let us look at the Batterman’s two criteria in turn. It is true that Kadanoff’s
approach does better than Landau’s approach in satisfying desideratum (A), that
the explanation must be ‘completely grounded in the lower-level theory’. Recall
that Landau imposed the requirement that all near-critical systems should have
a particular form of the free energy, and this form determines the Landau values
for the critical exponents. This was done without reference to the microphysical
Hamiltonian of the systems in question, but by defining the order parameter M ,
and writing down a reasonably general form for F , consistent with symmetry
considerations. In contrast, the Kadanoff RG techniques start from the lower-level
theory, dealing directly with a Hamiltonian which encodes all the microphysical
interactions amongst the spins. The recursion relation was constructed in the
light of the details of this Hamiltonian, and the critical exponents derived from
the fixed points of that relation. In this sense, Kadanoff’s approach is certainly
an advance on Landau’s; it explains on microphysical grounds (that is, in terms of
the properties of the Hamiltonian) why the Ising model has the critical exponents
it does.
But this attention to microphysical detail was also present in the classical Mean
Field approaches. We dismissed these on the grounds that they violated Batter-
man’s condition (B), that explanation not simply provide a list of microphysical
properties sufficient to realise the higher-level ones. The Mean Field approach in-
volves idealising each microphysical Hamiltonian to the best available Mean Field
form, and this form is indeed sufficient to realise the classical critical exponents.
But here we observe that Kadanoff RG has exactly the same fault, since we had
to tailor the recursion relation to return the same form of Hamiltonian — in our
example, the Ising form. Once this is decided upon, the explanation relies upon
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imposing this single recursion relation on all the models it is applied to. Like the
Mean Field approach, this amounts to an assumption that all the microphysical
Hamiltonian share microphysical properties. Of course, we can make this assump-
tion less restrictive by accepting a more sophisticated recursion relation, just as
we could adopt a more sophisticated form of Mean Field theory. But in neither
case does the additional sophistication change the fact that our choice determined
the critical exponents.
Again, we face the question of whether this idealisation is a justified one. Cer-
tainly, it should be justifiable for Ising models, for the recursion relation was
tailored to the microphysics of the Ising model. But consider applying a recursion
relation tailored for the Ising model, to non-Ising models. Even if the action of
this relation induces a flow which comes within the basin of attraction of the same
fixed point, this does not demonstrate universality (unless we assume what we are
setting out to prove) for we have no guarantee that it is appropriate to apply the
relation to the original models.
Of course we can go ahead anyway, and draw wide-ranging conclusions from
the nature of the fixed points belonging to our Ising-tailored recursion relation.
But this is exactly analogous to what we did in the Mean Field approaches, where
we did not worry about the Ginzburg criterion, nor any other indication that a
Mean Field form of Hamiltonian was a justifiable idealisation, but went ahead to
use it anyway.
So while the Kadanoff RG may give us a good derivation of critical exponents
for each specific model, it fails to explain universality in a way superior to the
classical approaches. What we argued in §3.4.2 is that all Hamiltonians whose
flows approach a critical fixed point share the same critical exponents. So in order
to explain universality we would need to show that all systems in a universality
class have flows that come near to the same fixed point. But there seems little
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hope of establishing such a conclusion by an argument along Kadanoff’s lines.
Furthermore, the most obvious methods of plugging this explanatory gap negate
the advantages of the Kadanoff approach. If we simply stipulate that all Hamil-
tonians sharing a universality class must share a form of recursion relation (or
at least share its fixed points) then the universality “explained” by the Kadanoff
approach seems no less an artefact of our stipulations than it is in the Mean Field
approach. On the other hand, if we construct a recursion relation for each of the
Hamiltonians in turn, and succeed in demonstrating that they share fixed points,
this would be restating the fact of universality, not explaining it. We might as
well model each system on a computer and demonstrate directly that the critical
exponents matched. Finally, a simple appeal to empirical success cannot help us:
recall that the classical theories do get the exponents right for d > 4, where it
stipulates a particular form of Hamiltonian no less than it does for d ≤ 3.
So it appears that in as much as a recursion relation is based on an analysis of
a particular Hamiltonian, Kadanoff’s approach can satisfy Batterman’s criterion
(A), but not (B), for much the same reasons as could MFT. Thus, if mean field
theory is not a satisfactory microphysical explanation for universality, I cannot see
that the Kadanoff real-space RG approach does any better.
None of this is to say that renormalisation techniques cannot succeed in pro-
viding an explanation of universality, but we need very different arguments. I shall
argue that we need the insights of Kenneth Wilson, who provided far more power-
ful methods of renormalisation and put forward a very different understanding of
the technique. However, as we shall see, the Wilsonian RG operates from a very
different stand-point than does Kadanoff.
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3.5 The Wilsonian Renormalisation Group
Our criticisms of the Kadanoff real-space approach suggests a path by which the
RG approach could hope to explain universality. If we are to hold that the crit-
ical exponents are governed by the nature of flows near a fixed point, we must
demonstrate why we expect all the systems in a universality class to flow within
the vicinity of a single fixed point. That is, we must provide an account of how a
transformation appropriate to each of the model systems can be shown to take us
to the domain of attraction of that fixed point.
Just such an account was provided by Ken Wilson in his Nobel-prize winning
work.39 In contrast to Kadanoff’s approach, Wilson’s techniques do not tie them-
selves to any particular microphysical model, nor even to a lattice. Instead, we
consider an effective Hamiltonian; that is, one that represents a continuous field on
space, chosen to represent the collective properties of a large number of interacting
spins. A particularly useful form for such a field is known as the Landau-Ginzburg-
Wilson (LGW) Hamiltonian, which we will focus on in this exposition.
There are a variety of approaches to the LGW Hamiltonian: we can view it
as an improvement to Landau Theory (Wilson, 1982/1993, 104); as a generalised
approach to Ising-like models and their variants (Wilson and Kogut, 1974, 95); or
even as a particularly sophisticated version of a Mean Field Theory (Binney et al.,
1992, §7). In each of these cases, we end up with a Hamiltonian, partition function,
and free energy for a field, with a form general enough to cover a large number of
microphysical models. In what follows I shall follow Wilson in considering how we
might develop the Landau theory of phase transitions.
39The comprehensive review article of Wilson and Kogut (1974) provides technical details, and
Wilson’s Nobel acceptance speech Wilson (1982/1993), includes a useful historical section which
lays out the influence that Kadanoff’s ideas had on his thinking.
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3.5.1 The Landau-Ginzburg-Wilson Effective Hamiltonian
We mentioned in §3.3.2 that rather than considering the order parameter as a
mean magnetization M , a constant scalar over all space, we can consider it as a
function of position, m(x). And the order parameter need not be a scalar: we can
generalise further, and allow it to be a continuous d-component field φ(x). Any
Hamiltonian, partition function or free energy that depends upon this field will not
be a simple function, but a functional. We then want to consider a Hamiltonian
density, rather than a Hamiltonian, which I will signify by h[(x)], such that:
H =
∫
ddxh[φ(x)] (3.59)
The associated partition functional is then:
Z =
∫
Dφe−β
∫
ddxh[φ(x)] (3.60)
with the free energy and other thermodynamic functions now functionals, but
obtained from Z in the same way as before. The exact meaning of the functional
integration of Equation 3.60 will be discussed later, but for the moment it can be
understood as implying a sum over all possible field configurations.
Recall that the form of the free energy in the Landau approach was held to be:
F(T,M) = a0(T ) + a1(T )M2 + a2(T )M4 + ... (3.61)
In contrast to Landau’s approach, we do not formulate LGW theory by imposing
a form on the free energy. Instead we impose a form on the effective Hamiltonian
density, h: one consistent with the symmetries of a ferromagnet, and with the
existence of short-range interactions. In the absence of an external field, a plausible
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form for a system with short-range interactions can be argued to be:40
hLGW =
1
2
α2 |∇φ(x)|2 + 1
2
µ2φ(x)2 +
λ
4!
φ(x)4 (3.62)
where α, µ and λ are phenomenological parameters, to be filled in to match the
system in question. (This slightly unfortunate notation comes to us from quantum
field theory. In particular, we should not confuse the parameter α in this equation,
with the critical exponent.) Briefly: the first term is made to be dependent on
the gradient of the field, to take account of a short-range interaction. Thus the
parameter α controls the strength of a “nearish-neighbour” interaction. µ is a tem-
perature dependent positive parameter which controls the phase transition. λ is
known as the coupling parameter, another terminological hang-over from quantum
field theory.
It is important to emphasise that this is an effective, phenomenological Hamil-
tonian: one that makes no mention of the microphysical spins themselves. Instead,
φ(x) is an order parameter field on space — in this case interpreted as a field of
magnetisation-density — and it is meant to sum up the effective contributions of
a large number of spins. The LGW form of Hamiltonian density in Equation 3.62
is intended to be general enough to cope with the effects of a large number of
microphysical models (including the Ising model — Binney et al. (1992, 400-4)).
Assuming once more the validity of Gibbsian statistical mechanics, the partition
function for the LGW model is:
ZLGW =
∫
Dφe−β
∫
ddxhLGW (φ) (3.63)
40There are many ways to motivate this Landau-Ginzburg-Wilson form. One accessible and
intuitive approach is given in Binney et al. (1992, 178-183). The papers of Wilson and Fisher
(1972) and Wilson and Kogut (1974, 90-123) discuss the reasons for believing that it will be a
good approach for many models in dimensions close to four.
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where the notation
∫ Dφ again signifies a functional integral: the integrand is a
summed over all ‘admissable’ values of the order parameter field φ. The meaning of
‘admissable’ needs to be considered carefully. We have good reason to believe that
this Hamiltonian should not take account of variations in the fields below the scale
of the lattice spacing a. For it is difficult to make sense of the order parameter
field fluctuating smoothly with wavelengths smaller than a. This demand that
φ(x), not vary on too small a scale can be implemented by considering the Fourier
transform of φ(x) and introducing a cut-off parameter, Λ:
φ(x) =
∫ Λ
k=0
ddk
(2pi)d
eik.xφ˜(k) (3.64)
so that no functions with a wavenumber above Λ will be considered. (To be more
exact, any fluctuations on a scale smaller than this are assumed to have been
averaged over, and absorbed into the parameters α, µ and λ of Equation 3.62.)
3.5.2 The Cut-off Λ and a Recursion Relation
By these means, we introduce an effective Hamiltonian density, which depends on
several parameters: α, µ and λ as well as the cut-off Λ. The full LGW functional
integral of Equation 3.63 is usually tackled by setting λ = 0, reducing the LGW
form reduces to the tractable Gaussian model, and then treating the full LGW
form as some sort of perturbation to this Gaussian model. A variety of systematic
approximation schemes have been invented for calculating ZLGW , most of them
adapted from previous work in quantum field theory.
Amongst the most powerful systems are those based on Feynman diagrams,
where we associate each term in an expansion of the functional integral with a
simple diagram, and then sort the behaviour of the terms by their topological
properties. We can then evaluate the integral to various orders by ensuring that
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we have included all expressions associated with the appropriate diagrams. The
highly technical details of these techniques are not crucial to us here.41 All we
need to know is that all methods of evaluating the integrals give us diverging sums,
unless we impose a cut-off Λ as a further parameter — a phenomenon known as
ultra-violet divergence.
In the context of condensed matter, this is not particularly surprising, once
we think about the physics of the system. We know that the theory will not be
realistic at small scales, since eventually we will be integrating field fluctuations
with wavelengths comparable to the lattice spacing, and at this point our effective
Hamiltonian can no longer be valid — the physics will become utterly different at
these scales, and our approach will break down. Yet while a cut-off is necessary,
we also require that the details of how we impose it should be irrelevant to the
results. For example, let us say that we simply ignore all fluctuations below a
certain wavelength: a particularly crude method. This imposition of a sharp cut-
off is just as physically unrealistic a feature of a condensed matter system, as would
be a series carried to arbitrarily short scales.
Thus, while we must always impose a cut-off, the details of how it is to be
imposed should not be important. We ensure this by calculating the differences
in the large-scale physics that occur when we change to a different value of cut-off
Λ → Λ + δΛ, and calculate the changes we must make to the other parameters
of the effective Hamiltonian hLGW in order to compensate. This is equivalent
to looking at how we can absorb the effects of all of the interaction details with
wavenumbers between Λ and Λ+δΛ, into renormalised values of the parameters α,
µ and λ. Under good conditions, we can come up with a transformation which can
move us from an effective Hamiltonian valid for one cut-off, to a second effective
41Kaku (1993, Ch.7 & 14) gives a clear overview of the technicalities of renormalisation using
Feynman graphs, with a focus on particle field theories. Binney et al. (1992, Ch.8 & 9) go into
a great deal of detail, while remaining focussed on condensed matter.
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Hamiltonian valid at another, and which gives the same large-scale physics.
This transformation is clearly analogous to the recursion relations we have
already discussed. For if we think of the cut-off as corresponding to the lattice-
spacing a, then the change to a new value of Λ corresponds to considering a “block-
ing” transformation replacing the original lattice with a different spaced one and
then rescaling. And the two procedures are usually discussed under the same title:
both transformations are referred to as ‘recursion relations’, or ‘renormalisation
transformations’. (Naturally, the closest comparison is to the continuous, rather
than the discrete version of the recursion relation).
3.5.3 The Critical Exponents from the LGW Hamiltonian
It is worth outlining the rather complex steps that are needed to extract critical
exponents from the LGW Hamiltonian, and its recursion relations. The main
reasons for the complexity arise from the fact that the LGW model is not exactly
solvable (i.e., ZLGW cannot be calculated) due to the functional integrals, and in
particular due to the λ term. The methods that have been developed to get around
this restriction are both interesting and ingenious. The stages can be summarised
as follows.
First consider the Hamiltonian density as consisting of two parts:
hLGW = hG + hNG (3.65)
that is, as a sum of a tractable Gaussian part, and an intractable non-Gaussian
part:
hG =
1
2
α2 |∇φ(x)|2 + 1
2
µ2φ(x)2 (3.66)
hNG =
λ
4!
φ(x)4 (3.67)
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With the Hamiltonian thus divided, it is possible to solve the term hG (i.e.: to
calculate ZG, the partition function of the Gaussian model) and to apply a recur-
sion relation to this Gaussian part. Finally, we appeal to varieties of perturbation
theory to allow us to apply a suitable recursion relation to the full Hamiltonian,
with the non-Gaussian term treated as a perturbation to the Gaussian one:
h′LGW = RbhLGW = Rb(hG + hNG) = RbhG + 〈RbhNG〉0 + ... (3.68)
To achieve the last step calls for two heavy guns from the theoretical physicist’s
armoury. First, we must calculate the perturbation expansion and apply the recur-
sion relation to it — a task which calls for the technology of Feynman diagrams.
Second, as T → TC (i.e., the cases we are interested in, close to the critical temper-
ature) we lose the analytic base of our expansion, which is shown in a phenomenon
known as infra-red divergence. However, this divergence only happens below four
dimensions, so the trick is to set dimension d = 4 − , and expand the results in
a Taylor series around  = 0. Surprisingly, this gives good results even when we
set  = 1, so we can use it to calculate results for three dimensional systems. This
technique is known accordingly as the epsilon expansion, and gave rise to perhaps
the most memorable title for a Nobel Prize-winning paper: Critical Exponents in
3.99 Dimensions (Wilson and Fisher, 1972).
Here, we must also introduce the concept of anomalous dimensions. The scaling
dimension of a quantity sums up its behaviour under a scaling transformation.
As an example, consider a rescaling of length by a factor b. Unsurprisingly, the
lengths associated with the problem scale as lengths, and the wavenumbers as
inverse lengths, i.e.:
x = bx′ , k =
k′
b
(3.69)
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so the scaling dimension for these quantities is the same as the physical dimension
— the one that we would expect from simple dimensional analysis. However, it
turns our that the fields must be rescaled by a slightly different factor if they are
to reproduce the large-scale results:
φ(x) = b−dφφ′(x′) (3.70)
therefore, in wavenumber space:
φ′(k′) =
∫
ddx′e−ik
′.x′φ(x′) (3.71)
= b−dφ
∫
ddxe−ik.xφ(x) = b−dφφ(x) (3.72)
The difference between the scaling and physical dimensions: dφ − d is called the
anomalous dimension of the LGW model. This anomalous dimension shows up
in the values of the critical exponents, and all the classical approaches predict an
anomalous dimension of zero — the same as simple dimensional analysis would
predict. More than anything else, it was this non-zero anomaly that puzzled pre-
RG theorists (see the historical remarks of Fisher, 1998, 657).
3.5.4 New Features of Wilson’s Approach
The relations between the parameters of the LGW Hamiltonian as considered at
different scales are thus determined by a recursion relation very similar to the sort
considered by Kadanoff. True, the technical details are somewhat different: we
typically work in wavenumber (momentum) space, and rescale our parameters ac-
cording to the scales of the wavelengths we take into account, whereas Kadanoff’s
techniques usually operate in real space. But still, the effective Hamiltonian suit-
able for one scale, is related to a Hamiltonian suitable to a very different one, by a
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recursion relation acting on its parameter values. But in an important difference to
the Kadanoff approach for the Ising model, the LGW model can absorb the effects
of interactions, without forced approximations, and absorb them into only a finite
number of terms. For the LGW Hamiltonian has a very important property: it is
renormalisable.
Renormalisability
To call a field theory (= a form of field Hamiltonian) renormalisable is to say that
the action of a recursion relation does not generate an infinite series of new terms
in the Hamiltonian, but merely adjusts a finite (and usually small) number. That
is, changes in the cut-off value Λ can be compensated for by changes to a finite
number of parameters. The significance of this property can be seen if we consider
the contrast in significance between the Ising and LGW Hamiltonians.
As we saw in §3.4.1, if we construct a fully accurate recursion relation for
the Ising Hamiltonian, then each time it is applied it will generate new terms in
addition to the originals. Our way of dealing with this is to neglect the higher
terms at each stage, forcing the new Hamiltonian to again take on an Ising form,
and just hope that none of the higher-order ones would become important. This
is one reason for Wilson’s description of Kadanoff’s scheme as absurd — there is
no guarantee that these higher order terms would not be far more important than
the ones we kept.
The LGW Hamiltonian is different. We know that a LGW-form Hamiltonian
with a certain cutoff, can be re-expressed as a second LGW-form Hamiltonian, with
a different cut-off, and with different parameter values. But its renormalisability
means that there will appear no extra parameters in addition to those we have
already written down; that is, higher-order terms will not come to dominate. This
is not to say that the calculations which we are faced with will be exact, or even
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tractable, but we can at least be sure that if we start with a Hamiltonian of LGW
form, and consider a new momentum scale, the rescaled version will not neglect
the most significant aspects of the physics.
Relevant and Irrelevant Operators
At the heart of the LGW approach to explaining universality is the idea of relevance
and irrelevance. These terms have the same sense as in Kadanoff’s procedure in
§3.4.2, but since the Ising model has a different significance to the LGW model,
the implications are different. It is traditional to refer to each term of the LGW
Hamiltonian as an operator of order n: On, which contributes to the Hamiltonian
a term of the form
∫
ddxφn. (Once again, the quantum mechanical connotations
of the term ‘operator’ are due to its origins in QFT, and must be firmly ignored).
We look at each term in the Hamiltonian density hLGW and ask whether it is a
relevant or irrelevant operator, depending on how it is transformed by application
of the recursion relation. We can also consider possible additions to hLGW , and
ask whether these operators would be relevant or irrelevant.
The point is that if we can show that an operator is irrelevant, it will mean
that it can have no effect on the critical behaviour of the system. For recall the
discussion of §3.4.2. As we can see from Equation 3.52, if we repeatedly apply a
recursion relation to a Hamiltonian containing an irrelevant operator, that term
will be made smaller and smaller. Yet the recursion relation has been designed in
such a way that applying it repeatedly should not change the critical behaviour.
Thus the origin of the term ‘irrelevant’ operator: since they will be irrelevant to
the critical behaviour. Relevant operators, on the other hand, will almost certainly
have an effect on critical behaviour, and marginal operators may have an effect —
often one that is rather hard to calculate.
So if we look at the relevance of an extra operator treated as an addition to the
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Scaling properties of operator On in d dimensions
d n = 2 n = 4 n = 6 n = 8
5 2 -1 -4 -7
4 2 0 -2 -4
3 2 1 0 -1
2 2 2 2 2
Table 3.3: Scaling properties for operators of the Gaussian model. For a table
entry x, the rescaled free energy scales as bx. Therefore, if the table entry is
positive (negative), the operator On is relevant (irrelevant).
LGW Hamiltonian, we will be able to see whether the critical behaviour is likely to
be affected by that operator. The answer turns out to depend on the dimension of
the system, and the analysis again depends on the technical apparatus of Feynman
diagrams. But as an illustration, we can consider a far simpler example, and
examine the relevance of various even operators to the Gaussian model (that of
Equation 3.66).
hG =
1
2
α2 |∇φ(x)|2 +O2 +O6 +O8 (3.73)
(where we have been taking O2 to be
1
2
µ2φ(x)2 in both the Gaussian and LGW
models, and O4 to be
λ
4!
φ(x)4 in the case of the LGW model.) Table 3.3 summarises
the results.
This analysis indicates why the classical methods might fail below d = 4, but
succeed in higher dimensions. At higher dimensions, only the operators of the
Gaussian model are relevant, so we observe the Landau exponents. But at lower
dimensions, some of the higher n operators become relevant, and this can start
to have a more complex effect on the critical behaviour, giving rise to the more
complex LGW analysis.
Of course, we want to perturb the LGW model, not the Gaussian one, and this
183
is possible with a great deal more theoretical work (see for example: Binney et al.,
1992, §14.2). And we must also consider the relevance of many different types of
operators (not just the even ones) as well as additions to the LGW Hamiltonian
that may have effects we cannot account for using these perturbative methods.
Clearly, the generality of any conclusions will be dictated by the range of opera-
tors we have shown to be irrelevant. What we can say, however is this: if we can
show that an operator is irrelevant, then any model that has an effective Hamil-
tonian differing from the LGW only by that operator, will have the same critical
behaviour as LGW. And it turns out that one can prove irrelevance of large classes
of operators based on their order, and their symmetry properties (for example, one
can be sure that all even-n operators of higher order than n = 6 will be irrelevant
in more than three dimensions).
In my view, such results offer a fully satisfactory explanation of universality,
and also demonstrate why universality classes should be dependent on both the
symmetry of the order parameter (reflected in the symmetry of the operators),
and the dimension of the system.
Physical Interpretation
I think the division drawn here between Kadanoff’s and Wilson’s approach is a
useful one, but it is not the only one possible, and the names I have chosen are
not entirely apposite. For Wilson contributed much to the techniques and under-
standing of real-space techniques, and Kadanoff did the same for LGW and related
approaches. And there are many other broad divisions that can be drawn amongst
the variety of renormalisation methods.42 But the points I want to press home are
the differences in physical interpretation between the ‘Kadanoffian’ and ‘Wilso-
42Wilson himself divides the methods according to a four-part categorisation (Wilson, 1975,
776), which adds to these two categories the Wegner formal theory of fixed points, and some
older techniques in quantum field theory.
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nian’ approaches. For although the procedure of transforming between models
appropriate to different scales is common to both, the significance of the model
considered at each scale is very different.
First, let us consider the strong parallels: changing our cutoff value in the LGW
model, is analogous to a rescaling in the Kadanoff picture. For we can consider
Λ as physically corresponding to the lattice spacing, the cut-off reflecting the fact
that we do not take into account any fluctuations on a smaller scale. Then a
change of Λ can be compared to applying a ‘blocking’ transformation to produce a
new Hamiltonian, and the changes in the parameters α, µ and λ, can be compared
to the changes in the couplings [K] in order to keep the large-scale physics the
same.
The main differences come when we ask how we should interpret the Hamil-
tonians that are transformed. The Kadanoff ‘blocking’ procedure is applied to
a specific microphysical model, which is at least an attempt to represent micro-
physical interactions. When we apply the recursion relation, we generate a new
Hamiltonian, which we recognise as an effective one, in that unlike the original,
it is not intended to represent any microphysical properties directly. The effective
interactions generated are then truncated at a certain order so they have the same
form as the old ones. In contrast, the LGW approach, we start with an effective
Hamiltonian, and since we choose it to have a renormalisable form, we can be confi-
dent that no new terms will be generated. Another way of looking at the difference
is that the Kadanoff approach takes a realistic microphysical Hamiltonian, ignores
the fact that it is almost certainly not renormalisable, and — regardless — trun-
cates the extra terms that should be generated. In opposition, the LGW approach
operates with a non-realistic, non-microphysical, but renormalisable Hamiltonian.
Translating this into the micro-macrophysical language we used earlier: the
LGW Hamiltonian need not aim to represent a microphysical model at all. Rather,
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it aims to represent the relevant directions associated with a fixed point in the pa-
rameter space.43 Thus our conclusions about relevant and irrelevant directions
associated with the LGW Hamiltonian will not apply to just a particular micro-
physical model, but will concern any model that has a flow that may come within
the basin of attraction of the LGW fixed point(s).
But now it looks as though the Wilsonian approach does no better than the
classical approaches in satisfying Batterman’s criteria for an explanation of univer-
sality. For in choosing the LGW form of Hamiltonian density, Wilson’s approach
is to impose from the ‘top down’ a form for the Hamiltonian, thus violating Bat-
terman’s desideratum (A). This is exactly the same point that disqualified Landau
theory as a satisfactory explanation for universality — it is not based in the mi-
crophysical details of the models in question, but is imposed by external, macro-
physical constraints. The LGW Hamiltonian is an effective form, which we adopt
on the basis of macroscopic symmetry considerations of the phase transition in
question. True, the LGW theory works with a Hamiltonian density, not with the
free energy; and it is more sophisticated and empirically successful than Landau’s
original, but it ignores the lower-level theory just as much.
3.6 Explaining Universality
To sum up the conclusions of the last two sections: there are various ‘classical’
theoretical approaches to phase transitions, which pre-date renormalisation, but
their empirical success is only partial, and they do not conform to Batterman’s
desiderata for a new approach to explain universality. Of the two we have exam-
ined: Landau theory imposes a common set of higher-level properties, in a single
43In fact, the LGW form can encompass more than one fixed point, both the so-called “Gaus-
sian” fixed point, which we obtain with λ = 0, and the Wilson-Fisher fixed point, which can
appear with non-zero values of λ.
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form for the free energy; and MFT found (or just assumed) properties common
to the microphysics of the models, idealising each of them as a mean-field form of
microphysical interaction. Thus, as one would expect, neither of them fulfilled Bat-
terman’s desiderata for a genuine explanation of universality, and thus of multiple
realisability.
But in the last sections, we saw that renormalisation techniques share the de-
ficiencies of the classical approaches: Kadanoff’s argument imposes microphysical
elements in common; Wilson’s approach imposes a general form of effective Hamil-
tonian due to macrophysical considerations. So we are left with a problem: it looks
as though RG techniques are no advance on the classical ones in explanatory terms,
even if they do go beyond them in empirical prediction.
In this section and the next, I offer an explanation as to how Batterman’s
opposing view could arise. We return to basics; first: what exactly we are aiming
to explain (§3.6.1); second: what is the explanatory strategy of renormalisation
(§§3.6.2 & 3.6.3). This leads to §3.7, where I discuss how a conflation of different
approaches could lead us to the illusion that Batterman’s criteria can be satisfied
by renormalisation.
3.6.1 What is Universality?
Batterman’s strategy of identifying multiple realisability as a variety of universal-
ity is attractive in that while the former is a controversial philosophical term, the
second is a widely-used term in physics, and can therefore be expected to have a
precise technical meaning. And Batterman does suggest that the terms ‘Universal-
ity or Universal Behaviour’ are used by physicists in ‘special’ and ‘technical’ senses
(Batterman, 2000, 116, 120). But the only definition he gives is contained in the
following passage: ‘Are there parameters that somehow characterise the dominant
features of systems of widely different types? If there are, physicists often call the
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observed behaviour and the dominant features ‘universal’.’ (ibid., 120). Clearly,
this definition is unsatisfactory, for it covers properties far outside the scope of RG
techniques; both trivial and non-trivial examples of multiple realisability. And
even within the scope of RG analysis, it counts properties shared across all uni-
versality classes (sometimes called trans-universal) such as the fulfilment of the
Widom equalities.
In practice, Batterman uses the term “universality” to refer to those properties
that he believes that an RG analysis can be applied to, an approach in common
with many expositions presented in physics textbooks. And other philosophers’
explanations of RG techniques appear to rest satisfied with similarly vague ideas
of universality:
... the fact that whole classes of radically different systems and phe-
nomena shared the same critical exponents is known as the universality,
which has no explanation in Thermodynamics. The systems and phe-
nomena can be as different as between fluids for the transition from
the one-phase state of gas to the two-phase state of gas and liquid and
magnets for the transition from the paramagnetic to the ferromagnetic
phase. (Liu, 2001)
Batterman states that he has taken his lead from the physicist Sir Michael Berry:
... saying that a property is a “universal feature” of a system is
the slightly pretentious way in which physicists denote identical be-
haviour in different systems. The most familiar example of universal-
ity from physics involves thermodynamics near critical points (Berry,
1987, 185).
Yet as Batterman himself points out, Berry’s characterisation implies that familiar
cases such as the period of a pendulum being independent of its microstructure
would be “universal” just as much as the critical phenomena. This is something
that Berry clearly does not intend, or his ‘most familiar example of universality’
could be taken from contexts a great deal more familiar than critical phenomena.
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Less trivially, classical equilibrium thermodynamics holds for a wide variety of
systems with very different microphysics, and properties such as pressure, temper-
ature and entropy could be understood as universal in this sense. But as already
mentioned, the widespread appearance of properties such as “temperature” are
usually explained by the systems possessing common microphysical properties.
That is, they count as “trivial” examples of multiple realisability, in the sense of
§3.1.1, and do not require an novel explanatory strategy.44
It is also worth repeating that the ‘classical’ analyses of critical phenomena pre-
dicted critical exponents even more universal than those predicted by RG. Rather
than a dependence even on minimal features of the systems, such as dimensionality,
they predicted values universal to almost all near-critical systems. In this respect,
RG techniques predict strikingly non-universal quantities, when it (correctly) sep-
arates systems into a finer-grained set of universality classes which depend on the
symmetries of the order parameter, and the dimensionality of the lattice.
I think it revealing that while philosophers focus on the universality of the
critical exponents as the important innovation of the renormalisation techniques,
physicists do not. In Fisher’s historical review of the subject he writes:
If one is to pick out a single feature that epitomizes the power and
successes of RG theory, one can but endorse Gallavotti and Benfatto
when they say “it has to be stressed that the possibility of nonclas-
sical critical indices (i.e., of nonzero anomaly) is probably the most
important achievement of the renormalization group.” (Fisher, 1998)
As already mentioned, the anomalous dimensions encode the deviation of the crit-
ical values from the Landau values, provided perplexing theoretical puzzles before
the advent of renormalisation. For it is not that without RG analysis, universality
would be a mysterious phenomenon. Rather, it is that there was no clear way
44Batterman (1998) suggests that an approach similar to renormalisation analysis might also
given insight into the success of equilibrium thermodynamics, but he also caution that it is
inappropriate to apply it in all cases (Batterman, 2000, 130).
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of obtaining the correct exponents, nor the observed separation into universality
classes.
Thus ‘universality’, at least in the vague definition offered here is not the real
explanandum for RG. Rather, the facts to be explained are the exact ways in which
systems fall into their universality classes, and the values of the exponents which
define those classes.
3.6.2 What is Renormalisation?
There are several ways of looking at the techniques collected under the ‘Renormal-
isation’ banner, which suggest different interpretations of the explanatory strategy
employed. I would like to separate three popular approaches.
The first is often presented as a fundamental insight underlying the renor-
malisation approach, and tends to be especially emphasised in introductory and
popular expositions. This is the idea that the structure of a near-critical system
repeats itself on different scales. I shall call it the self-similarity view. Though it
is widely reported otherwise, I do not believe that this insight does a great deal
of explanatory work, and it certainly does not lie at the heart of the RG strategy.
The second I call the sensible sum view and is based on the attitude taken by
Kenneth Wilson in his papers which put the RG techniques on firm foundations,
and was elaborated in his subsequent review articles. The third asymptotic view
has been developed by more recent workers, who have extended and generalised
the RG techniques to applications such as chaotic phenomena and turbulence.
It is rather striking how utterly different these attitudes appear. I suggest that
while all three of these viewpoints have some validity, they each arise from a focus
on particular aims and on particular applications of RG techniques, but do not
illuminate the explanatory strategy itself.
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The ‘Self-Similarity’ View
Writing about the physical basis for the RG techniques in calculating critical ex-
ponents, Sang Wook Yi outlines the justification for its application as follows:
Figuratively speaking, the system ‘looks’ the same whether we look
at the whole system or [a] certain part of it provided the correlation
length is large enough. To put it differently, a system with a large
correlation length looks the same whether we see it closely or a bit
from a distance. As the Ising-2D system approaches its phase transition
point, its correlation length gets larger and larger. So we can expect
that in its critical region the Ising-2D system exhibits so-called scale
invariance: the invariance of the critical properties of the system under
the (length) scale change. (Yi, 2000, §5.3.2)
This idea — that it is self-similarity at a critical point that allows us to calculate
numerical values using RG techniques and explains universality is too often put in
careless terms. I hope enough has been said to see that unqualified statements of
this sort are — at the least — highly misleading. Slogans such as ‘Looking the same
at different length scales’ needs to be cashed out, but the clearest sense available is
the effect of applying the recursion relation, which relates descriptions of systems at
different scales. But the two most obvious interpretations are mistaken: First, if by
‘looking the same’, one means that it can be expressed in terms of a Hamiltonian
of the same form but renormalised parameter values, then this is true of every
point in parameter space, for we truncate any extra terms generated (at least
for Kadanoff’s methods, which Yi is discussing). But on the other hand, if one
means that H stays exactly the same — not only the form, but the values of the
parameters remaining unchanged — then it is only at the fixed points in parameter
space that we find systems self-similar in this sense. Elsewhere on and close to
the critical surface, (i.e., at or close to each system’s critical point) the parameters
are altered by the recursion relation — if they were not, there would be no flow
toward the fixed points, and there would be no explanation for the universality of
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the critical exponents.
There is one notion of self-similarity which is appropriate, and this is the claim
that the thermodynamic quantities associated with near-critical systems take on
the Widom scaling form (i.e., they satisfy Equation 3.20). But this is not the
explanation of universality, it is the explanandum. We must explain why this
scaling form is shared by many near-critical systems, and more particularly, why
members of universality classes share particular values of the exponents. This is
what the RG is intended to do, by showing that flows from near-critical systems
will exit the critical surface along the relevant directions.
There are other, more nebulous senses in which critical systems do “look the
same” at every scale; for example, the correlation length is infinite, and there are
fluctuations of all sizes, with no characteristic scale. But we cannot put these
facts at the basis of an explanation of the universality of critical exponents, for
it does not follow that all critical systems in a universality class show similar
behaviour. This is easily seen by the existence of the many non-universal properties
of critical systems: any adequate explanation for universality must also explain
what determines whether a property is universal or non-universal, and here a
vague appeal to the fact that the system “looks the same” cannot help us.
The ‘Sensible Sum’ View
In his two articles that showed how RG techniques could be developed into a pow-
erful method for analysing critical phenomena, Wilson presented his techniques as
a purely technical solution to a purely technical problem.45 The technical problem
is to apply statistical mechanics to some particularly tricky cases. Calculating the
45Maris and Kadanoff (1978) state that they shall assume that ‘the RG approach is a practical
but approximate way of calculating the sums involved in Z.’ But they also suggest that this
viewpoint might be limiting, and miss the ‘deep physics of the renormalization group’. Sadly
they give no clue of where this ‘deep physics’ might be found.
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critical exponents involves evaluating the free energy and partition function near
the critical point. Unfortunately, the usual methods for the evaluation of the sums
and integrals are defeated by the multi-scale fluctuations which occur as the cor-
relation length ξ →∞. The RG provide a solution by reorganising the calculation
of the free energy and partition function — i.e., by doing the integrals or sums in
a cleverly chosen order:
The renormalization-group approach is to integrate out the fluctuations
in sequence, starting with fluctuations on an atomic scale and then
moving to successively larger scales until fluctuations on all scales have
been averaged out. (Wilson, 1982/1993, 584)
This attitude is repeated in his other review articles (e.g., Wilson, 1975): RG
techniques are seen as a set of methods for gradually integrating out the degrees
of freedom, starting at the smallest scales, and working upwards.
I take it that this ‘Sensible-Sum’ attitude is the interpretation that Chuang
Liu has in mind when he describes the RG as consisting of a ‘systematic — e.g. a
re-iterative — set of transformations which coarse-grain out the degrees of freedom
that are tied up by the long-range order’ (Liu, 2001). It is also explicitly expressed
by Bruce and Wallace, when they characterise the ‘essence’ of the RG as a method
to ‘reorganise sums [...] so as to deal successively with the contributions made
by configurational features of larger and larger scales’ (Bruce and Wallace, 1989,
243).
On this view, we are engaged in an exercise of standard statistical mechanics,
deriving all the thermodynamical quantities from the partition function or free
energy in the usual way. Where we meet difficulty doing the sums or integrals,
they must be reorganised. Of course this suggests that the RG method may
be extended to other physical problems involving a large number of degrees of
freedom, where a similar reorganisation may be useful. Wilson again:
The basic problem causing the difficulties in understanding critical phe-
nomena is the problem of the infinite number of degrees of freedom.
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This problem is also the bottleneck in quantum field theory and in
many of the stubborn problems of solid-state physics. The methods of
this paper are methods for attacking the problem of the infinite number
of degrees of freedom regardless of where this problem arises. (Wilson,
1971b, 3185)
So on this interpretation, RG techniques add nothing to the explanatory power
of the theories to which they are applied. Statistical Mechanics (or for that mat-
ter, Quantum Field Theory) is just supplemented with some extra mathematical
apparatus so that these theories can be applied in some rather challenging circum-
stances.
The Asymptotic View
A third attitude to RG techniques is to view them as a particular method of asymp-
totic analysis : the study of how some large-scale features of a system stabilise as
a quantity is taken to a limit. All agree that this is an achievement of the RG
method, but on this reading, we regard it as fundamentally a study of limits. The
simplest form of asymptotic analysis is elementary dimensional analysis, where
all the quantities associated with the problem scale as their physical dimensions;
more sophisticated versions include the powerful techniques of Barenblatt (1979).
In addition, it has been claimed that there are strong analogies between asymp-
totic analysis and renormalised perturbation theory (Chen et al., 1989, 1994). On
the view of these authors, ‘the essence of the renormalization group method is to
extract structurally stable features of a system which are insensitive to details’
(Chen et al., 1994, 376). Bruce and Wallace also hint at this attitude (apparently
as an alternative to the sensible-sum view) when they speak of those quantities
‘sufficiently deep-seated to survive coarse-graining and which together serve to
define the system’s universal critical behaviour’ (Bruce and Wallace, 1989, 248).
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This is the interpretation championed by Batterman;46 he characterises the
essence of RG techniques as follows:
The RG type analysis demonstrates that many of the details that dis-
tinguish the physical systems from one another are irrelevant for their
universal behavior. At the same time, it allows for the determination
of those physical features that are relevant for that behavior. Finally it
allows for the quantitative determination of the nature of the universal
behavior by enabling one to identify the critical exponents. (Batter-
man, 2002a, 42, italics in original)
So on this view, the RG techniques are in essence techniques for sorting large-scale
behaviour common to many systems from the large-scale behaviour that they do
not share, as well as being a quantitative calculational technique.
At first sight the self-similarity, sensible Sum and asymptotic viewpoints look
completely different, and rather hard to reconcile. Nigel Goldenfeld, a proponent
of the last of these, sees the opposing views as obstructing the application of RG
techniques to new areas of physics. He laments of his education in the sensible sum
view: ‘like most condensed matter physicists, I thought that the renormalization
group was, at heart, concerned with “integrating out degrees of freedom”. It was
difficult to see the relevance of this to non-equilibrium systems.’ (Goldenfeld, 1992,
1). A reconciliation is — I think — possible, though none of the viewpoints seem
to capture what the RG techniques are about, ‘at heart’.
3.6.3 A Reconciliation: RG as an Iterated Idealisation
It is possible to put forward a slightly deflationary attitude to the strategy em-
bodied by RG techniques, that might also explain how each of the aforementioned
views express important aspects of renormalisation, and yet appear so different
from one another.
46The thesis is emphasised in all of his articles on RG, but in particular: Batterman (1992,
1995, 2002b) and his book: The Devil in the Details 2002a.
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When we apply RG methods it is often commented that the physical insight
appears only in designing an appropriate recursion relation for the system under
question (e.g., Maris and Kadanoff, 1978, 654). And a well-designed recursion
relation is simply a rule by which we replace a very complex model of a system
with a large number of degrees of freedom, with a less complex model — the large-
scale effects of the extra degrees of freedom being absorbed into renormalised
parameters.
But there are a great number of designs for recursion relations, which appar-
ently have little in common beyond simplifying the problem in question while
retaining the large-scale properties of the system. Focussing on this thought, each
application of the recursion relation can be seen as a mathematical realisation of
a technique ubiquitous in science — that of idealisation. I discuss varieties of
idealisation in a little more detail in the next chapter (especially §4.3.3), but here
I mean simply the practice of replacing one theoretical model with another, this
replacement accompanied by some justification that the replacement should make
no (or little) difference to the quantities that we are interested in modelling. In
the specific cases of the recursion relations we have been examining, this replace-
ment plays a very particular role: we replace a Hamiltonian which takes account
of small-scale interactions, with a new one that does not, but we compensate for
neglecting them by making changes to the parameter values of the Hamiltonian.
Thus we move from a complex model to a simpler one, but with good reason to
believe it will still give us insight into the original. When we iterate the application
of the recursion relation we simply iterate the “idealisation” many times.
This view is quite close to Kadanoff’s original stated aim, which was to trans-
form an Ising system near criticality, into an Ising system far away from critical-
ity, where orthodox methods might be applied to calculate the critical exponents
(Kadanoff, 1966). The modern view of both real-space and Wilsonian renormali-
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sation has shifted. Rather than only looking at the systems at the end-points of
the flows, we look at the flows themselves. In other words, we look at the ways in
which we can reach different idealisations, not just the idealised models themselves.
Looking at the RG strategy as a formalised process of iterated idealisation
suggests that the other views mentioned may not be in conflict with one an-
other: rather they just focus on different aspects of RG techniques. First, the
Self-Similarity view focusses on a particular feature of near-critical systems that
is sometimes illuminated by the process of iterated idealisation. When we look
at a Hamiltonian near criticality, we find that the idealised versions share certain
characteristics with the original (in particular, they share an overall form). And
the RG can illuminate exactly how the features change with scale: finding that
near-critical systems share interesting features in this respect. But this is not the
essence of the RG, nor is it the explanation of universality, rather it is something
that the RG can be used to study.
The Sensible Sum viewpoint concentrates on a particular set of mathematical
techniques which we implement when we apply our iterated idealisation to the
expression for a free energy or partition function, for a near-critical system. Here,
we are indeed faced with a large intractable sum (or integral) when we attempt
to solve the original problem. And when we iterate the recursion relation, we do
indeed end up splitting this sum according to fluctuation scales. For in renormalis-
ing, we absorb the effects at each scale, starting with the shortest, and taking into
account their combined effects on the longer. (Kadanoff’s methods order the sum
by a real-space scale, whereas Wilson’s methods do so on wavelength.) However, it
seems misleading to think of this procedure just in terms of the mathematics that
must be done; it is not just a re-ordering of sums, but a consideration of a new
model at each stage, each with its own effective Hamiltonian, partition function
and free energy.
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Finally, the Asymptotic viewpoint focusses on a particular application of RG
techniques: to identify universal phenomena associated with critical fixed points, as
those will be stable under changes in the microstructure of the system. Certainly
this is one application of RG techniques (and a most fruitful one) but it plays
down the method by which it is achieved. Taking the asymptotic view also ignores
the fact that the same methods can be profitably used to analyse non-critical
phenomena, where no such universal stable quantities are found as the limit is
taken (as we emphasised at the end of §3.4.2).
One may wonder whether anything of substance hangs on the choice of inter-
pretations discussed in the last two sections. For practical purposes, there is much
to be said for adopting the interpretation that best suits the application in hand.
However, I think that when discussing the philosophical significance of the RG
strategy we must focus on a minimal core shared by RG techniques, and not bring
in either the specific technical means by which it might be implemented, nor the
aims it may achieve when applied. And for these purposes, there are good reasons
for preferring the Idealisation viewpoint.
3.6.4 Iterated Idealisation: An Original Explanatory Strat-
egy?
If we take the position recommended in the preceding section, and hold that renor-
malisation is a process of iterated idealisation, there are two obvious places to
search for a strikingly original aspect of the technique: it could be in the nature
of the idealisation implemented by a recursion relation, or it could be in the fact
that it is iterated.
Taking the first of these: techniques of idealisation are endemic to physics, and
have been explicitly recognised since at least the time of Galileo. And while there
are doubtless many different varieties used in the sciences, which can be separated
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from one another and analysed,47 we can be confident that the particular variety
of idealisation implemented by a recursion relation need not be original to RG
techniques. At least the process of rescaling and renormalising parameter values
in order to absorb microphysical details — or more generally, to reduce the number
of variables involved in a problem — is certainly nothing new. A simple example is
provided by the well-known technique of replacing the problem of calculating the
motions of a two-body mutually gravitating system, with the problem of single
body moving in a central field. The change in parameter values can be seen
in the replacement of the masses of the two bodies by the single reduced mass :
µ = m1m2
m1+m2
. Or, for an example closer to the condensed matter context, consider
the self-consistent Debye-Huckel theory of electrons. According to Coulomb’s law,
the potential at a distance r from one electron is given by: V (r) = q
r
, where q is the
electron charge. But in a cloud of electrons, say in an electrolyte or plasma, a cloud
of charge around each electron screens the Coulomb potential, and accordingly,
the Debye-Huckel potential is given by: V (r) = qe
− r
l
r
, where l is the Debye-Huckel
length, which depends on the number density of electrons and the temperature.
This is exactly the same form as the Coulomb potential, but we have replaced the
charge parameter q with qe−
r
l . Even the language used is the same: we say that
the “bare” charge has been replaced with a “renormalised” charge.
If it is not the variety of idealisation that is original to the RG techniques,
perhaps it is the fact that we iterate it, in the repeated application of the recursion
relation. This is how I read the conclusions of Lesne (1998), who argues that we
should distinguish two senses of the word “Renormalisation”. The first is more
associated with field theories, and refers to a one-shot procedure of imposing a
cut-off — also called regularisation. This is similar to the Debye-Huckel procedure
47McMullin (1985) explores different varieties of idealisation in Galileo’s own work. Nowakwa
and Nowak (2000) is an outline of one of the most sophisticated general approaches to a theory
of scientific idealisation, and draws on many historical case-studies.
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of replacing a “bare” quantity with a “renormalised” one. Lesne judges this as
less interesting than the second sense, which is the one we have been focussing
on, the examination of RG flows in parameter space to extract useful empirical
predictions. Thus, on her view, the interesting sense of the term turns on the fact
that we have managed to extract empirical conclusions by an iterated process of
idealisation, not by idealising a specific model.
But there is nothing new in iterated stages of idealisation, nor indeed in the idea
of taking a limit of such a series. For such a practice is common and can be traced
back at least to Galileo’s consideration of a series of falling objects encountering
progressively less air resistance (for discussion see McMullin (1985) and Laymon
(1991)).
Lesne’s idea that there is something qualitatively different about extracting
predictions from the iterated process of idealisation, rather than idealised mod-
els, is also somewhat misleading. For while it is true that RG techniques extract
predictions from the flows induced by the recursion relation, and not the models
themselves, we tailored the recursion relation to the model to which it is to be
applied. In both Kadanoff and Wilson’s approach, the construction of the rela-
tion is determined by the nature of a Hamiltonian model, be it an effective or a
microphysical one. And this is just as well, since we should not be able to draw
conclusions about the critical exponents ‘from the armchair’ with no empirical
support.
These considerations suggest that the explanatory strategy of renormalisation
adds nothing to familiar forms of scientific explanation, but I must admit un-
certainty as to where to place it in the usual classifications (that is, as causal-
mechanical, unificatory, deductive-nomological, etc). For taken in their context
within condensed matter physics, RG explanations combine idealisation, statisti-
cal mechanics, and limit operations — all of which are seen as controversial in the
200
literature on scientific explanation. Once again, I seek safe ground. If we restrict
ourselves to the pure philosophical issue of whether RG involves a novel explanatory
strategy, then the foregoing discussion shows that the strategy of the RG involves
nothing original over and above classical techniques for critical phenomena. (Of
course, it involves many originalities (and empirical triumphs) from a physicists’
point of view.) As these classical techniques are agreed to be standard as to their
explanatory strategy, I shall assume that the RG strategy can be accommodated
under the one of the standard headings in the philosophy of scientific explanation,
and leave it undecided which one.48
3.7 Concluding Remarks
We began in §3.1 by challenging two claims:
(1) The Renormalisation Group explains the phenomenon of universality.
(2) The explanatory strategy of the Renormalisation Group is an original one,
profoundly different to the old and more familiar attempts to explain either
multiple realisability or universality.
As to (1), we have seen that Kadanoff’s approach cannot explain universality in
the requisite sense. It can account for the values of the critical exponents for a
given microphysical model, but not why their values divide them into universality
classes. Wilson’s approach does a great deal better. It demonstrates that the
irrelevant operators of interaction Hamiltonians make no difference to the critical
48If forced to categorise the RG explanations of universality, I would count both Wilson’s and
Kadanoff’s approaches as causal-mechanical. Both give a broadly mechanical account of how the
critical exponents arise by showing how the Widom scaling forms of the free energy arise near
critical points. The issue of causation is less clear, but this is a generic feature of approaches
based on statistical mechanics.
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behaviour, and so explains how universality can arise amongst models falling under
the influence of a fixed point.
As to (2), the notions of ‘originality’ and ‘profound difference from the past’
have been made precise in terms of Batterman’s criteria (A) & (B), and both
approaches found deficient, though for different reasons.
In §3.7.1, I shall look at how the belief in the profound originality of renor-
malisation could have arisen, suggesting that it may be due to a conflation of
Kadanoff and Wilson’s approaches. In §3.7.2, I shall look at how the “Iterated
Idealisation” view of renormalisation can help us locate the central distinction be-
tween the two approaches, not as a difference in the explanatory strategy that they
implement, but in the theoretical models that they are applied to. I conclude in
3.7.3, with a look ahead to Chapter 5 where I suggest that renormalisable models
have a representational role not covered by orthodox accounts within physics or
philosophy.
3.7.1 A Diagnosis
In opposition to the conclusions of the previous sections, philosophical commenta-
tors such as Batterman, Liu and Yi do seem to view renormalisation as explaining
universality in a profoundly original way. From the discussion so far, we can iden-
tify at least two distinct and important misunderstandings about RG techniques.
First, I suggest that the practice of introducing RG techniques by Kadanoff’s
procedure, and treating his approach as the royal road to thinking about renor-
malisation, has led to confusion between the two methods presented here. For
if we conflate Wilson’s and Kadanoff’s approach, we might think that there ex-
ists a procedure which fulfills both of Batterman’s conditions. Specifically, we
might imagine a procedure that is both (a) wholly microphysically based — like
Kadanoff’s real-space procedure for the Ising Model, and also (b) a demonstra-
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tion that a variety of microphysically heterogenous Hamiltonians may exhibit the
same critical exponents — like Wilson’s analysis of the LGW model. This would
constitute an explanation of universality which would fulfil both of Batterman’s
requirements. Unfortunately, such a procedure is unknown in renormalisation the-
ory.
Second, it is possible that the technical details of the LGW Hamiltonian might
lead us astray, and make us think that it was intended as a direct representation
of microphysical properties. Unlike Landau’s approach, which imposed a form on
the free energy itself, and thus wore its macrophysical pedigree on its sleeve, we
considered an LGW form of the Hamiltonian. If we thought that this implied that
the LGW Hamiltonian had the same physical status as the microphysical Hamil-
tonian we considered when setting up the Ising model, then we might be misled
into thinking that the LGW approach was based totally in a microphysical theory.
The common use of the name: ‘LGW model’, might also give this impression, for
it suggests that the Hamiltonian plays a similar role to that of the Ising, Heisen-
berg, Potts and other microphysical models. But to emphasise again, it is not —
the LGW Hamiltonian expresses an effective form for the order parameter field,
summing up the contributions of many microphysical spins.
3.7.2 Kadanoff versus Wilson
Viewing RG techniques as processes of iterated idealisation, it is possible to locate
clearly a central difference in the approaches of Kadanoff and Wilson. For the
explanatory strategy remains the same, but in each case, it is applied to a physical
model with very different representational significance.
First, in Kadanoff’s approach, the process of iterated idealisation is applied
to an original Hamiltonian which is meant to be a direct representation of a mi-
crophysical model. It might not be perfect — no-one really believes that the
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nearest-neighbour Ising model is a particularly accurate representation of the mi-
crostructure of ferromagnets; but the point is that the model is meant to accrue
any empirical success from its representation of the microphysical state, even if
this representation is imperfect.
In this case, a recursion relation is designed around our microphysical model,
and it can be shown that the flows induced give rise to a critical exponent with a
certain numerical value. This is a perfectly good explanation of the non-classical
values of these exponents for each particular model in turn, and it is firmly micro-
physically based; but as we saw in §3.4, it cannot be an explanation of universality.
In the Wilsonian approach, the LGW Hamiltonian is an effective one, and
though we again design the recursion relation around this Hamiltonian, we hope it
will remain justifiable for a wide range of models. In particular, it will be justifiable
to apply it to all those that differ from the LGW Hamiltonian only by including
irrelevant operators. Wilsonian renormalisation thus provides a good explanation
of universality: it explains why the critical exponents for a universality class take
the non-classical values that they do, and it explains why the various microphysical
models fall into their respective universality classes. (Though as we saw in §3.5,
it is not “microphysically based” and so does not fulfil Batterman’s criteria.)
Of course the two approaches differ a great deal in their technical details, and
in their practical applications. But I think that the foregoing is a good way of
looking at a key difference between the two procedures. In both cases, we apply
a procedure of iterated idealisation, in the form of a recursion relation: but in the
first case, it is applied to the Hamiltonian of a specific microphysical model; in the
second case, to an effective Hamiltonian suitable for a wide range of microphysical
models. The physical significance both of the procedure itself and the conclusions
we can draw from it, are accordingly different.
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3.7.3 Originality After all?
In its rejection of the original aspects of renormalisation, this discussion might
come across as relentlessly negative. Yet I do not mean to play down in any way
the insight or the practical power of RG techniques, nor that they allow a deeper
understanding of the phenomena in question. I merely claim that the explanatory
strategy they exemplify is not a new one to the philosophy of science, and a fortiori,
cannot offer a radically new approach to explaining multiple realisability.
Here, the “iterated idealisation” view of renormalisation is useful once again.
Since we can separate the renormalisation strategy cleanly from the theoretical
models, we can turn from a fruitless search for an original explanatory strategy,
and look to the significance of the models it is applied to. And here I think that the
RG methods have introduced something quite new to the philosophy of science:
the concept of a renormalisable theory.
In §3.5.4, we used RG analysis to show that a Hamiltonian such as the LGW
model, with all the relevant operators associated with a certain fixed point, would
allow us to predict the universal quantities, in complete ignorance of any further
operators. This is a rather striking situation: we are presented with a theory that
is empirically successful (over the scale of energies under which it has been tested),
but its empirical success gives no reason to believe that it is close to an accurate
representation of the system in question.
At first sight, this appears at odds with orthodox accounts of scientific represen-
tation, which typically demand some link of resemblance or isomorphism between a
theoretical model, and the system to which it is successfully applied. In particular,
the realist demand for a firm link between theory and reality appear threatened.
However, we can already see from the discussion that this is not quite correct.
The analysis of the recursion relations is adjusted to the systems in question,
even when the LGW Hamiltonian can be shown to be suitable for such a wide
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range of microphysical Hamiltonians. We do not derive universal quantities “from
the armchair”, but by close analysis of the empirical features of the systems in
question.
Similar issues have impressed some of the New Emergentist writers, who claim
that they demonstrate a sense in which higher-level sciences are independent of
the small scale. I shall address both these issues in more detail in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 4
Phase transitions in Finite
Systems
4.1 Introduction
At the close of his second Meditation, Descartes is diverted from intellectual spar-
ring with his all-powerful deceitful demon to consider a more mundane issue. Can
he clearly and distinctly perceive the nature of something so simple as a piece of
wax? As he places it in his fire its sensible properties of colour, texture and so-
lidity, undergo abrupt qualitative changes, yet it remains the same wax as before.
He is forced to admit that none of those sensible properties could be in the nature
of the wax itself, and thus he had not clearly and distinctly perceived it after all.
In picking his example, Descartes chose well. For there are few everyday phe-
nomena that have confounded analysis as consistently as have phase transitions. It
was only late in the last century that physics made good progress in understanding
many aspects of these changes: how a single collection of molecules can rearrange
themselves in such a way that wax can melt, a liquid become a gas, or a piece
of iron can become magnetic, while remaining the same materials throughout. It
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has proved possible to build on existing accounts of many-body systems — sta-
tistical mechanics and thermodynamics — to give a comprehensive account of the
changes. But this theoretical apparatus continues to provide surprises.
4.1.1 What is a Phase Transition?
There are clear definitions of what counts as a phase transition within theories
of thermodynamics, and there are slightly different definitions within various ap-
proaches in statistical mechanics. But it is surprisingly difficult to characterise
them in theory-neutral terms. In general, they are marked by abrupt changes in
one or more large-scale physical properties of a system, with a small change in
some control variable. Descartes’ melting wax undergoes a phase transition when
its density and other large-scale properties undergo a large change with a small
change in temperature. And if we raised the temperature even more, the liquid
wax would boil, and the density would undergo an even more dramatic sudden
change. We see similar changes in the large-scale magnetic properties of a piece
of iron, when we cool it below the Curie temperature and apply a small external
magnetic field.
Once we consider phase transitions from within a particular physical theory,
we can be a great deal more precise, and can start sorting them into types. Ther-
modynamics and statistical mechanics both represent phase transitions by non-
analyticities in the free energy, as a function of one or more of its thermodynamic
variables.
The Ehrenfest categorisation of phase transitions originally took advantage of
this definition by grouping phase transitions by the lowest derivative of the free en-
ergy which undergoes a discontinuity. Thus first-order transitions (which include
melting, boiling and the reversing of magnetic polarisation) have a discontinuity
in the first derivative of the free energy with respect to a thermodynamic control
208
variable. Second-order transitions include those at the Curie point of magnets,
where the magnetization itself increases continuously from zero, but the magnetic
susceptibility undergoes a discontinuity at the Curie tempature. (The magneti-
zation is the first derivative, the susceptibility the second derivative, of the free
energy with respect to the applied field.)
The Ehrenfest classification has now been rejected, since its underlying ratio-
nale was based in mean-field theory, which has been superseded. Also, it has been
found that some of the more complex phase transitions do not fit comfortably
into its categories. However, modern approaches retain some of those original dis-
tinctions. They begin by sorting phase transitions into two groups: first-order (as
with Ehrenfest) and continuous (all the higher-order Ehrenfest). These continuous
transitions are then further subdivided according to the symmetries of the phases
each side of the transition.
4.1.2 Two Issues
Recently, a debate has arisen in the philosophy of physics literature on the best
way to understand the physical modelling of phase transitions.1 The controversy
centres on the fact that non-analyticities in the free energy of a system are central
to the theoretical account of phase transitions, and yet statistical mechanics can
only accommodate non-analytiticies in a system with an infinite number of degrees
of freedom — while physical systems such as Descartes’ wax, or a boiling kettle of
water are surely finite. In my view, the debate comprises two very separate issues,
but the literature has tended to have address them simultaneously, and without
distinguishing them clearly.
The first issue is about the relation of theory to real physical systems. The most
successful treatments of phase transitions can deal with them only as features of
1In particular, see Liu (1999, 2001, 2004), Callender (2001) and Batterman (2004).
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infinitely large systems, and make a central use of this infinite number of elements
in order to derive their results. Na¨ıvely, this seems to imply that we have no
successful theory of the phase transitions we see around us, since they occur in
finite systems. We need an account of how our existing theories may be related
to the concrete systems observed in the world. I shall call this the “Idealisation
Problem”.
A second issue is about the relation between two different theoretical ap-
proaches to phase transitions: those based in thermodynamics and those based
in statistical mechanics. This second issue can be viewed as a special case of the
question of the general relation between those two theories: in what sense, if any,
can one be reduced to the other? It has been argued that their respective ap-
proaches to phase transitions pose particular difficulties; so I shall call this the
“Reduction Problem”.
I feel that the Idealisation and Reduction problems have been conflated in the
existing literature, perhaps because of a belief that statistical mechanics uses non-
analyticities to represent phase transitions only because of some need to follow
the lead of thermodynamics in doing so. Of course such a requirement would lead
immediately to a requirement for infinite systems. But as we shall see, putting
the issue this way is extremely misleading. For the main reasons for representing
phase transitions as non-analyticities are internal to statistical mechanics, and
are independent of any need to capture the treatment of phase transitions by
thermodynamics. In the rest of this section I shall consider the Reduction Problem
and argue that it holds little interest on its own. The remainder of the chapter
will then be concerned with the Idealisation Problem, which cannot be dismissed
so easily.
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4.1.3 The Reduction Problem
Chuang Liu argued in a 1999 paper that phase transitions provided an example
of a genuinely emergent phenomenon, in the sense that the treatment provided by
thermodynamics cannot be reduced to the treatment of statistical mechanics.2 In
thermodynamics, phase transitions are represented by surfaces, lines and points in
the value-space of the relevant thermodynamic variables, at which one or more of
these variables is not analytic. Liu judges that ‘a rigorous account of phase tran-
sitions in purely thermodynamical terms encounters no real conceptual problems’
(Liu, 1999, S93). But he also claims that this representation of phase transitions
by non-analyticities is ‘a feature that any micro-explanations of phase transitions
must recover’, and goes on to argue that statistical mechanics was wanting in this
respect, since under some rather weak assumptions, such non-analyticities cannot
appear in a finite system.
Liu notes that the problems can be avoided if we consider statistical mechanics
in the ‘Thermodynamic Limit’ (TD Limit), which involves taking N — the number
of particles in the system — to infinity, while carefully preserving their overall
density and the interactions between them. In this infinite limit, non-analyticities
may appear in the quantities provided by statistical mechanics. But, he contends,
the recovery of the thermodynamical representation in statistical mechanics still
fails for finite systems. In keeping with his general assumption that a failure
of reduction is a signature of ‘emergence’, Liu calls phase transitions ‘emergent
phenomena’.
Craig Callender cut off Liu’s argument at its first stage, his rebuttal being an
instance of the overall thesis of his 2001 paper: that we are often guilty of ‘taking
thermodynamics too seriously’. In this case, the fault comes when Liu lifts the
2In the terms of Chapter 1, Liu takes emergence as defined by a failure of inter-theoretic
reduction, an approach considered in §1.5.
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definition of phase transitions as non-analyticities out from its thermodynamical
context, and demands that statistical mechanics must also treat them this way.
Callender denies that statistical mechanics has any such obligation and objects to
‘this knee-jerk identification of mathematical definitions across levels’ (ibid, 550).
Rather, he holds that statistical mechanics must be allowed to deal with phase
transitions in whatever way seems fruitful by its own lights.
On this particular point, one must surely agree with Callender. By demand-
ing that the same definition be used in each theory, Liu’s argument assumes an
over-simple view of theoretical reduction. And in any case, the reduction of ther-
modynamics to statistical mechanics in the classic Nagelian sense has long been
recognised to be a project fraught with difficulty.3
If anything, it is surprising that statistical mechanics can even approximately
reproduce any part of the thermodynamic representation of phase transitions,
whether in the TD limit or otherwise.4 For phase transitions are among the most
subtle and intricate phenomena treated by modern physics, and the hard-won the-
oretical advances have come mainly in statistical mechanics, where they have far
outstripped the ‘classical’ thermodynamic approaches. For example, the phenom-
ena associated with spontaneous magnetisation and supercooled fluids are now
sizeable research areas, and neither can be properly understood without a sophis-
ticated statistical mechanical treatment.
Since it goes so far beyond the treatment of thermodynamics, it seems clear
3Nagel (1961) is the classic statement of inter-theoretic reduction, though it has been much-
criticised. Sklar (1993) gives a comprehensive survey of problems associated with the thermody-
namics/statistical mechanics reduction. And see §1.5.1 for more details and further references.
4Amongst other simplifications, taking the TD limit often quenches thermal fluctuations,
which greatly helps the identification of quantities between the two theories. This disappearance
of fluctuations in the TD limit might appear to conflict with its use in association with phase
transitions. At critical points, it is the presence of fluctuations in the order parameter of the
system that drives the distinctive critical behaviour. In fact, in these cases the fluctuations are
not quenched by the TD limit, because the correlation length association with the fluctuations
also becomes infinite.
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that statistical mechanics should be free to develop its own definition and analysis
of phase transitions. It would be a ridiculous and artificial restriction to insist on
a strict adherence to an old definition for the sake of a reduction project that is
already in serious trouble. As such, I shall assume from now on that the Reduc-
tion issue may be left aside. When developing new, fruitful methods of dealing
with phase transitions within statistical mechanics, or in other frameworks, we
should feel no pressure to follow thermodynamics in representing them as non-
analyticities.
4.2 The Need for the Thermodynamic Limit
Despite the claims expressed in the last section, the fact is that almost all of the
sophisticated and successful statistical mechanical treatments of phase transitions
do make use of the TD limit, and they do represent phase transitions as singu-
larities. The most successful approaches include mean field theories, Landau’s
approach, Lee-Yang theory, and renormalisation treatments — all of which use
non-analyticies. So even if we follow Callender in dismissing the Reduction issue,
we are still confronted with a serious problem. For regardless of how thermo-
dynamics represents phase transitions, statistical mechanics still represents them
as non-analyticities in the free energy. And as already mentioned, these non-
analyticities do not appear in the free energy of a finite system: only infinite
systems can accommodate them. The Idealisation problem is how to relate these
accounts to the systems that we see in the world, since they appear to have a finite
number of degrees of freedom.
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4.2.1 The Idealisation Problem
I shall now try to set out a clearer statement of the Idealisation problem, and
thus of what would count as a satisfactory solution. I will structure the discussion
around three questions:
• A Motivation: Why is the thermodynamic limit so useful for theories of
phase transitions? Is it indispensible?
• A Definition: What constitutes a phase transition in a finite system?
• A Justification: If our theory of phase transitions does make an ineliminable
appeal to the infinite nature of a system, what justification do we have for
applying the theory to finite systems?
In practice, physicists do not worry about these questions, mainly because as a
matter of empirical fact, quantitative predictions derived for infinite systems hold
very accurately for finite systems of “laboratory scale”. But it is unsatisfactory for
philosophers of physics to merely note as a surprising fact that analyses can be used
to model systems for which they are provably inapplicable. We need an account
of how this comes about. There has been some interest in addressing this question
from philosophers of physics, and as several authors emphasise,5 our difficulty
does look more serious than the general worries about relating clean, idealised
systems that the theoretricians can consider, to the messy, realistic ones that the
experimentalists must observe. For the definition of a phase transition is an all-or-
nothing singularity in the free energy, which in no clear sense can be “approached”
as N becomes very large. And it is important to realise that the theories really
do require a genuine singularity; vague appeals to “steepness” or an “extreme
5Examples are found in Callender (2001, 550), Liu (1999, S100), and Batterman (2004, 13-
14). (Batterman is especially concerned with the singular limits that appear at continuous phase
transitions.)
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gradient” will not do. For we can find finite systems with extreme gradients in the
relevant thermodynamic variables which do not become a singularity as the TD
limit is taken: these do not represent phase transitions.
The issue I called ‘Motivation’, will be addressed in the remainder of this
section, where we shall look at the Lee-Yang theory of phase transitions. Using
this example, we will see that existing theories do make essential use of the TD
limit, but also that there is no barrier in principle to alternative theories that do
not appeal to it. Having seen how theories of phase transitions use the TD limit,
we can address Craig Callender’s suggestion 2001, 547-552 that there is an outright
contradiction amongst four statements that could plausibly be made about such
theories (§4.3).
Drawing on the discussion of these points, we will move to the second question
of ‘Definition’, which appears the most urgent; for without a clear definition of
phase transitions which applies to finite systems it is difficult to claim that we
have a theory of phase transitions at all. In §4.4, I propose a definition, which
allows us to address the third question, of ‘Justification’: how we can justify
applying our best theories to finite systems. Finally, in §4.5 we apply some lessons
drawn from the classical discussion to a suggestion of Laura Ruetsche (2003), that
quantum statistical mechanics can provide guidance of how to interpret quantum
field theories.
So to start with, we can look at an example of a statistical account of phase
transitions as non-analyticities. As already mentioned, mean field theory, Lan-
dau’s techniques and renormalisation methods each make use of the TD limit, but
perhaps the clearest example of the ineliminability of the infinite nature of the
models is to be found in Lee-Yang theory (Yang and Lee, 1952). The details are
found in standard textbooks (e.g., Thompson (1972, 85-89), Reichl (1980)), and
only an outline sketch need be given here.
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4.2.2 The Lee-Yang Theory of Phase Transitions
Although the Lee-Yang theory is a very general approach, we can illustrate it with
a concrete example. Consider a simple model system of a large, but finite number
of spins in thermal contact with an external reservoir. The total energy E can
take values n, where n = 0, 1, 2, ..., N , where N is the total number of energy
levels and  is the interaction energy between the spins. If we write the number of
microstates corresponding to the nth energy level as g(n), the canonical partition
function is given by:
ZN(β) =
N∑
n=0
g(n)e−βn (4.1)
where β = 1
kT
, the inverse temperature. We make the change of variable z ≡ e−β,
which allows us to factorise the polynomial
ZN(z) =
N∑
n=0
g(n)zn = κ
N(V )∏
r=1
ln
(
1− z
zn
)
, (4.2)
where zn are the N zeroes of the partition function, and κ is a constant which we
will ignore in what follows. Since all coefficients in Equation 4.2 are positive, the
zn will lie away from the physical values of z, which are on the positive real axis.
To analyse the locations of the zeroes in more detail, we define the complex
generalization of the free energy:
hN(z) ≡ lnZN(z)
N
=
1
N
N∑
n=1
ln
(
1− z
zn
)
(4.3)
and note that a Taylor expansion of hN(z) around a point z 6= zn has a finite radius
of convergence, given by the distance of the nearest zero from z. Therefore hN(z)
can be differentiated infinitely many times in any region that does not contain any
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zeroes, which means that within such a region there will be no non-analyticities in
the partition function nor the free energy. Therefore, for any point z0, there can
be a phase transition only if there is a zero in a region arbitrarily close to it on the
complex plane. For finite N , there will be a finite number of zeroes, so there will
be no phase transitions except at the points zn themselves. And we have already
seen that these lie away from the physical values of z on the positive real axis.
We now want to see how a phase transition might develop in the limit of infinite
N . Here we assume that the limit:
h(z) = lim
N→∞
lnZN(z)
N
(4.4)
exists, and that we can write
h(z) =
∫
dz′ρ(z′) ln
(
1− z
z′
)
(4.5)
where ρ(z′) is the local density of zeroes in the complex plane.6
Analysis of this expression can show us where the local density of zeroes is
positive. For systems such as our simple model, we obtain a curve C that “snips”
the real axis.7 And so at the region where the curve meets this axis, we have the
possibility of a non-analyticity, and therefore a physical phase transition.
What is more, the Lee-Yang method provides a classification of phase tran-
sitions, according to the line density of zeroes along this curve C. First-order
phase transitions are characterised by the line-density remaining non-zero where
C crosses the real axis. But for continuous phase transitions the line density goes
6Ruelle (1969) examines rigorously and generally the conditions for the existence of the TD
limit.
7Thompson (1972, 85-9) provides an analysis of the shapes of C for some realistic models.
Blythe and Evans (2003) give a pedagogical account of Lee-Yang theory, before considering how
the techniques can be extended to nonequilibrium cases.
217
smoothly to zero as the curve approaches the axis, and we find no discontinuity
in the first derivative of the free energy (though there may be discontinuities in
higher derivatives).
This sort of analysis of the density of zeroes in the complex plane, and thereby
the nature of the singularities in the free energy, tells us a great deal about how the
derivatives of the free energy behave in the TD limit. Since in statistical mechanics,
macroscopic quantities are obtained from derivatives of the free energy, this in turn
yields information about the properties of a substance as it approaches a phase
transition. These predictions can be tested against experiment (albeit on a finite
system!) and are found to be remarkably successful.
Yet the Lee-Yang analysis also shows clearly that a phase transition — defined
as a discontinuity in the free energy — cannot appear in a finite N system of the
type considered. What is more, this lack of non-analyticity can be shown under
some fairly weak assumptions, which cover a large variety of systems.8 Yet all
the melting and boiling we see around us occur in finite systems. This seems to
doom our theoretical account to irrelevance, since it provably does not apply to
the phase transitions we observe.
4.2.3 Some Roles of the Thermodynamic Limit
If we accept (from §4.1.3) that it is not just from a desire to reproduce the thermo-
dynamic analysis that we model phase transitions as non-analyticities in the TD
limit, we must look for other motivations. Discussions tend to focus on a single
motivation as the reason for its use. But choices vary. Of the authors mentioned
so far: Callender focuses on several mathematical conveniences that it allows,9
8Emch and Liu (2002, Ch.12) have a detailed discussion with a rich resource of references.
It should be mentioned that some mean field approaches do evade the assumptions that go into
such proofs. Nevertheless, most MFTs do still apply the TD limit in any case.
9Callender (2001, 549-552). He also makes some puzzling comments about the vanishing of
thermal fluctuations in the TD limit. While the neglect of these fluctuations may be important
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Batterman concentrates on its provision of an analysis of singular limits,10 and
Liu on the mathematical rigour it provides.11
I feel that settling on one exclusive choice of motivation is a mistake: rather,
the TD limit plays several distinct roles in theories of phase transitions. Here I
shall separate three, and though I make no claim to comprehensiveness, it appears
that much would be lost by ignoring any of them.
Mathematical Convenience
Those who hold that the TD limit is practically essential, but foundationally unim-
portant, tend to motivate its use from mathematical convenience. They grant that
physicists use the thermodynamic limit, and that they appeal to the singularities
that arise there, but hold that this is just because it makes their calculations easier.
In the first place, it is often easier to cope with infinite sums than large-but-finite
ones, and it is often possible to simplify matters further by replacing sums with
integrals. It is also possible to identify non-analyticities even when we cannot pro-
vide exact solutions; the appeal to the line-density of zeroes we saw in Lee-Yang
theory is just one example of the powerful geometrical and topological techniques
that can be brought to bear.
If mere mathematical convenience were the only reason for the deployment
for the Reduction problem, their significance is not so clear for the Idealisation problem. For
in the case of critical phase transitions it is these very fluctuations that grow in range, cause
the failure of mean field theory and necessitate the use of RG techniques — but as we saw in
Chapter 3, both the demonstration of this failure, and the RG techniques themselves, also use
the TD limit.
10Batterman (2004): a focus I think misplaced for the reasons elaborated in §4.3.2.
11In Liu (1999) he focusses on the need to rigorously derive singularities, and concentrates
on the neglect of fluctuations, though here he seems motivated by the Reduction issue. In
a later article (Liu, 2001) he concentrates more on the ‘accentuation or exaggeration of the
corresponding physical properties by neglecting or filling out negligible differences’ by which I
take him to mean what I call seclusion below. A joint paper with Gerard Emch mentions its use
in discarding surface effects (Emch and Liu, 2005), and their jointly authored book separates out
several more examples of mathematical and physical motivations (Emch and Liu, 2002, 394-6).
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of the TD limit, the whole issue would be of little foundational or philosophical
interest (except perhaps as a vivid example of the powers of idealisation, or of
the difficulties in inter-theoretic reduction). All that would be required would be
a demonstration that a theory using the TD limit gave the same result as the
“inconvenient” analysis of the finite case. Experimental success would go a fair
way towards such a justification, and for more reassurance, we could compare some
‘toy’ cases where both finite and infinite results are obtainable. But we are not
in this situation; our problem is not that theories of finite phase transitions are
mathematically inconvenient or impractical, it is that they do not exist.
Seclusion
A very different set of motivations stem from a need to isolate and separate out
distinct phenomena occurring simultaneously at the point of a phase transition.
We analyse phase transitions by examining the partition function or free energy
of a system, but these functions will be made up from many contributions: some
related to the effects of the phase transition itself, but many of them unrelated.
We want to remove as many irrelevant contributions as possible, so that the phase
transition itself can be recognised apart from extraneous effects. I shall call this
practice ‘seclusion.
This second motivation has long been recognised in the philosophy of science
as a species of idealisation distinct from motivations of mathematical power. It
has been with us at least since Galileo’s separation of the horizontal and vertical
components of a projectile in order to exhibit separately its accelerated and inertial
motion. (It may well be older, but McMullin (1985) argues that Galileo was
novel in applying the technique, which he calls — perhaps misleadingly — ‘causal
idealization’).
One good example of seclusion is that taking the TD limit automatically dis-
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cards complicating features such as ‘surface’ or ‘edge effects’. Consider a lattice
system of finite extent with contributions to the partition function coming from
all sites. The contributions of those at the edges and surfaces will be markedly
different to those nearer the centre of the sample, since any short-range interac-
tions will be affected due to their different arrangement of neighbours. In the TD
limit, the whole body can be treated as ‘bulk’, and the surface effects vanish.
We shall see later (§4.4.3) how “cross-over” effects can separate different cate-
gories of phase transitions in the TD limit, and many other seclusion effects appear
there. It is in infinite systems that we can distinguish the features that are defini-
tive of phase transitions, as well as distinguishing different types in a systematic
classification. However, this does not imply that a theory dealing principally with
the infinite case should be inapplicable to finite systems: it merely suggests that
some work needs to be done to fill the gap; and of course, that is one of the
problems with which we are concerned.
Structure
A third motivation for considering the TD limit is that it introduces new math-
ematical structure to our theories: a structure which plays a more fundamental
role than “merely” increasing convenience. Rather, it introduces qualitative dis-
tinctions which would not otherwise be available and may be essential to give an
adequate theoretical. For example: Robert Batterman insists that theories must
recognise the existence of what he calls ‘physical discontinuities’ (Batterman, 2004)
at phase transitions. This demand can be interpreted as requiring that the clear
qualitative distinction between physical phases must be reflected directly by some
clear qualitative distinction in our mathematical representation of different phases.
And such a distinction is not immediately available in representations of states of
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finite systems.12
As we have seen, the Lee-Yang theory appeals to a structure which emerges
only as the TD limit is taken — the line-density of zeroes in the complex plane.
Other theories provide the required structure in very different forms. Perhaps
the most striking examples appear in algebraic approaches to quantum statistical
mechanics, where distinct phases of an infinite system are represented as unitarily
inequivalent representations of the algebra of its observables (Sewell, 1986, Ch.2).
Yet for a finite system, the Stone-von Neumann theorem assures us that all such
irreducible representations are unitarily equivalent. So again, without the TD limit
our theoretical account does not provide enough structure to distinguish more than
one phase. We shall return to this in some detail in §4.5.
Again, it is perfectly possible that this extra structure can be supplied in some
other way than by introducing an infinite system. For example, Lev Landau’s
approach to phase transitions involves introducing an order parameter that ex-
presses characteristic features of each phase, and it seems that one could appeal to
attributes such as its sign (when a scalar) or direction (when a vector) to express
a qualitative difference between phases. In fact, Landau’s approach does use the
TD limit and appeals directly to non-analyticities, classifying phase transitions by
the lowest order of derivative of the order parameter that contains a discontinuity
(Landau and Lifshitz, 1959, Ch.8), but there seems no a priori reason why the
alternative would not work.
Each of these three roles — convenience, seclusion, and structure — are signif-
icant in themselves. While they appear independent of one another, they are all
satisfied by the idealisation of taking the TD limit. Of the three, the first appears
to be at most a motivation of ‘mere’ practicality, (though for a working physicist
12But see §4.3.1, where we reject Batterman’s further claim that these physical discontinuities
must be represented by mathematical discontinuities.
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it is of course quite sufficient in itself.) The second and third appear of more
foundational importance, and I shall focus on them in what follows. However, it
is important to emphasise that none of the roles seems to require the infinite limit
— alternative approaches are not ruled out. But it is striking that the TD limit
is able to fulfill all three roles, and to do so naturally. More significant for what
follows, a demonstration that a single role can be filled without the TD limit is
not a solution to the Idealisation problem. We require alternatives for all three.
4.3 An Apparent Paradox
Craig Callender puts the Idealisation problem in sharp relief in his 2001 paper by
presenting four jointly contradictory statements about phase transitions, repro-
duced (and re-ordered for later convenience) below:
1. Phase transitions are governed/described by classical or quantum statistical
mechanics (through Z).
2. Real systems have finite N .
3. Phase transitions occur when the partition function Z has a singularity.
4. Real systems display phase transitions.
Once we add the theorem that a partition function Z of a finite system cannot
display a singularity, the four are contradictory. And it is possible to classify
attitudes to the nature of phase transitions by looking at which of these statements
are denied. In the rest of this Section, I shall examine the consequences of denying
each of the statements on Callender’s list, and whether doing so can be counted
a satisfactory solution to the Idealisation problem. Surprisingly (perhaps), it is
possible to find advocates for rejecting of each one of his statements.
223
4.3.1 Deny Statement 1: Declare that phase transitions
are not governed/described by classical or quantum
statistical mechanics
The most straightforward approach is to take our apparent paradox at face value.
Ilya Prigogine points to it as yet another failure of reductionistic approaches to
complex phenomena: phase transitions are ‘emergent properties’, a term he uses
in a very strong sense, to mean that they are not derivable from known laws of
quantum mechanics or classical physics. Accordingly, he holds that phase tran-
sitions are insufficiently described by the theories we have been considering, and
holds that genuinely new law-like behaviour appears in systems large enough to
exhibit such phenomena (Prigogine, 1997, 45).
Since Prigogine has long been engaged in a research project to discover emer-
gent laws across many areas in physics, he draws this conclusion with a great
deal more readiness than would most physicists or philosophers. I feel that this
straightforward denial of the scope of present physical theories is an extraordinary
move to make, given that our paradox started from the striking success of statis-
tical mechanics in modelling phase transitions. Our problem is to understand the
relation between the infinite methods it uses and the finite systems it models so
faithfully. This problem is not touched by trying to deny that any such link exists.
Both Batterman and Liu can be read as considering rather less extreme vari-
ations on this position. Liu’s conclusion in his most recent article (2004) is that
neither the Ising spin models nor the TD limit are ‘realistic’ in that they do
not accurately represent the structure of real systems. But these two deficiencies
somehow compensate for one another: ‘It seems that by introducing two radically
unrealistic idealizations — the Ising lattice and the thermodynamic limit — one
is able to do better [than a more realistic approach]’ (Liu, 2004, 256). However, it
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is not entirely clear that Liu equates the ‘unrealistic’ treatment of statistical me-
chanics with a straightforward failure of description. It is equally possible to read
his statement as marvelling that such an a priori unpromising approach gives such
accurate results. In any case, Liu gives no explanation of how the compensation
is supposed to work, and however we interpret his position, he gives no clue as to
how the theories achieve their empirical success.
Robert Batterman suggests that the existence of phase transitions forces us to
accept the existence of what he calls ‘physical discontinuities’. These are physical
quantities which really do undergo discontinuities ‘out there’ in the world. So he
interprets the singularities suggested by the mathematics in a very direct way. As
examples he offers the qualitative difference between phases, and also one which
he discusses in greater detail, the breaking of water into droplets. In both cases,
he holds that the singularity is ‘physical’.
... it surely does seem very plausible to describe the breakup of water
into droplets as a genuine physical discontinuity. It is true that we do
not see the topological change in the phase transition (say when we
witness water boiling in a tea kettle) in the same way we see a stream
of fluid break apart. But that, by itself, does not show that there is no
genuine physical discontinuity in the thermodynamic system.
My contention is that thermodynamics is correct to characterize phase
transitions as real physical discontinuities and it is correct to represent
them mathematically as singularities. Further, without the thermo-
dynamic limit, statistical mechanics would completely fail to capture
a genuine feature of the world. Without the thermodynamic limit, in
fact, statistical mechanics is incapable even of establishing the existence
of distinct phases of systems. (Batterman, 2004, 12-13, italics his)
Batterman appears to be siding with Prigogine in insisting that statistical me-
chanics is actually wrong in failing to accommodate phase transitions as physical
distincontinuities in finite systems. For he seems to claim the following: a phys-
ical discontinuity can be ‘seen’ as the density of water boiling in the tea kettle
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instantaneously jumps from one value to another, and so statistical mechanics is
inadequate if it fails to represent this discontinuity in any finite system.
I admit to some uncertainty as to how to interpret Batterman’s ‘physical discon-
tinuities’, and it is helpful to disambiguate his thesis into two claims, one markedly
stronger than the other. The weaker claim is that there are important features of
the physical world that are represented by discontinuities (or more precisely, by
non-analyticities) in the mathematics used by our best theories. Since our abil-
ity to represent these features would be lost if we gave up using the TD limit, the
limit is essential. The stronger claim adds to the first that the features represented
by the mathematical discontinuities are ‘real physical quantities’ undergoing ‘real
physical discontinuities’.
In so far as I understand Batterman’s terminology, the stronger claim appears
untenable. For it is possible to recognise the existence of distinct phases and
the transition between them without being forced to accept that any physical
quantity undergoes a discontinuity. The most straightforward alternative would
be to recognise that phase transitions take a finite time, during which the water
belongs in no definite phase. This could be implemented in a variety of ways, but
one would be the following. Let us consider a finite sample of water, and examine
its density as a function of time as it boils. Certainly, there is a range of densities
over which we are happy to call it a liquid, and a range of densities over which
we happy to call it a gas, and further that there is a discontinuous ‘gap’ between
these two ranges of densities. We can certainly recognise a ‘physical discontinuity’
in this sense. However, this does not mean that there is any particular sample of
water whose density must ‘jump’ across this gap instantaneously when the water
boils.
Further details would vary according to inclination, but one option would be
to hold that for the sample of water as a whole, neither the terms ‘liquid’ and ‘gas’
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are relevant. Alternatively, we can hold that there is local variation while boiling,
with some areas being liquids, some gases (until we get down to some scale, at
which point these terms fail to apply).
I should clarify that I see no a priori reason to deny the possibility of physical
discontinuities. Indeed space, time or any other physical quantity may be discrete,
in which case they might be very common indeed. However, their existence should
not be demonstrable by observing — say — water boiling in a tea kettle. We need
an account of phase transitions that would accommodate this behaviour, even if
the world contained only continuous physical quantities.
If we reject Batterman’s stronger claim, then we are still free to consider the
weaker one on its own. His claim then is that without discontinuities, the or-
thodox statistical mechanical techniques fail to ‘capture a genuine feature of the
world’. The weak claim leaves aside the issue of whether these ‘genuine features’
are themselves discontinuities in physical quantities, but they are certainly some-
thing physically significant, and they need to be represented by any empirically
adequate theory. The most obvious way to implement this would be to replace
the orthodox procedure for constructing a partition function for a finite system.
Rather than sum over a finite number of degrees of freedom, we replace any finite
sums by infinite ones. This approach might be in keeping with the actual practice
of physicists, but it leaves unanswered all the mandatory questions identified in
§4.2.1. Namely: How can it be justified? What definition can we give for a phase
transition in a finite system? As such, Batterman’s weak thesis on its own is not
an answer to the Idealisation question, and we need to choose another path.
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4.3.2 Deny Statement 2: Declare that real systems do not
have finite N
A second way of dealing with our problem is to hold that, contrary to appearances,
real systems really do have infinite N . That is, physical systems undergoing phase
transitions either have an infinite number of parts, or in some other way acquire
the infinite degrees of freedom necessary to support a discontinuity in the free
energy.
A direct approach would be to point out that since no real system is completely
isolated, the modelling of a finite system with one of infinite extent reflects the
fact that the system is always coupled to the rest of the universe.13 Emch and Liu
(2005) can be read as advocating such an approach, with the justification that it
is the “least of all evils”. They point to the infinitely insulating walls or infinite
distances that are implicit when we consider a perfectly isolated finite system, and
conclude: ‘unless specific surface or boundary effects are of interest, taking the
infinite limit is (from a philosophical point of view) more sensible than not taking
it’. I would suggest that only from a practical or physical point of view is it more
sensible. From a philosophical point of view, taking the infinite limit represents a
far more radical step. For the idealisations involved in postulating completely in-
sulating walls involve neglecting small external perturbations that become smaller
as we consider increasingly isolated systems. This limiting procedure is in contrast
to the singularities, which are not ‘approached’ in any simple way as the system
becomes larger. In any case, it is not an acceptable defence of a position merely
to point out that an alternative also has its problems.
13If we want to reserve judgment about the size of the universe (not to mention considerations
of locality), an alternative route to the same goal would to claim that any system can acquire
an infinite number of degrees of freedom from interaction with a continuous field of some kind.
Classically, this could be the electromagnetic field, but we could also point out that at a quantum
level, all matter ultimately has a field-like nature.
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More generally, it is hard to see how such suggestions can provide a satisfactory
solution to the Idealisation problem. For example, to provide a definition of a
phase transition we do not merely need to show the possibility of non-analyticity,
but also that non-analyticity appears at the points of phase transitions, and only
at those points. Coupling the system to a large number of degrees of freedom
makes discontinuities in F possible, but for an adequate theory, they must appear
at the right places and times. For example: consider two kettles next to one
another: in one the water boils, in the other it does not. We must guarantee
that the non-analyticity is in some way associated with the first kettle. It cannot
‘leak’ over to the second kettle, since there is no phase transition occurring there.
That is, our non-analyticities must be tied to the finite systems involved in each
phase transition. It is difficult to see how such a satisfactory justification could
be conjured from an appeal to coupling to the rest of the universe, or to some
electromagnetic or quantum field.
But we can modify our denial of the finite nature of the systems to yield a
more subtle suggestion. Batterman’s weaker suggestion identified in §4.3.1, might
be read as recommending such an adjustment. He might not actually doubt that
real systems are made up of a finite number of particles, but he certainly demands
that they be ‘characterized’ using an infinite N .
I want to champion the manifestly outlandish proposal that despite the
fact that real systems are finite, our understanding of them and their
behavior requires, in a very strong sense, the idealization of infinite
systems and the thermodynamic limit. (Batterman, 2004, 9)
Perhaps the best way to implement Batterman’s proposal in Callender’s terms
would be to modify Statement 2 to: “Real systems have finite N , but to describe
them, statistical mechanics must model them as infinite.”
I have some sympathy with an alteration in this spirit, but have difficulty with
the motivations that Batterman gives. He argues that the ineliminability of infinite
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limits stems from situations in which the relevant limits are singular, that is: when
a small parameter being taken to zero describes behaviour that becomes markedly
different as the limit is approached.14
However, these singular limits that Batterman appeals to do not appear in all
phase transitions, only in some cases such as critical points. There is little space
here to discuss the relationship between non-critical and critical phase transitions,
and to do so would be to wander from our main theme.15 But singular limits cannot
be the key to understanding why the TD limit must be used. For the theories
which adequately represent phase transitions (both critical and non-critical) make
a central appeal to the TD limit, whether the limit is singular or not.
Instead, let us agree with Batterman that the use of the TD limit is inelim-
inable, while reserving judgment on his diagnosis of singular limits as the root
cause. This brings us back to the main problems, to definine phase transitions in
finite systems and to justifying their application of our best theories. Batterman
says little about the details of a definition, but the rest of his article is concerned
with providing a justification for infinite idealisations. He illustrates these with a
set of examples drawn from hydrodynamics. When a stream of water breaks off
14Batterman begins his article (§§1-3) by considering the relation between theories (the Re-
duction problem), and there he appears to use singular limits only as a metaphor for a new
approach he recommends for intertheoretic reduction. However, his arguments are addressed to
the Idealisation problem in the remainder of the paper, and there he appeals to singular limits
in a literal sense.
15For more details, see the discussion of different varieties of phase transition in Chapter 3
(especially §§3.2 & 3.1.2) but a few brief comments seem in order. At a critical phase transition,
a micro-structural property called the correlation length, ξ, also diverges to infinity. This ξ is
a measure of the range of the correlation of fluctuations. Since mean field theories neglect the
correlation of such fluctuations, they fail near critical points (in less than four dimensions for
the Ising model), and a mean field account of the critical phenomena is seen to be inadequate.
Renormalisation introduces a systematic scheme for reducing the degrees of freedom, utilising
a transformation that ‘traces them out’ while accounting properly for the diverging correlation
length, and that does not fail near the transition, but instead gives accurate predictions for
quantities such as the critical exponents. The main point for our purposes is that the failure of
the mean field approximations is not directly connected to the necessity for the infinite limit,
but rather to the diverging correlation length.
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into drops, the shapes of the “neck” and of the drops are universal : they remain
the same across many different kinds of fluid, which nonetheless differ in their mi-
croscopic structure. Batterman argues that if the microscopic details of the fluid
make no difference to their large-scale features, it might be justifiable to replace a
particulate body by a continuum.
For the special case of critical phase transitions, there appears to be hope of a
similar approach. Some critical phenomena are also universal: the same large-scale
effects occur in systems with widely varying micro-physical details. As we saw in
Chapter 3, renormalisation techniques can provide an account of this universality,
and could lead to an argument that a sufficiently judicious replacement of a finite
spaced lattice with a continuum might leave untouched the large-scale physics that
we observe in phase transitions.
But worries immediately arise. First, we do not seem to dispense completely
with an infinite system. As we mentioned in §4.2, renormalisation techniques
start with infinite N models, and then demonstrate that the physics below a
certain scale can be neglected.16 This suggests only that details below a certain
scale are irrelevant, not that the infinite nature of the system can be disregarded
completely. A second concern is that the phenomenon of universality occurs only
near critical points, not at all phase transitions; and even there, not all properties
associated with phase transitions are universal. For example, the temperature at
which a critical phase transition appears is not universal. As far as I understand
Batterman’s suggestions, his justification for ‘screening off’ small-scale physics
would not hold for such properties, so there would be no reason to trust the
predictions of the theory.
16The particularly interesting case of finite-size crossover is addressed in §4.4.2.
231
4.3.3 Deny Statement 3: Declare that phase transitions
do not only occur when the partition function has a
singularity
This is the course recommended by Craig Callender, and is also one of the op-
tions considered by Chuang Liu. Callender diagnoses our temptation to accede
to the statement as stemming from our wish to directly import definitions from
thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, but as he points out: ‘the fact that ther-
modynamics treats phase transitions as singularities doesn’t imply that statistical
mechanics must too.’ But in diagnosing this motivation, Callender is engaging
only with the Reduction problem. Simply denying Statement 3 leaves the theory
of statistical mechanics without a good account of finite phase transitions, indeed
it leaves us unable to recognise their existence. Callender holds that finite phase
transitions must be governed by analytic partition functions, which ‘in some sense
approximate a singularity’, but gives little idea of what this sense is to be.
The most obvious move would be to assume that a sufficiently extreme gradient
in the free energy could represent a phase transition. However, this cannot be the
whole story. The Lee-Yang theory, in common with other treatments, requires a
genuine discontinuity, not just an extreme gradient in the free energy. We can
easily construct finite systems with extreme gradients in their free energy that do
not develop into discontinuities when the TD limit is taken; these do not signify
genuine phase transitions.
Liu (2001, 2004) is also worried by the difficulties presented in filling out Cal-
lender’s ‘some sense’ of approximation, because he feels that this only makes sense
when one can point to an asymptotic limit which ends at a phase transition. Liu
draws a contrast with how we might justify ‘applying calculus to almost continu-
ous bodies (i.e., those which contain a large number of very small particles of finite
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mass)’. He judges that we are correct to do so, because it is meaningful to say that
δM/δV approaches dM/dV , as δM → 0.17 Thus there is a clear sense in which
one quantity approximates the other for ‘almost continuous bodies’. However, this
is in contrast to the case of the thermodynamic limit:
Until the limit is reached, the pressure or free energy of any macrosys-
tem is analytic. The non-analyticity is not at all asymptotically reached
by the process of taking TL [the Thermodynamic Limit]. At no stage of
this process is non-analyticity (representing a phase transition) roughly
or approximately defined. (Liu, 1999, S103)
Here Liu brings up an important consideration, but a further distinction needs to
be made. Consider Liu’s ‘almost continuous’ body. There are at least two ways
to regard his justification for applying calculus to it. The first is the one that Liu
discusses: we consider the quantity δM/δV for the particulate body, which can be
directly interpreted as a physical quantity. Postulating a differentiable function
M ≡M(V ) and considering its derivative dM/dV , we can then show that δM/δV
is very well approximated by dM/dV as δM becomes very small. This provides us
with a justification for making the substitution δM/δV ≈ dM/dV throughout our
equations. In this first approach we aim to represent a realistic physical system,
but then approximate some of the terms in our mathematics.
A second way is to argue that in regard to the behaviour of the body that we
are interested in, it would be as well to consider a continuous substance rather than
one made up from particles. We therefore consider this idealised physical situation
rather than the original: modelling a continuous body rather than an atomistic one.
In this case, the quantity dM/dV is treated as representing a physical quantity,
albeit one connected to a fictional, unrealistic situation. To justify this procedure,
we need some argument that the substitute system will share the behaviour we are
interested in. To make such an argument there is no sense in which the particulate
17Of course, this is not a rigourous approach to justifying the application of calculus to physical
systems, but it serves to illustrate Liu’s argument.
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body need ‘get asymptotically closer’ to the continuous one. And this is so, even
if we do appeal to the fact that δM/δV ≈ dM/dV for small δM .
This distinction is a well-known one, and versions have been drawn in many
different contexts, and under many different names. Butterfield (2006a, 24-5) and
Teller (1979, 348-9) agree in calling the first ‘approximation’ and the second ‘ideal-
ization’. McMullin (1985, 264n) separates similar procedures under the headings:
‘construct’ idealization and ‘causal’ idealization.18 I shall continue with Butterfield
and Teller’s terminology in what follows.
In many cases, the choice between idealisation and approximation makes little
practical difference, because we often find that the justification we need to supply
for each procedure is very similar. We have already seen in Liu’s example that the
small difference between δM/δV and dM/dV may be used to justify either approx-
imation or idealisation. Or consider an almost force-free body such as a hockey
puck moving on ice. We might either consider dropping some of the smaller force
terms from our equations (approximation) or replacing the whole problem with
consideration of a genuinely force-free one (idealisation). In both cases the equa-
tions we consider will be the same, and the justification for each comes from the
negligible differences that these force terms make to the results we are interested
in. For these cases, the idealisation/approximation distinction is of no importance
to how a calculation proceeds.
But sometimes the two come apart: and in cases associated with the TD
limit, the distinction is often crucial. Callender’s ‘in some sense’ cannot be filled
out by considering an approximation: it must refer to an idealisation. In other
words: Liu’s absurdity of attempting to ‘approximate an analyticity with a non-
analyticity’ (whatever that might amount to), can be avoided if instead we idealise
18Other authors draw similar distinctions, Cartwright (1989) uses ‘abstraction’ for what I am
terming ‘idealisation’, but she is also interested are interested in wider connotations, such as a
distinction between “partially true”, and “strictly false” idealisations. I would like to avoid these
additional considerations.
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a finite system with an infinite one. For it is legitimate to replace a finite system
with an infinite one, and then to consider what sort of features of the finite systems
might correspond to the non-analyticities that appear in the free energy of its infi-
nite replacement. Of course we must face the questions of the physical significance
of this procedure. Most importantly: what justification can we provide that the
replacement will give us insight into the phase transitions of the original? I shall
try to fill some of these gaps in §4.4.2.
Before we move to consider the next option, we must mention the specialist
research programme studying phase transitions in ‘small’ systems, or those involv-
ing gravitational effects, where the TD limit cannot be applied. One advocate of
this approach, Dieter Gross, argues that many first-order phase transitions are not
best understood in the TD limit. He works with an alternative set of definitions,
based around the statistical mechanics of the microcanonical ensemble (Gross,
2001). This is a far more straightforward denial of Statement 3 than we have
so far considered: Gross simply rejects the whole non-analyticity approach, and
suggests an alternative way in which statistical mechanics can model phase tran-
sitions. Unfortunately, it appears that these replacement definitions do not give
rise to theories with as wide a range of applicability as the orthodox ones. So until
Gross’ programme develops further, his approach must be seen as a complement,
rather than a replacement.
4.3.4 Deny Statement 4: Declare that real systems do not
display phase transitions
Perhaps surprisingly, this is the option that appears to be taken by many physicists,
even those who have made great contributions to theories of phase transitions. For
example, Leo Kadanoff was the first to propose that the ‘scaling’ relations seen
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in critical phenomena could be analysed using a ‘blocking’ procedure.19 In his
textbook on critical phenomena he writes:
The existence of a phase transition requires an infinite system. No
phase transitions occur in systems with a finite number of degrees of
freedom. (Kadanoff, 2000, 238)
Similar statements can be found in many texts, usually with an associated plea
that as the systems we see around us have very large N , they are ‘effectively’ or
‘nearly’ infinite. (Of course, as we discussed in §4.3.3, a discontinuity does not
appear at any finite N , nor do we get “nearer” to one as N increases.)
Perhaps even more striking is the attitude expressed in a text on the computer
modelling of phase transitions (Mouritsen, 1984). These techniques model only a
finite array of spins, and one might expect that theoreticians would welcome these
as providing a more direct route to real physical transitions than do orthodox
techniques, since they reproduce the finite nature of the physical systems. Not in
the least; Mouritsen follows Kadanoff in declaring that phase transitions cannot
occur in finite systems, and continues:
Nevertheless, finite systems have reminiscences of phase transitions,
and systematic [computer] studies of these pseudo-transitions as func-
tions of system size may reveal information about the phase transition
in the infinite system. (Mouritsen, 1984, 20, italics his.)
So even in those situations where it is mathematically convenient (indeed, neces-
sary) to model a finite system directly, there is no suggestion that these models
can show anything other than a ‘pseudo-transition’. Instead, we look at our re-
sults as functions of system size, and attempt to extrapolate them to the infinite
case. Only when Mouritsen is satisfied that the infinite case would exhibit a non-
analyticity, does he consider that we really are dealing with a true phase transition,
19Chapter 3 gives more details of his proposals, and how his line of thought was later honed
into the techniques of the Renormalisation Group by Kenneth Wilson.
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and only then does he attempt to categorise it and draw further conclusions about
its properties (Mouritsen, 1984, 22-26).
The fact that these theoreticians of phase transitions flatly deny that they take
place in finite systems, may seem surprising. Presumably, they see kettles boil
no less clearly than the rest of us. But the very fact that they feel that their
denials are uncontroversial suggests that we are dealing with a matter of words
only. The modelling of phase transitions with non-analyticities is a part of their
theoretical toolbox, and the term ‘phase transitions’ has come to refer only to
phenomena that fit this definition. Of course a change in reference of the term
‘phase transition’ does not solve the Idealisation problem, but just changes the
form of words in which it must be stated. In usual terms the problem was to
relate phase transitions in finite systems to a definition available only in infinite
systems. Now we must state it as a problem of relating “nameless phase-transition-
like phenomena” in finite systems to “phase transitions”, now defined so as to only
appear in infinite systems. Likewise, the theoretician’s pleas that large systems are
‘effectively’ or ‘nearly’ infinite, translate to Callender’s statement that the phase
transitions must ‘in some sense’ approximate a singularity. The problems remain
the same: the fact that we trust the infinite results to tell us about the finite sized
phenomenon remains unchanged, and we still need an account of when this trust
is well-founded.
4.4 Phase Transitions in Finite Systems
Let us review the issues still outstanding. We have a definition of phase transitions
common to almost all successful theories of those phenomena. This definition, as
well as those theories, apply only to infinite systems. Yet they describe well the
phase transitions (or “phase-transition-like” behaviour) of finite systems, indeed
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this is the main standard by which we judge their success. To avoid a simple
contradiction, we could choose to deny any of the four statements presented in
§§4.3.1-4.3.4: but by just doing so we may leave the important questions un-
touched. We have seen some reasons for the utility of the TD limit, but still
require (i) a definition for phase transitions that we can apply to finite systems
and (ii) a justification for applying the theories to them. In §4.4.1 and §4.4.2I shall
address each of these, and then in §4.4.3, return to see how the answers cast light
on how the TD limit is able to fulfill the roles we identified for it.
4.4.1 Defining Phase Transitions in Finite Systems
Consider a finite system with N degrees of freedom in a particular state S. Let us
denote its free energy as FN(S) and its partition function as ZN(S). And assume
that our system is one in that clearly delimited set for which there exists a well-
defined procedure for taking the thermodynamic limit. The free energy of that
system when the TD limit is taken we can call F∞(S) and the partition function
Z∞(S). (Naturally, FN(S) and F∞(S) will coincide for a system that is already
infinite). We have a well-defined criterion for phase transitions in infinite systems,
so there is an obvious definition for the finite case.
Definition 1. Phase transitions occur for a finite system in state S if and only if
F∞(S) has a singularity.
Rather surprisingly, using this definition it is possible to hold on to all of
Callender’s four statements without contradiction; though only in a Pickwickian
sense — it is a “trick” possible only due to his choice of wording. Namely, the
singularity referred to in Statement 3 is one not in the partition function ZN but
in Z∞.
I believe that this definition of a phase transition in a finite system is at least
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naturalistically appropriate, in that it is in keeping with the practice of physicists.
In particular, it accounts for their uncritical reliance on theories of the infinite to
tell us about finite cases. For example, it makes some sense of the otherwise odd
practice we saw in §4.3.4, of withholding judgment as to the nature of a phase
transition until results are rigorously demonstrated in the infinite case, even if
finite results are available.
But from a philosophical point of view the definition looks suspect, for it seems
to make the existence of phase transitions a subjective, theory-dependent question,
rather than something directly determined by physical facts about a physical sys-
tem. This worry can be decomposed into two more sharply defined objections:
first, that the existence of a phase transition is determined by a counterfactual
(indeed, a highly unrealistic counterfactual); and second, that the existence of the
phase transition depends on exactly how the system is modelled, or how the TD
limit is taken — subjective matters that we can change on a whim. Let us take
these in turn.
Phase Transitions are Actual
The thought behind the objection is that properties such as ‘is boiling’ appear
to be an intrinsic property of a given sample of water. And as such, the facts
we need to decide whether or not it is undergoing a phase transition should be
physical facts, about actual states of affairs contained within — say — a kettle.
They should not exist only in an idealised model on a theoretician’s blackboard.
This objection is based on a version of a general principle often known as
the ‘Truthmaker Principle’, roughly: that any actually true proposition should be
made true by actual facts, real goings-on in the world. Put as a general claim,
the principle is both disputable and lacks an agreed articulation (and this is not
for a lack of attempts, e.g., Armstrong (1997, Ch.8) and Mellor (2005)). But I
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shall not dispute the specific version appealed to here. For if we look carefully
at Definition 1, we see that all the truthmaking facts can be located within the
kettle, though we may need to appeal to counterfactuals to apply our detailed
theory and decide whether the facts count as a phase transition (and if so, what
type). That is, it is facts about the finite sample of water that determine whether
or not a phase transition is occurring, and determine whether it is first-order or
continuous. However, we find it necessary to appeal to a radically counterfactual
circumstance to state these facts in any reasonable way.
There is a strong parallel between this situation and the defense offered by
David Lewis in regard to his analysis of counterfactuals, which is held to contravene
a similar principle. He defends his analysis, which is made in terms of a “similarity”
relation amongst possible worlds, by suggesting that it is the qualitative character
of the actual world which determines this “similarity” relation. However, he also
defends the ineliminability of the other possible worlds: ‘it is only by bringing the
other worlds into the story that we can say in any concise way what [qualitative]
character it takes to make what counterfactuals true’ (Lewis, 1986b, 22). Lewis’
memorable example was the following: while it is no doubt possible to describe
Buenos Aires to a stay-at-home Australian by describing many intrinsic properties
of Buenos Aires, it is so much more concise and illuminating to say ‘It’s like a
Spanish-speaking Sydney’.20
Returning to the tea kettle, we should realise that it is the character of the
finite sample of water that determine the nature of the infinite system that we then
consider. When we draw conclusions about the nature of the phase transitions,
they are conclusions about the character of the finite sample, but by reference to
the infinite model we can express them in concise and illuminating form.
This consideration also blunts the worry that our definitions makes reference
20I thank Jeremy Butterfield for pointing out the parallels with Lewis’ position. His 2003
paper contains an interesting note on the genesis of this particular example (24n).
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to physically impossible circumstances. So long as we are satisfied that the truth-
makers are intrinsic properties of the finite boiling water, the physical impossibility
of the TD limit does not seem to pose any further problem than does the original
counterfactual appeal. There is nothing paradoxical about the fact that our clear,
concise expression makes reference to a physically impossible situation. Of course
it must be conceded that an uncritical consideration of physically impossible coun-
terfactuals might lead us to all kinds of absurd conclusions. We must be cautious,
and this is part of the reason why it is so important to take the TD limit in a
well-defined manner.
Phase Transitions are Objective
While there exist standard procedures for taking the thermodynamic limit, and
rigorous methods to determine whether it is well-defined,21 these procedures are
human inventions, and choices could have been made differently. Even when clear
rules are laid down, theoreticians will always be willing to break them, if it proves
fruitful for the analysis a particular situation. The definition of a phase transition
thus seems arbitrary in a disastrous sense: we can choose whether one is occurring
or not by modelling it differently, or taking the limit according a different scheme.
To allay this concern, it should be recognised that it was empirical consider-
ations that have led TD limits to be taken in the way that they are. Over the
last century, theories have developed to account for differences and similarities
in the phase transitions we observe. We have been led to distinguish first-order
vs. continuous transitions; and symmetry-breaking vs. non-symmetry-breaking
transitions for example. The particular procedure for taking the TD limit has
21Ruelle (1969) is the definitive modern analysis of the conditions that allow a TD limit. Emch
and Liu (2002, Chs. 11-12) provide a historical and philosophical discussion of the techniques,
including the amusing fact that the necessity of the TD Limit was put to a vote at a 1937
conference. The result was not recorded.
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developed along with the theories, in such a way that phase transitions are defined
in good accordance with experiment, and the categorisation is faithful to empirical
similarities and distinctions.
If it was found that a different set of methods for taking the TD limit gave
a better classification of phase transitions, more faithfully accounting for the ex-
perimental observation, it would be adopted. There are good historical examples
of such alterations: for example, we mentioned earlier how the Ehrenfest cate-
gorisation of nth-order phase transitions (n being the lowest order of derivative of
the free energy with a discontinuity) was discarded when it was found to exclude
transitions where F diverges.22
One final difficulty must be mentioned. Strictly interpreted, the definition I
have offered would allow phase transitions to occur in very small systems indeed.
A lattice of four Ising spins laid out in a square might be said to have the infinite
two-dimensional Ising model as their TD limit, and so could undergo a phase
transition. Personally, I think this bullet can and should be bitten, but it can also
be easily dodged. To do so, one might add an additional condition that the original
finite system must be sufficiently large, or the gradient of FN be sufficiently steep,
before any change can qualify as a phase transition. This will make the attribution
of phase transitions a vague matter in some cases, but we would have no problem
producing clear cases on each side of the divide: four atoms of H2O would not be
enough to boil, but a kettle full of it can.
4.4.2 Justifying the Application to Finite Systems
If the account presented in the last section is acceptable, then we have a definition
of a phase transition in a finite system. We are now in a position to move to our
last question: how can we justify applying our theories of infinite phase transitions
22For historical details, see Domb (1996).
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to finite ones? A partial answer can be made by appealing to the design of the
TD limit: for the whole point of the limit is to produce an infinite system that
would tell us about the statistical mechanical behaviour of the original finite one.
More support comes from a simple appeal to empirical success. But it would be
advantageous to come up with further justification, and in some specific cases we
can.
As an example, consider the phenomenon of crossover, an important feature
of critical phase transitions. As substances approach a critical phase transition,
they typically exhibit behaviour characteristic of one of a small number of univer-
sality classes. For example, beta-brass is placed in the “Three-dimensional Ising
universality class”, since it shows critical behaviour associated with that of the 3D
Ising model. ‘Crossover’ happens when a substance appears to show behaviour
characteristic of one universality class, but then suddenly changes to another as it
is brought even closer to its critical point. One of the triumphs of Renormalisa-
tion techniques are that they provide a beautiful explanation of crossover, entirely
lacking in older techniques such as mean field theories and Landau’s approach.
I discussed renormalisation in more detail in Chapter 3, but we can get a feel-
ing for the explanation as follows; (full and clear treatments can be found in good
textbooks on critical phenomena such as Cardy (1996, Ch.4) or Goldenfeld (1992,
271-280)). A condensed matter system can be characterised by the parameters of
its microscopic Hamiltonian: interaction strengths between molecules, couplings
between an external field and the system, and so on. We can represent many differ-
ent Hamiltonians by constructing a space coordinatised by all of these parameter
values, with each Hamiltonian represented by a point in the space. (Typically,
the temperature is also represented as a parameter in this space, so each point
represents a system at a particular temperature.)
Renormalisation techniques allow us to examine the near-critical behaviour
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of such systems by constructing an iterable transformation on this space. The
transformation is designed to preserve the large-scale physics of the system, and
the resulting system is rescaled so it can also be assigned a point within the space
of Hamiltonians. The transformation thus induces a ‘flow’ through points in the
parameter space which preserves all the large-scale physics of the system. There
are certain fixed points of these transformations, and the properties of some of
them (in particular, the critical fixed points), can be shown to affect the near-
critical behaviour of any system whose flow comes close to them. Crossover occurs
when a system’s flow approaches one fixed point, but then as it is brought closer,
it veers away and as a result, loses the behaviour characteristic of one universality
class and takes on another behaviour associated with another.
At critical phase transitions, a quantity known as the correlation length di-
verges. A particular variety of crossover, known as finite-size crossover, occurs
when the ratio of the correlation length to the system’s size determines the fixed
point to which the system flows. When the correlation length is small compared
to the size of the system, the system’s flow is attracted to a fixed point associated
with the phase transition of an infinite system. However, as this phase transition is
neared, the correlation length grows, becomes comparable to the size of the finite
system, and then the flow crosses over to some different fixed point. The upshot
is that as a parameter such as temperature is tuned so that a system approaches
the critical phase transition, the system exhibits behaviour characteristic of an
infinite system, but as the temperature is tuned more closely to the critical point,
this behaviour disappears. Usually this is reflected in the ‘smoothing out’ of the
gradients of quantities such as the free energy, so the singularities associated with
an infinite system become peaks, which are tall and narrow — but analytic.
Finite-size crossover thus provides a very neat explanation for how a theory of
phase transitions which only describes infinite systems, might model finite systems
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to accuracies well within experimental error. For a correlation length will only
approach a system’s physical size as it is brought incredibly close to the phase
transition itself, well within the tolerance of experimental measurement. And
until we enter this regime the critical behaviour will be as though the system
was infinite in extent. So powerful is this effect, physicists can be confident that
experimental results on finite physical systems should match the theoretical ones
taken in the TD limit.
We can give a measure of how striking this effect can be, when we consider
the process of extrapolating the results of computer models of a finite number of
spins to the TD limit. Computer models of systems as small as L = 10a (i.e.,
ten spins per side of a square lattice,) have been shown to give results so close
to the theoretical results obtained in the TD limit for 2D and 3D Ising systems
(Mouritsen, 1984, 21) that little extrapolation is needed.
Here I should admit to some double-standards. In §4.3.2 I criticised Batter-
man for offering general accounts of phase transitions which apply only to specific
cases. I admit that finite-size crossover also only provides an example of how we
might justifying the application of our theories of phase transitions to near-critical
systems — it is not a general prescription. And in fact, justifications tend to be
made on a case-by-case basis. Where all else fails, large computer simulations
of specific systems can give much reassurance that as N gets large for a specific
system, quantities such as the free energy converge to the values obtained in the
TD limit. These cannot give general proofs, but can provide justification for the
use of the theories on a model-by-model basis.
4.4.3 More on the Roles of the TD Limit
Back in §4.2.3, we identified three separate roles which the TD limit fulfils. The
first, of mathematical convenience, is no doubt dispensible in principle, and with
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vast increases in computing power, perhaps sometimes even in practice. But it
is the other two roles that are of foundational significance: the need to isolate
and seclude the phenomena we are interested in, and to provide the mathematical
structure in order to distinguish them into their natural varieties and disregard any
unrelated effects. As we shall see in this section, these are not merely practical
considerations, and the TD limit fills both roles simultaneously.
Let us start with ‘seclusion’. Real, finite, phase transitions are invariably hy-
brid beasts, with contributions to their partition function or free energy coming
from many different effects, and even from different types of phase transition. A
satisfactory theory of phase transitions must be able to tease these apart, pro-
vide a categorisation, and some understanding of how the effects may combine to
produce the effects we see.
One kind of hybrid phase transition occurs in systems very much larger in
some spatial directions than in others, and here we can appeal to another type
of crossover phenomenon, known as dimensional crossover. When we apply the
definition offered in §4.4.1, our first task is to take the TD limit, but in these cases
it may be unclear in which dimensions it should to be taken. For example, we
might be trying to analyse the transitions of a very thin film of some substance,
just a few atoms thick. In this case, it might not be obvious whether we are
to take the infinite limit of a two-dimensional or three-dimensional system. But
dimensionality has an extremely pronounced effect on phase transitions. Typically,
choosing between two and three dimensions is amounts to a choice as to the type
of phase transition, or even whether it takes place at all. Thus, we revisit the
“subjective” worry of §4.4.1.
Consider the parameter space once more. Both two and three-dimensional infi-
nite systems will have their own fixed points. As the correlation length approaches
a scale similar to the thickness of the film, the flow can “cross over” from three to
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two-dimensional behaviour. Let us say for the sake of argument that both fixed
points represent phase transitions, but of different varieties. What we would ob-
serve in this case is a substance behaving at first as though were undergoing a
three-dimensional phase transition, but then as it is brought closer to the transi-
tion point, switching to behaviour associated with a two-dimensional system. To
the question of whether the substance is really undergoing a phase transition of
the two or three dimensional variety, the most natural answer would be that it
showed behaviour associated with both.
The crossover phenomenon goes some way to reassuring us that the limited
arbitrariness of how the infinite limit should be taken is not a problem — to speak
figuratively: even the substance itself seems unsure and crosses over between the
two options! But the main point is as follows: the composite behaviour of the
finite system can be understood theoretically by looking at the two basic types
of transition in the infinite limit, and then look at how they interfere with one
another in crossover. Dimensional crossover thus provides further illustration of
the indispensibility of the TD limit, both from the need to seclude the phenomena
associated with phase transitions and also by providing the additional structure
to separate them cleanly into classes associated with the fixed points (both of the
italicised terms being taken in the sense of §4.2.3).
4.5 Putting Unitary Inequivalence to Work?
There is a striking feature of the interpretation of quantum field theories: the lack
of a unique Hilbert space representation of their canonical commutation relations.
This situation prompts various interpretative questions, among them, we must
decide which of these representations should be given direct physical significance,
whether any are privileged above others. It also suggests that there is no unique
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quantisation of a given classical field theory.
In a 2003 paper, Laura Ruetsche takes an original approach to such problems.
She starts from the observation that the lack of uniqueness arises from the infi-
nite degrees of freedom of the field, and observes that this feature is also present
in quantum statistical mechanics (QSM) when the thermodynamic limit is taken.
But in the QSM context, there is a better established understanding of the rep-
resentational work done by inequivalent Hilbert space representations, and she
proposes that we should be guided to analogous conclusions in the interpretation
of quantum field theories.
In this section, I want to challenge Ruetsche’s approach: not because I utterly
reject the interpretation she arrives at, but because the reasoning that takes her
there is directly undermined by the position taken in the rest of this chapter.
4.5.1 Algebras and their Representations
The standard way of looking at quantum theories of finite systems is as a Hilbert
space theory. Such a theory is characterised by the following features:23
• The observables are associated with the set B(H) of all bounded self-adjoint
operators acting on a Hilbert space H.
• The states of the system are represented by the set ρ(H) of all positive
normalised trace-class operators on a separable Hilbert space H.
• For a state ρˆ and an observable Aˆ, the theory associates an expectation value
Tr(ρA).
• The dynamics of the system can be represented by the unitary operator
Uˆt = e
−iHˆt
~ , where Hˆ is the energy observable. In the Heisenberg picture,
23In what follows, I take on the notation and approach of Ruetsche (2003), with additional
material and discussion taken from Sewell (1986) and Emch (2006).
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this operator acts on the observables, giving the evolution of a state ρˆ over
time t as a transformation Aˆ→ Aˆt, where Aˆt = UˆtAˆUˆ∗t .
The standard way of obtaining such a structure is to quantise a classical theory. In
fact, there is a rather successful algorithm which we can use to convert a classical
theory cast in Hamiltonian form into a Hilbert space theory. This quantisation
algorithm takes the canonical position and momentum variables (qi, pi) and con-
verts them to symmetric operators (qˆi, pˆi) acting on a separable Hilbert space H,
obeying canonical commutation relations (CCR’s) which are related to the clas-
sical Poisson bracket. We call a Hilbert space theory that satisfies the scheme, a
representation of the CCR’s, and write one as (H, {Oˆi}).
Although it is still orthodox to think of quantum theories as Hilbert space
theories, there is an alternative view which arose from the investigation of the
realisations of CCRs in quantum field theory. It can be shown that each Hilbert
space representation of CCR’s gives rise to an abstract C∗ algebra, called its Weyl
Algebra, and that this algebraic structure was independent of the particular Hilbert
space representation chosen.24 The suggestion is that this Weyl algebra could be
considered as a theoretical framework in its own right, directly representing the
states and observables of the quantum system. And because this alternative repre-
sentation is unique, it might even provide a ‘cleaner’ interpretation of a quantum
theory, than the Hilbert space theory obtained by the orthodox quantisation algo-
rithm. This algebraic approach identifies bounded25 quantum observables directly
with self-adjoint elements of a C∗ algebra A, and physical states with functionals
24In a little more detail: a C∗ algebra is an algebra A over the field C of complex numbers, with
an involution and a norm. The involution ∗ satisfies: (A∗)∗ = A, (A+ B)∗ = A∗ + B∗, (λA)∗ =
λ∗A∗ and (AB)∗ = B∗A∗ for all A,B ∈ A and all λ ∈ C and where λ∗ denotes the complex
conjugate. Calling an element self-adjoint means that A∗ = A. The norm, satisfies ||A∗A|| =
||A||2 and ||AB|| ≤ ||A||||B||. Clifton and Halvorson (2001, §) provides a philosophically oriented
exposition and discussion.
25For an explanation and justification of the restriction to bounded observables, i.e., those
associated with the bounded self-adjoint operators in H, see Sewell (1986, 13-15).
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ω on A, specifically the linear functionals ω : A → C, which are normed and
positive for all A ∈ A.
The links between the two approaches are strong, for we can represent an
algebra A in a particular Hilbert space, by setting up a structure preserving map
pi : A → B(H). A state ρ in a Hilbert space H then naturally gives rise to the
algebraic state ω(A) = Tr(ρpi(A)) for all A ∈ A. And the GNS construction
(named after Gel’fand, Naimark and Segal) allows us to move in the opposite
direction. For any algebraic state ω in A, there is a representation and a Hilbert
Space, (piω,Hω) of A, together with a cyclic26 vector |Ψω〉 ∈ Hω, such that ω(A) =
〈Ψω|piω(A) |Ψω〉 for all A ∈ A. The GNS construction guarantees that for every
abstract algebraic state there is a Hilbert space representation, and also guarantees
that it is unique (up to unitary equivalence). Although we discussed this algebra
as having arisen from a previously given Hilbert space theory, we are quite free
to consider it in abstraction — as a theory in its own right, without any Hilbert
space underpinnings.
For finite systems, the Hilbert space and Algebraic approaches co-exist peace-
fully, for the Stone-von Neumann theorem assures us that any two irreducible27
representations of CCRs associated with a finite dimensional configuration space,
will be unitarily equivalent. This means that for any two Hilbert space represen-
tations (H, {Oˆi}), and (H′, {Oˆ′i}), there exists a unitary map U : H → H′ such
that U−1O′iU = Oi for all Oi. Unitary equivalence is generally interpreted as im-
plying the equivalence of Hilbert space theories (in the sense that the two theories
will deliver the same expectation values for corresponding observables; for further
discussion on the link between unitary and physical equivalence, see Clifton and
Halvorson (2001, §2.2-2.3)). However, for infinite systems, the Stone-von Neu-
26Cyclic means that piω(A) |Ψω〉 is dense in Hω. All representations can be expressed as direct
sums of cyclic representations.
27A representation of H is irreducible, iff there are no non-trivial subspaces of H that remain
invariant under the action of all operators in the representation.
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mann theorem does not hold, and in general there exist unitarily inequivalent
representations of the CCR’s. Yet the associated Weyl algebra is well-defined,
and representation independent. The question immediately occurs: are the dif-
ferences between unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations imbued with
any physical significance? Or are they merely alternative formulations of the same
physical theory?
Ruetsche sets up two extreme interpretative positions. The ‘Hilbert space chau-
vinist’ believes that the Hilbert Space approach is fundamental, and as such we
have to choose a privileged representation as physical: all alternative representa-
tions are judged to be superfluous. In opposition, the ‘algebraic chauvinist’ treats
the self-adjoint elements of the Weyl algebra as fundamental, and any distinc-
tions amongst particular Hilbert space representations are distinctions without a
physical difference.
An adherent to either of these extreme positions soon meets difficulties when
they try to interpret quantum field theories. The algebraic chauvinist cannot admit
many unbounded operators that we would like to invest with physical significance,
since they only appear in a particular representation (e.g., position, momentum
and the number operator). The Hilbert space chauvinist is forced to choose a
particular representation and to deny that any states not in this privileged Hilbert
space possess physical significance. Each of Ruetsche’s two positions are extreme,
and might well be said to play the roles of straw-men (though she presents them as
realistic, and associates her algebraic chavinist with quotes from Segal). But the
continued debates in the interpretation of field theories demonstrate the difficulty
of defining the best intermediate position — see for example: Ruetsche (2002),
Clifton and Halvorson (2001), Kronz and Lupher (2005).
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4.5.2 QSM and the Thermodynamic Limit
Ruetsche looks to quantum statistical mechanics for guidance on her interpretative
position. She notes that neither chauvinist can accommodate the representational
work that unitarily inequivalent representations do within QSM, at least once
we demand that such a statistical theory must accommodate phase transitions.
For as in the classical case, in quantum statistical mechanics we need to take the
thermodynamic limit before it is possible to model phase transitions. And there the
unitarily inequivalent representations do attain a very firm physical significance.
We should look briefly at how this arises.
Let us consider a QSM system (finite or infinite) as modelled in the C∗ algebraic
framework. The system can be represented by the pair (A, αt): a C∗ algebraA, and
a one parameter group of automorphisms αt, which for all states A ∈ A, represents
their evolution through a time t. Let the system have inverse temperature β = 1
kT
.
Now consider an algebraic state ω which satisfies the following condition:
ω [Aαiβ(B)] = ω(BA) for all A,B ∈ A (4.6)
We say that a state satisfying this condition is a KMS state with respect to the
automorphism group αt at inverse temperature β.
28 For a finite system this KMS
state exists, and is unique. And when the state is given a particular Hilbert space
representation, by the correspondence scheme described above, it matches that
given by the usual density matrix of Hilbert space Gibbsian statistical mechanics,
28The states are named after Kubo, Martin and Schwinger who first pointed out the thermo-
dynamic properties of states satisfying Equation 4.6. (Being a little more careful, we say that
KMS states must satisfy the condition in a dense subalgebra of A.) For more discussion and
a precise formulation see, for example Emch (2006, §10.4), which also gives details of the rich
stability properties of KMS states.
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viz,
ρˆ =
e−βHˆ
Tr
[
e−βHˆ
] (4.7)
(where again β = 1
kT
, and the dynamics will be given by the family Uˆt = e
−iHˆt
of unitary operators generated by the Hamiltonian Hˆ). The Gibbs state is the
unique Hilbert space state associated with the thermodynamically stable state of
a quantum system with the Hamiltonian Hˆ, so this encourages us to identify the
KMS state as the algebraic version of a thermodynamically stable state. But when
we want a theory of phase transitions, the uniqueness of the equilibrium state for
each temperature becomes a curse.
One way to get away from the uniqueness is to consider the TD limit, but
now the picture starts to break down, for the Gibbs state of Equation 4.7 is not
well-defined for infinite systems. Fortunately KMS states are more general, and we
can find states of infinite systems that satisfy Equation 4.6. And it is possible to
motivate the identification of these KMS states with thermodynamic equilibrium
states, even without the motivation of a corresponding Gibbs state. For example,
where KMS states are unique, they satisfy both local and global thermodynamic
stability conditions against perturbations of state, including invariance under the
dynamical group αt (Sewell (2002, 113-123) and Emch (2006, §10.4)). It is also a
theorem that if there is a unique (αt, β)-KMS state, then that state is a factor state,
and these are characterised by features such as a lack of long-range correlations
and fluctuations, leading us to identify them with pure thermodynamic phases.
(There is more motivation for this identification; Sewell (1986, §4.4)).
But in the infinite limit, we can also find automorphism groups αt and inverse
temperatures β such that there are a plurality of (αt, β)-KMS states. But each
algebraic state ω in this plurality can be decomposed uniquely into extremal KMS
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states (Emch and Liu, 2005, 158-160). Let us suppose that there are two such:
ω1 and ω2. Besides, these extremal states can be shown to be pairwise disjoint,
which means that no algebraic state that we can express as a density matrix on
Hilbert space representation (Hω1 , piω1) can be expressed as a density matrix on
(Hω2 , piω2). In other words, the unique decomposition gives us extremal states
that are not representable in the same Hilbert Space, for they live in unitarily
inequivalent representations. And these extremal states are again factor states,
which we have seen are associated with pure thermodynamic phases.
We are led to the following picture: QSM represents states of thermodynamic
phase by KMS states. In finite systems, these are always unique and correspond
to the Gibbs state, but in infinite systems they are not unique. But they can be
decomposed into extremal, factor states, which can only be represented in unitarily
inequivalent Hilbert spaces. One final piece of information is needed to complete
the picture: the algebraic framework represents temperature as a “global” super-
selected observable, which is a constant number for each representation.
Ruetsche points out that both chauvinists are in trouble. For the difference
between inequivalent representations is the only aspect that distinguishes the dif-
ferent states. The algebraic chauvinist is committed to consider such a distinction
unphysical, since it is not represented in their semi-local algebra. On the other
hand, the Hilbert space chauvinist is meant to select a single representation, and
consider all others to be unphysical. And this would commit them to holding that
only one equilibrium state was physically possible with only one temperature, and
so lose their theory of phase transitions.
4.5.3 Lessons Applied
Considering these and similar problems Ruetsche is led to advocate “grades of
physical possibility”. One thinks of the algebraic states as picking out the broad-
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est sort of possibility: the totality of states available to a given system. Then, by
choosing a particular Hilbert space representation we narrow down possibility, fix-
ing physical contingencies such as temperature and representing only those states
consistent with them. Ruetsche (2003, 1339-41) admits that her approach is only
a sketch of a position, and grants that the idea of ‘treating physical possibility as
a matter of degree’ is one that needs to be developed in more detail.
Since Ruetsche’s position is at present only an outline, it is hard to estimate
its promise. But I am concerned by her belief that if the position can be filled
out it can be hoped to provide a general understanding of quantum theories with
infinite degrees of freedom (ibid, 1341). For it appears to me that she has drawn
general lessons about representational significance from just those features which
are bound up with peculiarities specific to the TD limit.
This can be seen if we repeat the question of why we take the TD limit, but
this time for quantum rather than classical statistical mechanics. Again, the sta-
tistical theory is intended to model a finite system, but we appeal to the TD limit
nonetheless. Of the three motivations separated in §4.2.3, let us ignore the consid-
eration of mathematical convenience, for the algebraic approach is fairly difficult
to use for everyday calculations in any case. And at the level of generality we
are considering, the motivation of seclusion is less important, for we could run the
same discussion with a very “clean” example of a single type of phase transition,
which needs no further isolation.
We are left with our motivation for taking the TD limit, as providing the theory
with enough structure to provide a satisfactory theory of phase transitions. And
this can be identified with the fact that it is only in the TD limit that the KMS
state can become non-unique and non-trivially decomposable into extremal states
— exactly the structure needed to provide a theory of phase transitions.
The clearest way of appropriating this structure requires us to recognise phys-
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ical significance in the unitarily inequivalent representations of states. But then
Ruetsche’s point that neither of her ‘chauvinists’ are able interpret the new struc-
ture in a straightforward manner, is hardly surprising. As we have just seen, it is
also difficult to interpret the structure provided by the TD limit in the classical
case. But this suggests that both the Hilbert Space chauvinist and the Algebriac
chauvinist can follow the lead of the classical discussion, and make use of the
newly available mathematical structure, without compromising their position. Let
us briefly sketch how this can be done.
First, the Hilbert Space chauvinist can consider the KMS/Gibbs equilibrium
state to provide the most direct representation of any finite system. But to analyse
phase transitions, he must consider the TD limit, in particular he must ask whether
the KMS state in that limit is unique and extremal. He can hold that it is facts
about the original finite KMS/Gibbs state that determines how the infinite KMS
state should be constructed; and thus it is the finite system state that determines
the nature of any infinite system states, which describe phase transitions. The fact
that he cannot consider more than one representation of this infinite KMS state
as directly representational becomes irrelevant — he does not need to.
The Algebraic chauvinist is equally free to consider the finite KMS/Gibbs state
as the directly representational one (though he will feel that it is the KMS algebraic
state that is primary, as opposed to its particular Hilbert space representation as a
Gibbs state). And when he looks to the infinite KMS state in the TD limit, he is not
limited to the semi-local algebra when he looks for a temperature observable. The
GNS construction gives him the structure he needs to distinguish temperatures,
and he can hold that this construction is encoded in the original (finite) algebraic
state, even if it did require a diversion through the infinite limit, and through the
structure of inequivalent Hilbert space representations to use it.
We can see that both Ruetsche’s original problem (the inadequacies of the
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resources available to the chauvinists), and its solution (as outlined above) arise
directly due to the pecularities of the representational role of the TD limit, in
exact parallel with the classical cases. So Ruetsche’s suggestion that we should
take interpretative lessons across to a situation in which the infinite nature of the
system is to be interpreted realistically — such as a field theory — appears at least
questionable.
At the end of her article, Ruetsche briefly considers the objection that she may
‘have rested interpretative conclusions on the consideration of a setting which is a
hotbed of manifest falsehoods and extreme idealisations’ (Ruetsche, 2003, 1342).
Her response is simply to deny the charge, holding that her interpretative con-
clusions are resting on ‘those facets of the thermodynamic limit that appear to
do representational work’; a contention she supports by pointing out their indis-
pensibility to the structure of the theory. My response should be clear: while the
TD limit is indeed indispensible, this does not mean it plays a direct representa-
tional role, and certainly not that we should draw on it to inform wide-ranging
interpretative doctrine.
For vividness, we can push the parallel with the classical case a little further.
Imagine that we looked at a classical field theory such as electromagnetism, and
wondered how to interpret any non-analyticities in the fields. The analogue of
Ruetsche’s argument would be to look to the TD limit of classical statistical me-
chanics, note that it made a central and ineliminable use of non-analyticities to
represent an element of physical reality, and argue that electromagnetism must
admit them as well.29 Using this classical statistical mechanics to guide our inter-
pretation of a classical field theory would — I suggest — be as misguided as using
quantum statistical mechanics to guide our interpretation of quantum field theory.
29It might be objected that the representational role of the free energy function in statistical
mechanics is not sufficiently analogous to that of the electromagnetic field. A closer parallel would
be to the order parameter field, which we introduced in §2.4.2. This is defined over space-time
points, and will have singularities at many varieties of phase transition.
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Effective Field Theories
All this having been said, there is an oft-discussed interpretative position, within
which QSM would be relevant to the interpretation of unitary inequivalence. One
contemporary approach to understanding many of the pecularities of QFTs, such
as the existence of infra-red and ultra-violet divergences, and their renormalis-
ability, is that they should be understood as “effective” field theories. That is,
they are to be understood as valid only for a particular energy scale, absorbing
the effects of small-scale/high-energy interactions into the definition of the field
parameters. In particular, there have been suggestions that the understanding
of renormalisation techniques as applied to phase transitions in condensed matter
physics, show that renormalisability is a “signature” of an effective field theory. So
the renormalisability of present field theories should make us hesitate to interpret
them as directly representing any fundamental furniture of the world.
I discuss this view of quantum field theories in the next chapter (§5.5.3), but
it bears on Ruetsche’s thesis. For if we accept the “effective field” view, with
an added hypothesis that the unknown higher-level theory is one with a finite
dimensional state space, then lessons from the interpretation of QSM start to look
a great deal more relevant. Objects such as the order-parameter field would be
seen as a variety of effective field, in that they summarise the effects of many lattice
interactions into a continuous field. And this treatment also breaks down at certain
energy scales (i.e., those that probe distances comparable to the lattice spacing).
In this way we might consider the infinite nature of QFTs as having arisen in a
way analogous to the TD limit. But there are at least two extremely controversial
presuppositions that would have to be made before adopting this position. First,
we would have to hold that all present quantum field theories are effective; second,
that the higher energy theory, of which they are merely a low-energy limit, is a
discrete theory with finite degrees of freedom. If Ruetsche is committed to both of
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these theses she does not give any hint of it. In contrast, she writes throughout as
though she wants to interpret quantum field theories as straightforward a manner
as possible, directly describing fundamental features of the world.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
We have arrived at the following picture. Only in the infinite limit can we find the
mathematical apparatus used to describe and categorise phase transitions. The
density of zeroes in the complex plane (Lee-Yang), the orders of discontinuities in
the free energy (Ehrenfest and modern variants), and the nature of the fixed points
(renormalisation), all give a fruitful analysis of different types of phase transitions.
On the other hand, the phase transitions that are actually observed and against
which these theories are tested take place in systems that appear to be finite.
The natural position would be one that endorses the indispensability of the
TD limit for our successful theories of phase transitions, but without denying the
evident fact that they occur in the finite systems we see around us. The definition
in §4.4.1 is a proposal that allows us to occupy exactly such a position, allowing us
to define the finite instances as fully genuine phase transitions (albeit sometimes
“messy” or “hybrid” examples).
Naturally, the proposal offered is not the only way in which we can occupy such
a position. But I feel that it must be occupied in some way, for the alternatives are
untenable. To argue that it is only for the sake of simplicity in our mathematics
that we cling to the infinite limit is to fail to recognise that it makes available
a taxonomy and structure which are essential to an adequate theory of phase
transitions. And if we admit its indispensibility, but try to deny that finite systems
exhibit “true” phase transitions, then we face a dilemma. Either we hold that
all empirical phenomena are in fact aspects of infinite systems, or we hold that
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the phenomena represented by the theory are not those empirical phenomena we
observe. If we take the first option then we are committed to the view that we have
evidence of the infinite nature of physical systems every time we see a kettle boil.
But taking the second option is to hold that our most successful theories cannot
be applied to the phase transitions we test them against. Unless we can provide
a coherent story of how our infinite theories can acquire empirical significance
nonetheless, their success becomes a mystery.
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Chapter 5
The New Emergentist Theses
The previous chapters addressed some of the New Emergentists’ central themes
and tried to make them precise as philosophical theses. Briefly, these were: the
existence of emergent properties (Chapters 1 & 2), the phenomenon of universality
(Chapter 3) and the necessity of the infinite limit (Chapter 4). In these concluding
sections I shall look at how the New Emergentists are placed in regard to various
issues where emergence is claimed to have relevance.
I first consider how the New Emergentist position bears on the ‘emergentist’
sciences of Complexity Theory, which is often spoken of as a development of An-
derson’s ideas (§5.1). Next, I look at a theme not prominent in More is Different,
but much emphasised Anderson’s later work, and by other New Emergentists: the
phenomenon of “protected” properties (§5.2). This takes us to a debate between
Anderson and Steven Weinberg as to the foundational place of high-energy and
particle physics (§5.3). In §5.4, I consider how the New Emergentist position
helps illuminate the status of “emergentist” positions in the philosophy of mind,
of quantum mechanics and the autonomy of the special sciences. I close with
some comments on the significance of renormalisable theories in the context of
condensed matter and the parallels that have been seen in quantum field theory.
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5.1 Emergent Properties and Complexity The-
ory
Since the appearance of More is Different in 1972, many active fields of re-
search have appeared, collected under names such as ‘Complexity’, and ‘Self-
Organisation’. Despite many differences of approach, they each claim to be specif-
ically devoted to the study of emergent properties and to be the natural descen-
dents of Anderson’s ideas.1 But these fields study a variety of phenomena, not all
of which seem to be directly related to the specific conception of emergent proper-
ties defended in Chapters 1 & 2. In this short section I suggest that we should be
cautious in relating all of these new ideas directly to the New Emergentist theses.
De Wolf and Holvoet (2005) present an impressively wide survey of ‘emergen-
tist’ literature, and offer several insights on the relations between the fields. They
argue that the two notions of ‘Emergence’ and ‘Self Organisation’ can be clearly
separated from one another (though they catalogue many instances where they
have not), whereas the term ‘Complexity’ is often used as umbrella term. They
offer ‘working definitions’ of each:
A system exhibits emergence when there are coherent [properties]2 at
the macro-level that dynamically arise from the interactions between
the parts at the micro-level. Such [properties] are novel w.r.t the indi-
vidual parts of the system.
Self-organisation is a dynamical and adaptive process where systems
acquire and maintain structure themselves, without external control.
(De Wolf and Holvoet, 2005, 3 & 7)
1Laughlin (2005), Waldrop (1992, 79-81) and Solomon (2005) all identify Anderson as a
complexity pioneer, and More is Different as a founding document. Solomon even dates the birth
of complexity science to its publication. Anderson (1989) is both encouraging and cautionary
when he gives his own recommendations for extensions of notions in condensed matter physics
to new areas.
2De Wolf and Holvoet use their own term ‘emergents’ here, which they define as ‘a general
term to denote the result of the process of emergence: properties, behaviour, structure, patterns
etc.’
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Although these definitions are not precise, the first is consistent with the position
we have explored in earlier chapters, but the second is clearly a separate notion. De
Wolf and Holvoet give cases both of emergence without self-organisation (e.g., sta-
tionary states of thermodynamics) and self-organisation without emergence (e.g.,
certain classes of flocking behaviour where an overall plan is possessed by each
agent). But they concede that many interesting phenomena described as ‘com-
plex’ contain elements of both emergence and self-organisation.
Some rival approaches to complexity can be distinguished by an implicit choice
to promote either emergence or self-organisation as a cause, the other left as an
effect. For example, Kauffman (1996) treats emergent properties as the result of
self-organising processes, whereas Prigogine (1997) appears to reverse this. There
are also those who see a common cause behind both, often the non-linear character
in the underlying microphysical laws (e.g., Scott, 2003).
Yet looking again at De Wolf and Holvoet’s definitions, it is clear that self-
organisation is not the theme of Anderson’s ‘More is Different’, nor a natural
development of it. To link emergence and self-organisation, we would have to pro-
duce some argument that all such mechanisms for emergence are non-centralised
and maintain structure in an adaptive manner. True, symmetry-breaking itself
is associated with phase transitions, where we might argue that some aspects of
the definition of self-organisation are fulfilled, but the link must be shown in all
cases. But symmetry-breaking was only a single example of a mechanism for emer-
gence, and we should leave open the possibility that alternatives need not have
any relation to self-organisation.
Like De Wolf and Holvoet, I think it important not to conflate emergence
with self-organisation. They criticise several authors for doing so (ibid, 3-6), but
it is particularly confusing when one is demonstrated, and the other assumed to
follow. For example, consider the claims of Roberts (2005) that economics is an
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‘emergent science’. He notes that no one person controls markets, house prices
or commuting times and moves directly to his conclusion with the claim that
‘economics is the study of such emergent phenomena’. This is a popular move: to
show self-organisation, by demonstrating how a stable structure can arise without
any external control, and then move to the conclusion that the structure must
therefore have emergent properties. This is typically done without making it clear
exactly which of the properties in question are held to be emergent, or what variety
of ‘novelty’ (if any) is being claimed.
5.2 Protectorates
In contrast to our focus on emergent properties, and on the infinite limit, we have
neglected a strong theme in the New Emergentist writings. Not only do emergent
properties look importantly different to the microphysical ones that underly them,
some also display an interesting robustness, or insensitivity to these microphysical
details.
This phenomenon, often called universality, was the theme of Chapter 3, where
we looked at how it might be explained by the renormalisation group. But the
New Emergentists are not so interested in its explanation as in the implications
of the existence of such states and properties themselves. Since universal proper-
ties are “protected” against many changes to their microphysical structure, they
call the states ‘protectorates’, and the associated universal properties ‘protected
properties’.3
“[P]rotected” properties of matter — generic behaviour that is reliably
the same from one system to the next, regardless of details. There
3These terms were coined by physicists Robert Laughlin and David Pines (2000) and embraced
by Philip Anderson (2000). An extended popular discussion of protectorates is given by Laughlin
(2005), who explicitly identifies them with fixed points of a renormalisation transformation,
although the concept is clearly meant to also extend beyond areas in which the RG techniques
are usually applied.
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are more sophisticated ways of articulating the idea, such as the sta-
ble fixed point of the renormalisation group, but these all boil down
to descriptions of behaviour that emerges spontaneously and is stable
against small perturbations of the underlying equations of motion.4
(Laughlin et al., 2000, 32)
The New Emergentists claim the protected properties are ‘directly relevant to the
broad question of what what is knowable in the deepest sense of the term’ and
‘fundamentally at odds with the reductionist beliefs central to much of physics’.
Drawing on the discussion of Chapter 3, we should be wary of such wide-ranging
claims. And as in the discussion of emergent properties, we should be careful to
separate methodological and epistemological claims from metaphysical doctrine.
Again, much of the New Emergentist discussion of protectorates is taken up with
suggestions for their implications for the methodology of physics. These vary
from uncontroversial statements: e.g., that many working in higher-level sciences
need not worry themselves about the cutting edge of particle physics (Laughlin
and Pines, 2000, 30); through specific suggestions of the barriers to progress in
understanding high temperature superconductivity (Anderson, 2000); to highly
speculative suggestions about principles governing molecular organisation on the
mesoscopic scale (Laughlin et al., 2000). I shall again leave these methodological
suggestions to those to whom they are addressed — working scientists who can
assess their fruitfulness in theory and experiment.
But one of these suggestions, I think we should dismiss. Laughlin and Pines
assert that when we have theories which give us reliably accurate knowledge of
large-scale properties to a high level of precision, they must be theories of protected
properties. The precise details of their argument is unclear, but the following is
their fullest exposition, where they refer to an underlying microscopic theory as a
4Note that this definition brings in requirements worryingly reminiscent of self-organisation.
I shall ignore these overtones, since it does not appear to affect their arguments, either here, or
against Weinberg.
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‘Theory of Everything’:5
Simple electrical measurements performed on superconducting rings
determine to high accuracy the quantity of the quantum of magentic
fluc hc/2e ... Four-point conductance measurements on semiconductors
in the quantum Hall regime accurately determined the quantity e2/2
... These things are clearly true, yet they cannot be deduced by direct
calculation from the Theory of Everything, for exact results cannot
be predicted by approximate calculations ... Experiments of this kind
work because there are higher organizing principles in nature that make
them work. The Josephson quantum is exact because of the principle
of continuous symmetry breaking. The quantum Hall effect is exact
because of localization. Neither of these things can be deduced from
microscopics, and both are transcendent, in that they would continue
to be true and to lead to exact results even if the Theory of Every-
thing were changed. Thus the existence of these effects is profoundly
important, for it shows us that for at least some fundamental things
in nature the Theory of Everything is irrelevant. (Laughlin and Pines,
2000, 28-9)
If I understand this argument correctly, viz. as moving from the accuracy with
which a large-scale systemic quantity may be predicted, to asserting that it can-
not depend sensitively on the details of the microphysical laws, then it must be
rejected. For it is plausible that there are many quantities that could be predicted
accurately for a large system, but would depend very sensitively on the details of
a microphysical theory. A trivial example would be a total mass-energy of a large
system, which would depend very sensitively on the rest-masses of the individual
particles, but this places no barrier on it being measured or predicted to a high
degree of accuracy.
Other New Emergentist suggestions about protectorates share a frustrating
feature with statements about emergence: they are often equivocal between epis-
temological and metaphysical claims. When they introduce the idea that it is only
5Similar pronouncements are found in (Laughlin et al., 2000, 32) and (Laughlin, 2005). The
term ‘Theory of Everything’ is an ironic one, as they warn us: ‘the Theory of Everything is not
even remotely a theory of every thing.’ (Laughlin and Pines, 2000, 28)
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at a small length scale or high energy that an effective theory breaks down, they
warn: ‘The nature of the underlying theory is unknowable until one raises the
energy scale sufficiently to escape protection’ (Laughlin and Pines, 2000, 29). But
these epistemological cautions are mixed with explicitly metaphysical claims such
as this: ‘these [protected] properties are actually caused by collective organizing
principles that formally grow out of the microscopic rules but are in a real sense
independent of them’ (Laughlin et al., 2000, 32). So, I shall keep with my earlier
assumption that their ostensibly metaphysical claims are to be taken seriously.
In fact, in this context the New Emergentists have good motivation for making
serious metaphysical claims. For as we shall see in §5.3 they make these causal
statements with a specific target in mind.
5.3 The Anderson/Weinberg Debate
Anderson’s original Emergentist arguments found their most outspoken opponent
in Steven Weinberg, who claimed that there was a clear sense in which the prop-
erties he studied as a particle physicist had a status above those studied by a
condensed matter physicist. His famous statement of the privileged position of
the microscopic, goes as follows:
In all branches of science we try to discover generalizations about na-
ture, and having discovered them we always ask why they are true. I
don’t mean why we believe that they are true, but why they are true
... Why is nature that way? When we answer this question the answer
is always found partly in contingencies, that is partly in just the nature
of the problem we pose, but partly in other generalizations. And so
there is a sense of direction in science, that some generalizations are
“explained” by others. ... There are arrows of scientific explanation,
which thread through the space of all scientific generalizations. Having
discovered many of these arrows, we can now look at the pattern that
has emerged, and we notice a remarkable thing: perhaps the greatest
scientific discovery of all. These arrows seem to converge on a common
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source! Start anywhere in science and, like an unpleasant child, keep
asking “Why?” You will eventually get down to the level of the very
small. (Weinberg, 1987, 434-5)
Weinberg gives few further details of his strongly “objective” conception of expla-
nation; and most criticisms concentrate on that deficiency of his account. And this
led to the debate taking a rather unsatisfactory path, with critics accusing him
basing his account on a notion of ‘objective explanation’ which simply cannot be
filled out in any detail (e.g., Mayr, 1988), and Weinberg expressing disatisfaction
with others’ interpretations of the concept (Weinberg, 1988).6
We can now see one reason for the New Emergentists to emphasise an objective
metaphysical sense in which protected properties are independent of details of the
very small. For if they can justify these claims of independence, it looks as though
they would be able to cut through all these controversies. That is they could
attack Weinberg’s claim that his arrows of explanation would point towards the
small — whatever his detailed picture of objective explanation.
5.3.1 Protected Properties or Protected Quantities?
There is certainly a case to be made here, but first, some of the sweeping claims
of the New Emergentists need to be qualified. To see why, we should return
to a further ambiguity7 in the sense of ‘microphysical details’ that we met in
6Weinberg’s frustration in being misunderstood is perhaps most strikingly evinced when he
even sinks so far as to ask for philosophers for help in making the concept precise (Weinberg,
1987). The response has not been entirely constructive; Cat (1998, 294) merrily confesses of
being reminded of Carnap when Weinberg outlines his appeal to a ‘Logical Structure of the
Universe’.
7There is also a second ambiguity in the repeated appeal to ‘microphysical details’. Such
‘details’ could mean either the precise state of the system in question (i.e. where every last
atom and molecule is located and its energy state), or it could mean the precise form of the
microphysical laws, as encoded in the interaction potentials between these atoms and molecules.
But since both only enter the question through the Hamiltonian of the entire system, we can
be confident that the fact of universality is demonstrating that either kind of ‘details’ may be
changed, at least to some degree.
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Chapters 1 & 2, where we distinguished between attributes as determinables, and
as determinate values of determinables, calling the former properties, and the latter
quantities.
Unfortunately, the New Emergentists do not distinguish between protected
properties and quantities. Occasionally, they speak of determinate quantities
as protected, such as the Josephson quantum (e.g., Laughlin and Pines, 2000,
quoted on p.266); but more often they are concerned with determinable prop-
erties, listing for example, ‘superconductivity, band insulation, ferromagnetism,
anti-ferromagnetism’ (Laughlin and Pines, 2000, 29). But the plausibility of the
cases are very different, as are their implications for Weinberg’s argument. Taking
just one example from Laughlin and Pines’ list, viz. ferromagnetism: we saw in
Chapter 3 that it is only a very few quantities in the thermodynamics of magnets
that are universal (i.e., the critical exponents). Others, such as the temperature
of the phase transitions are strikingly non-universal, and vary by material.
The question arises as to whether there is a coherent sense in which some
determinable properties can also said to be protected, even though they are not
universal. I think the answer is Yes, for as we saw in §3.5, so long as our mi-
crophysical Hamiltonian falls under the influence of a particular fixed point, we
can write an effective Hamiltonian H with a particular form (the LGW Hamilto-
nian in that case). Systems with the same form of H, but different values for the
coupling constants may have many properties in common, but not many identical
quantities. Two LGW Hamiltonians for example, may well share the property
of ferromagnetism by virtue of their common form, but would not have identical
quantities of magnetisation.
But even if we have a coherent sense for both protected properties and pro-
tected quantities, it is only the latter that provide a solid base for an attack on
Weinberg’s argument. For if we attacked Weinberg’s argument relying on the
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widespread “determinable-only” protected properties, Weinberg could easily reply
that he wanted an ‘objective explanation’ for not only the properties associated
with ferromagnetism, but their exact values. Only if we restrict the argument to
the rarer protected quantities can this move be blocked.
5.3.2 A Limited Counterexample
Thus, to restrict Weinberg’s room for reply, we will now focus on protected quan-
tities: with the critical exponents serving as our examples. And now it seems that
we have all we require to ambush Weinberg. Protected quantities depend only on
the dimensionality of the lattice, and the symmetry broken in the transition, as
summarised in the order parameter. Both of these are clearly large-scale properties
of the whole system (in the terms of Chapters 1 & 2, they may be amongst the
microphysical1 but they are certainly not microphysical2). And so, in protected
quantities such as critical exponents, we have an apparent case where the arrow
of explanation cannot easily point to the very small; and this is one that does not
depend critically on how Weinberg fills out his concept of “objective explanation”.
For we can have counterfactual circumstances with the same protected quantity
in question in which all the microphysical details are changed (at least to some
degree). To dictate that his ‘arrow’ must point to the microphysical nonetheless,
seems to me to be a notion of “objective explanation” unworthy of the name.
But if we consider all the qualifications we have made to get to this point,
the victory over Weinberg does not look so terribly impressive. Truly protected
quantities are rare, and only for them can we make a fairly watertight case that
Weinberg’s arrows do not point in the directions that he needs them to. And even
there, perhaps once our ‘unpleasant child’ asks us why the nature of the order
parameter or the dimensionality of the lattice, are the way they are, Weinberg will
insist that our answer will be in terms of the very small. And since he explicitly
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dictates a principle of ‘transistivity of explanation’ (in Weinberg, 1988), his arrows
might end up pointing to the small after all.
As well as this problem, it is not clear to me that Weinberg really could demand
explanations for every quantity as well as the properties. For if we are to trace the
value of every quantity in science, there are plenty of basic constants that have
no obvious connection with the very small (Einstein’s cosmological constant, for
example). It is hard to decide these questions without further details of Weinberg’s
‘objective explanation’ — perhaps we have not fully succeeded in side-stepping this
issue after all.
5.4 The New Emergentists and ‘Emergentist’ De-
bates
In Chapter 1, I suggested that approaches to emergence often suffered from the
undue influence of interest in other philosophical problems. A philosopher of mind,
concerned with problems of the causal efficacy of the mental, would search for a
definition of emergence that bore clearly on issues of causation. Or an interpreter
of quantum mechanics, would look for some property such as a break-down of
unitary evolution, that might cast light on the quantum/classical division.
I suggested that the New Emergentists’ approach was superior to these parochial
approaches, in that they did not design a definition of emergence so that it
could solve some existing problem, but formed their concept by drawing on well-
understood physical processes. So let us return to these specific problems to see if
the New Emergentist picture can help with any of them. We begin with quantum
mechanics.
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5.4.1 Quantum Mechanics and the Measurement Problem
There are at least two programmes within the study of the foundations of quantum
mechanics which could be said to involve emergence in a significant sense. First, we
could interpret the well-known decoherence programme of quantum measurement
as being engaged in study of a specific mechanism for emergence.8 Second, it
has been proposed that quantum measurement itself can be seen as a species of
symmetry-breaking, and that the measurement process can be explicitly modelled
using the framework for such processes that has been developed within quantum
statistical mechanics.
Let us start with the first proposal. The decoherence programme aims to show
how a quantum system interacting with its environment, will quickly evolve into
a state in which the non-diagonal elements of the density matrix (in a representa-
tion for position, or a position-like quantity) quickly become negligible. In itself,
decoherence is not a solution to the measurement problem, but it is an important
part of approaches such as Everett-like proposals, where we need an explanation
of why only branches with classical-like macroscopic quantities are observed.
It is tempting to look at this process as a possible mechanism for emergence
in Anderson’s sense. Decoherence is a physical process by which properties of
large collections of particles can be shown to behave very differently to small
collections. So decoherence might be viewed on a par with symmetry-breaking.
But the parallel is not a good one, at least not in the best-known approach:
environmentally induced decoherence, where we look at the effect of interactions
of a system with some external environment. Here, our contrast is between the
properties of an isolated small system, and a non-isolated small system. Or to
put it another way, the contrast between properties of small and large systems is
8Many workers in decoherence theory freely refer to their search for the process by which
classical properties ‘emerge’ from quantum processes; e.g., Zurek (1991, 37), Wallace (2003, 87).
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not made directly, we examine only the properties of a subsystem of the larger
system. In view of this important difference, the classical-like properties that the
decoherence effect can produce should be recognised as importantly different to
the emergent properties we have been concerned with.
The proposal that measurement might be seen directly as a symmetry-breaking
effect has been made in several forms, more commonly as suggestions frustratingly
short on detail, e.g., Laughlin (2005, 47-59), Anderson (1984, 50-51). But some
provide detailed models of the measuring apparatus, Emch (e.g., 2006, §10.6),
Sewell (2007). These models typically set up two quantum systems: one large,
which represents a measuring device; and one small, the system to be measured.
Emch’s approach uses quantum statistical mechanics to analyse the states of the
combined system, and shows how a phase transition can be induced in the com-
bined system, which depends on the original state of the smaller system. It can be
demonstrated that the properties of the state of the ‘measuring apparatus’ that
emerge from such an interaction have many ‘classical characteristics’.
This programme can provide suggestive results, and the specific models seem to
me to give much insight into measurement processes. But it is important to realise
the restriction on their scope. We can extract as many classical characteristics from
our symmetry-breaking models as we like, but so long as we stick with unitary
dynamics, we cannot get rid of the superposition of measurement alternatives. So
like the decoherence approach, it cannot solve the measurement problem on its
own, but needs the help of a separate interpretation (a point which Emch and
Anderson concede,9 but Laughlin does not seem to accept).
9Anderson concedes that a separate interpretation is necessary in a transcribed discussion
(2005, 512-513) and reluctantly chooses an Everett picture, complatining that ‘there is too much
philosophical baggage to carry around, but I can’t see how to avoid carrying that baggage.’ Yet
Adler (2003, 235) points to 2001 survey, where Anderson dismisses a discussion on the quantum
measurement process by its not mentioning the word ‘decoherence’. Adler takes this as proof that
Anderson thinks that the decoherence process solves the measurement problem. An alternative
interpretation is that Anderson thinks that decoherence is a necessary part of the solution —
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5.4.2 Emergence in the Philosophy of Mind
It is almost by definition that the New Emergentist doctrines cannot go terribly
far in addressing the issues tangled up in the so-called ‘mind-body problem’. For
the arguments are based on differences between physical and mental properties:
for example, particular causal capacities, a capacity to support consciousness, or
some semantic character.
But the New Emergentists’ examples all contrast the differences of one set of
physical properties with another. And the novelty must be shown to come about by
means of well-understood physical processes. As such it is difficult to see how the
lessons taken from physical-physical contrasts can be used for anything other than
a broad parallel with a physical-mental contrast. So even leaving aside my doubts
on Batterman’s claim that renormalisation techniques give new insight into the
phenomenon of multiple realisability (expressed in Chapter 3; I have doubts about
his further claim that the multiple realisation of mental properties by physical
properties will be explained by the same strategy.
It would be otherwise if the anti-materialist arguments only held for the non-
identity of micro-physical properties with the mental.10 But I do not know of any
anti-materialist arguments that admit this limited scope.
As it stands, any New Emergentist argument cannot progress much beyond
pointing out the wide differences between microphysical and macrophysical prop-
erties, and asking rhetorically whether the differences between physical and mental
properties could not be bridgeable, by some similar process. We have no new reply
if the anti-materialist persistently holds that it cannot.
and thus a necessary part of any decent discussion of the topic — but not the whole story.
10In the terms of Chapter 1, I mean microphysical2 properties: properties of systems below a
certain size, which they display only in isolation, or when they are parts of systems other than
the one in question.
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5.4.3 The Philosophy of Special Sciences
The outlook is a great deal better for those who look to the New Emergentist
thesis to explain the independence and variety of the special sciences. Here, the
New Emergentists are able to present a coherent picture of how all of these areas
of study can be said to have the same subject of study: physical properties, but
still split naturally into realms that are both different from and independent of
one another.
For an explanation of the variety of the different special sciences we look directly
to emergent properties, and see that fully physical properties of large and small sys-
tems can be very different to one another. Mechanisms such as symmetry-breaking
show us how the dynamical laws governing the properties of larger systems may
look very different from smaller ones, and as such we can see how a new set of
methodologies, specialist knowledge and mathematical techniques may be needed
to study them.
For an explanation of the independence of the special sciences, protected prop-
erties may have some bearing. For in these circumstances, we have an explanation
for how we can come up with theories for properties of large systems, even in ig-
norance of the details of the microphysical interactions. As argued in Chapter 3,
these circumstances can sometimes be explained by the apparatus of the Renor-
malisation Group. But again we must caution that the RG is only one explanation
amongst many alternatives. In particular, many special sciences may be engaged
with functionally defined properties. To give an extreme example: systems the-
ory explicitly abstracts from all but the input and output of functionally defined
‘black-boxes’, and its independence from particle physics is explained ‘trivially’ (in
the sense of §3.1.1). And it seems plausible that a similar explanation be suitable
for areas of biology, economics and psychology (though this is to disagree with
Anderson’s more speculative suggestions, e.g., 1972, 393).
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5.4.4 The Necessity of Infinite Systems
There is a final theme in Anderson’s paper that I feel should be interpreted as
having little metaphysical significance. In More is Different, Anderson charac-
terises the process of one science emerging from the subject matter of another as
a shift from ‘quantitative to qualitative differentiations’ and claims that emergent
behaviour is only ‘rigorously definable’ in the ‘N →∞ limit’.
The significance of this ‘switch’ from a qualitative difference in finite systems,
to a quantitative one when the infinite limit was taken, was the subject of Chapter
4. Anderson sometimes appears to connect this feature with the existence of
emergent properties, a link I feel is not helpful. While the use of the infinite limit
is often connected with theories of emergent properties (both symmetry-breaking
and the RG use it), I do not think that the connection is a necessary one, as I
argued (contra Chuang Liu) in §2.5.1.
Chapter 4 offered a picture of the infinite limit in which phase transitions and
other emergent phenomena could be seen as genuine, qualitative phenomena, but
without investing the infinite limit with any mysterious metaphysical significance.
I cannot find anywhere a statement from Anderson or his followers, that looks as
though it is meant as a full-blooded metaphysical claim. So I suggest that in this
case, the statements of the New Emergentists are intended as purely methodologi-
cal recommendations. I also take this as yet another suggestion that in those areas
where they do make explicit metaphysical pronouncements — about emergent and
protected properties for example — they are fully aware of what they are doing.
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5.5 Renomalisability, Realism and Effective Field
Theories
Let us consider a system that is well-described by a renormalisable theory (such
as the LGW model). Our success, and the details of the RG analysis suggests that
the LGW Hamiltonian captures all the relevant operators associated with a certain
fixed point, but we also know that there is a vast range of microphysical models
that flow within the range of this fixed point. This is a rather striking situation: we
are presented with a theory that is empirically successful over the scale of length
and energy under which it has been tested, but its empirical success gives no
reason to believe that it is close to an accurate representation of the microphysical
structure or properties of the system in question.
This last point looks as though it might be highly significant, for the usual
realist accounts of the empirical success of scientific theories is in terms of some
firm link between the real system and its mathematical treatment in the theory.
Of course, there is much controversy over the exact nature of this link; most often
it is treated as a variety of isomorphism, or of resemblance Suarez (though for
a criticism of these views, see 2002, 2003). And there are also suggestions that
theoretical models form an important mediating stage (e.g., Morgan and Morrison,
1999). But however it is made out, there is meant to be a clear link between models
or theories, and any real systems that they are meant to give predictions for. But
in the case of renormalisable theories/models, it seems that there is no easily
recognisable link between the mathematical expression of the Hamiltonian and an
element of physical reality.
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5.5.1 An Anti-Realist Attack
The considerations above suggest that renormalisable theories could provide a
counter-argument to scientific realism, both on na¨ıve and more sophisticated ver-
sions. Let us start with the classic articulation of the realist intuition: Putnam’s
response to the empirical success of a theory that it must have got something right
about the world, or its success would be a ‘miracle’. But if we are presented with
a renormalisable theory, the appropriate attitude is to be to be fairly confident
that the model has got very nearly nothing right about the world (with the usual
exceptions of the dimensionality of the lattice and of the order parameter of the
system). But we need not appeal to miracles — once we have recognised that our
Hamiltonian is renormalisable, we have an explanation of its empirical success,
which does not rely on an orthodox realist link.
We must also add that we cannot dismiss this situation as one in which just
a few microphysical details are missed. There is no expectation that the “true”
microphysical theory will share anything very much with the effective one. It is
unlikely to be a field theory (in the condensed matter case, at least), and symmetry-
breaking rears its head once more, to remind us that the lower-level theory may
have symmetries utterly at odds with the LGW model.
This situation does not seem to change when we consider more sophisticated
versions of realism. There are a wide variety of approaches that march under
the banner of ‘structural realism’, but all keep the link between theory and real-
ity. They merely weaken any link of resemblance to some version of a structural
correspondence. But the minimal symmetry features that characterise a universal-
ity class cannot be enough to constitute any “structural correspondence”, unless
the account is to collapse to vacuity. And similar remarks could be made about
accounts such as the ‘Natural Ontological Attitude’ (Fine, 1984) and other sophis-
ticated realist approaches (Psillos, 1999). If the correspondence claimed is so weak
278
as to be satisfied by the minimal quantities that serve to define a universality class,
our “realism” would not deserve the name.
However, this type of argument is not original to renormalisable theories. For
again and again in the history of science, we have discovered that empirically
successful theories were almost entirely wrong about the details of the system in
question. Classic examples include the phlogiston theory of heat, aspects of both
corpuscle and wave theories of light, and Newtonian theories of gravity. All allowed
novel successful predictions to be made, despite their lack of “true” correspondence
to the systems in question. Such examples lie at the basis of the so-called Pes-
simistic Meta-Induction (PMI) argument against scientific realism (Laudan, 1981).
Realists have not lacked responses to such attacks. For example (at least one ver-
sion of) structural realism was formulated in response to them (Worrall, 1989).
The difference between these examples and the renormalisable theories is the
temporal order in which we are presented with a non-realistic but empirically
successful theory, and the explanation for this empirical success. For example, in
the case of the phlogiston theory, the kinetic theory of heat presents us with an
explanation for its (limited) empirical success. It can show how molecular motion
can be transferred in the manner of a “flow” under some circumstances; how there
are many processes in which heat is conserved, and so on. It also shows the limits
of the superseded theory, by circumscribing those circumstances under which it
will be successful. But in the case of a renormalisable theory, we are presented
with the explanation for its effective success before any discovery of a particular
microphysical structure underlying it. And we are also presented with limits on
its domain of applicability: near to the critical point, or within a certain energy
range. We know that it will break down outside that domain, even if we cannot
test it there, but we do not know what its break-down will reveal.
So renormalisable theories do not give us a new attack on scientific realism,
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though they might be said to sharpen an existing one. We could call the coun-
terexample “PMI plus”: for not only does the record of previous theories suggest
to us that the present one is likely to be inaccurate, but if it is renormalisable we
are also given an explanation of its success that does not rely on its accuracy (at
least within a certain regime).
5.5.2 A Realist Parry
Fortunately for the realist, an understanding of RG techniques does not only pro-
vide an attack on the realist position, it also gives them a way to escape. They
may concede that the LGW effective Hamiltonian cannot represent the microphys-
ical structure directly, but simply ask what it does represent. I cannot see that
the answer can be anything other than the fixed point of the recursion relation
in parameter space. (More precisely, the terms of the Hamiltonian represent the
relevant directions of the fixed point). This allows us to recognise that a theory is
effective, remain ignorant of the microphysical Hamiltonian, and yet be satisfied
with an explanation of its empirical success. We can be confident that it will be
successful just so long as we are confident that the theory represents the correct
RG fixed point, and has captured all of the relevant operators (plus any marginal
ones that may arise to complicate matters).
The representational role certainly looks an odd one, but we can retrieve a
realist link by pointing out that the recursion relation is tailored to the specific
physical situation we have in hand (whether this is in Kadanoff’s approach, tai-
lored to a specific microphysical model, or in Wilson’s approach, where it is to
a macrophysical model). So we can hold that there is a connection between the
empirically successful theory and the physical system: an indirect one, mediated
by the design of the recursion relation and the fixed point. I feel that this is an
appropriate response to the realist worries surveyed above: the theory-reality link
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still exists, but it is very different to the orthodox suggestions of resemblance or
isomorphism.
5.5.3 Effective Field Theories
Thoughout this thesis, I have only alluded in passing to the remarkable analogies
that exist between theories in condensed matter and high energy physics. Where
I have addressed them specifically, such as the criticism of Ruetsche’s thesis in
§4.5, I have been largely cautious about their significance. But Wilson’s work in
condensed matter has been hugely influential in the interpretation and philoso-
phy of quantum field theories; in particular, in the attitudes to the significance
of renormalisation. Before the 1970s, the renormalisation procedure was either
seen as a rather mysterious, but necessary ‘dippy process’11 one had to apply to
quantum field theories before they gave sensible, finite empirical predictions; or it
was seen as some deep requirement for theory choice (though also a mysterious
one). As Weinberg (1980, 517) puts it: ‘I thought that renormalizability might
be the key criterion, which also in a more general context would impose a precise
kind of simplicity on our theories and help us to pick out the one true physical
theory out of the infinite variety of conceivable quantum field theories.’
However, due largely to Wilson’s work, there has been a remarkable ‘change
in attitude’ (Weinberg, 1997, 41) to the Standard Model, and Quantum Field
Theories in general, viewing them as ‘Effective Field Theories’ (EFT’s) for a given
energy scale. That is, a quantum field theory merely expresses the low-energy
limit of a different theory, which explicitly includes interactions on a smaller scale
which have been absorbed into the parameters of the given field Hamiltonian.
The technical details of quantum field theories are far outside the scope of the
present discussion, but a broad conceptual picture can be obtained by replacing
11Feynman (1988). He also refers to it as ‘a shell game’ (1998, 6).
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the length scale with an energy scale E (a high energy scale replaces a small
length scale) and thinking, not of alternative microphysical Hamiltonians, but
of alternative higher energy theories. For the condensed matter case, it is as we
approach the lattice scale a, that universality starts to break down. In the quantum
field case it is as we approach the energy M at which a new particle is likely to
be produced. As we approach this scale, non-renormalisable interactions appear
(until this point, they are suppressed by powers of E/M). So as E approaches M
we cannot ignore them any more, and a new physics is required. Cao and Schweber
urge that we have reason to expect that the new physics is also described by a
quantum field theory, for they point to a theorem of Appelquist and Carazzone
(1975), which demonstrates that if a renormalisable QFT includes a high energy
particle, there will be a theory of the low energy limit (also a QFT) as if that
particle did not exist. They can thus guarantee a smooth transition from one
QFT to another, with no problems of the rigourous existence of a low-energy
limit.12
This view has inspired some philosophical comment, largely as a reaction to the
work of Cao and Schweber13 who view each energy level as ‘a quasi-autonomous
domain, each with its own fundamental laws, and fundamental ontology’. They
argue that this supports ‘a pluralism in theoretical ontology, an antifoundational-
ism in epistemology and an antireductionism in methodology’ (Cao and Schweber,
1993, 69).
If we lay aside the issues of epistemology and methodology, we are still left with
two separate metaphysical claims. First, there is the idea that if we treat field
theories as effective, then each energy level constitutes its own quasi-autonomous
12For technical details of the effective theory approach, including simple examples, see Polchin-
ski (1984, 1999) and, as a contrasting approach, Georgi (1994).
13Their principal works include: Cao and Schweber (1993), Cao (1997), Schweber (1993).
Commentaries on their philosophical claims have come from Huggett and Weingard (1995),
Castellani (2002) and Saunders (2003).
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domain, within which we have fundamental laws and ontology (and so, presumably,
fundamental properties). Second, there is the anti-foundational thesis, that as we
increase the energy, we just carry on finding new effective field theories, and as
Huggett and Weingard (1995) put it, reality is a ‘never-ending tower of EFTs’.
Each may be considered separately.
In regard to the first, the emphasis seems very much to be on the quasi of
the quasi-autonomous, for we see the same determinable/determinant ambiguity
as we saw in §5.3.1. That is, the form of the field Hamiltonian at each level may
be largely independent (decoupled) from the form it may take on higher energies,
but many of the actual values of — say — the coupling strengths or, particle
masses in the renormalisable theory are dependent on the unknown processes at
higher levels. The price we must pay for insisting that each level is ‘autonomous’,
is to leave the values of these parameters unexplained at that level; they can only
be fixed by matching to experiment. Thus, it is very much open to debate as to
whether each level can be said to be “truly separate” from those at higher energies.
In regard to the second metaphysical claim, the tower of EFTs is certainly a
coherent metaphysical picture, and it is certainly true that the physics of renor-
malisation does licence it as a possibility. At low energies we would be able to use
a renormalisable quantum field theory, but as we look at high energies, it would
break down in a way that suggests there are unrenormalisable terms. We might
deal with this by introducing a new particle, and obtain a renormalisable theory
once again. But then as we increase the energy further this would in turn start to
look unrenormalisable — and so on.
But one of the points of renormalisable theories is that they conceal the physics
above a certain energy level. As such, we have no reason to believe in an infinite
tower of EFTs as against any other picture that is equally compatible with what
we know of the low-energy regimes. While it is very nice to be able to appeal to
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the theorem of Appelquist and Carrozone this theorem shows that a higher-energy
renormalisable QFT would be sufficient for the observed results at low energy, not
that one is necessary. The higher energy theory could be a non-renormlisable field
theory, or for that matter something that looks utterly new. Indeed, if we really
are to take the parallel with Wilson’s success seriously, we could even argue that we
should expect quantum field theories to turn out to be low-energy approximations
to a lattice theory.
5.6 Closing Remarks
Where does all this leave the New Emergentists? I think it leaves them with
a position on emergence with clear standards for the application of the term,
which is fully grounded in standard physics (and physicalism), and able to point
to paradigm cases of emergent properties. Most importantly, their position gives
very clear guidance on what an appeal to emergence can and cannot do. An
emergent property can be very different from microphysical properties, and the
laws they obey can be very different from those obeyed by the smaller constituents
of a system. And in the case of the protected, or universal properties, large-scale
properties can be more similar to one another than to the microphysical.
But the New Emergentist position also makes it clear that emergent properties
are not a panacea, to be appealed to whenever we are puzzled by the properties of
large systems. In each case, we must produce a detailed physical mechanism for
emergence, which rigorously explains the qualitative difference that we see with the
microphysical. If such a mechanism is missing, an appeal that a suggested property
is ‘emergent’ does nothing more than give it a comforting name. And for the New
Emergentists it would be the wrong name. For unless we have shown that an
emergent property really does ‘emerge’ from the lower level, and that microphysical
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supervenience remains unthreatened, we have not shown it is emergent. For all
we know, such a higher-level property might not supervene on the microphysical,
but “float free” from it entirely. And this should serve as a warning to those who
uncritically appeal to the notion to dissolve the mysteries of mental properties,
the appearance of classical physics and biological phenomena. For calling these
phenomena ‘emergent’ is no explanation of the nature of such properties, but a
commitment to provide one.
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Appendix A
British Emergence and Broad’s
Doctrines
To recapitulate from the main text, the basic claim of British Emergence is that it
is impossible to predict the properties of a composite system from the properties of
the components in isolation, or in other composites which are not of the same form
as the one in question. Although the main text focusses on one example of how
this might come about — via a configuration law — Stephan (2002) argues that
Broad’s writings contain two very different ways in which the prediction might be
recognised as impossible. Broad himself does not distinguish the two possibilities
clearly; (nor for that matter does the historical study given by McLaughlin (1992)).
Yet I feel that Stephan’s distinction is crucial for a proper understanding of the
doctrine.
A.1 Broad’s two Senses: Emergence1 and Emergence2
Broad thought that some properties — in particular the secondary qualities, and
those of psychology — had to be emergent, because they were not ‘behaviourably
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analysable’. He is frustratingly vague about this important term, but this quote
serves to introduce the idea:
[R]ed seems to me to be a quality of a certain motion-complex in one
sense, and life to be a quality of a more elaborate complex in a very
different sense. By saying that a body is living I just mean that its
motions and other changes fit into each other and into the environ-
ment in certain characteristic ways. The statement is an analysis of its
characteristic modes of change. But in saying that a motion is red I
certainly do not mean that it is a vibration of such and such frequency.
The statement is not an analysis of its characteristic mode of motion;
but is the assertion that a property, which is not analysable in terms
such as velocity, frequency, etc., that apply directly to motions as such,
occupies the same contour as a certain set of motions. (Broad, 1921)
Clearly, there is much to be said about what “behaviour” can be included in
the analysis. Stephan (2002) argues that Broad’s distinction may be understood
as similar to that made in the philosophy of mind between a functionalisable and
non-functionalisable property. If this is so, some of his arguments share features
with those that are based on the non-functionalisability of qualia, though with the
advantage that ‘functionalisability’ is fairly clearly defined, whereas ‘behaviourably
analysable’ is not. On this reading Broad’s Archangel, which we introduce in the
next section, would be a precursor to Jackson’s 1982 example of Mary, the brilliant
but colour-blind neuroscientist.
I prefer to understand Broad’s term “behaviour” in a rather different way, one
that is not so dependent on a clear notion of a causal role at a higher level. In
this conception of emergence, all the properties of each microscopic component of
the system are totally predictable from general laws of composition. Nevertheless,
the systemic properties cannot be predicted from all of these properties, which
seems to suggest a failure of supervenience (see §1.3.1). Broad’s appeal to ‘be-
haviourably analysable’ properties is rather an appeal to those determined by the
properties possessed by the components. Earlier Broad had identified motion as
287
a possibility for the ‘single fundamental kind of change’ possessed by the particles
of an ultimate micro-level in his outline of ‘The Ideal of Pure Mechanism’ — the
most strict denial of any emergentist hypothesis (Broad, 1925, 44). He goes on to
relax this ideal, allowing different properties and changes to feature in a mechanist
theory, but I believe he is referring back to this ideal in his conception of non-
behaviourably analysable properties as those that do not (strongly) supervene on
the most fundamental kind of change. This reading is textually supported by his
reference to ‘motions as such’, in the quote above.
Regardless of which reading is correct, Broad obviously holds that general
laws of composition, as usually understood, address only behaviourably analysable
properties. Thus one way in which a property can be emergent is if it is not
behaviourably analysable. They would not be contradicted, but would simply
miss it altogether. Broad makes much use of this class of emergent properties,
which we shall call emergent1:
Definition:. A systemic property is emergent1 just in case it is not behaviourably
analysable.
But Broad also holds that there could be fully behaviourably analysable sys-
temic properties that are nonetheless emergent, in his sense of being underivable
from the behaviour of the system’s components in other, simpler composites. In
these cases, the systemic property cannot be deduced, not because they are not
behaviourably analysable, but there are specific laws of composition the existence
of which we could not have suspected from the behaviour of simpler composites.
These properties we can call emergent2:
Definition:. A systemic property is emergent2 if it cannot be deduced from the
properties of the components of a system using only general laws of composition.
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Emergent2 properties, together with Broad’s examples of specific laws of com-
position are the cases of British emergence that I focus on in the main text (§1.5.2
onwards), so I shall not repeat that discussion here.
However, it is worth pointing out a further distinction amongst emergent2
properties that is not recognised by Broad, nor by Stephan. Let us take a case
in which only general laws of composition are in effect, and we can assign each
system a particular state space according to those laws. Now introduce a specific
law of composition, and consider whether this law leads to an expansion of the
state space of the system, or whether it just takes on new values while being
defined on the original state space. If the spaces are expanded, then the emergent2
properties are still novel, according to Broad’s criteria but they were properties
that were available to the system operating under the general laws alone. However,
if there are such systems whose state spaces are now larger, it seems that these
emergent properties will be even “more novel”, in that they were not even available
to the system when only the general laws were in effect. It is possible that this
distinction can be related to the previous division of ‘behaviourably analysable’
properties, but this leads to further difficulties in interpretation, since this new
distinction appears within the class of emergent2 properties, which are all meant
to be behaviourable analysable.
Leaving this problem aside, Broad has provided us with (at least) two ways
to distinguish trivial from non-trivial systemic properties, and thus provided two
clean senses of ‘novelty’ which can be used in discussions of emergence.
A.2 Broad’s Mathematical Archangel
Broad introduced an aid to the the imagination in his “Mathematical Archangel”,
who is not only infinitely mathematically powerful, but ‘gifted with the further
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power of perceiving the microscopic structure of atoms as easily as we can perceive
hay-stacks.’1 This being ‘could no more predict the behaviour of silver or of
chlorine or the properties of silver-chloride without having observed samples of
those substances than we can at present’ (Broad, 1925, 71).
Unfortunately, Broad introduced the Archangel within a discussion that moves
without comment between his two conceptions of emergence. As well as being
unable to predict the chemical properties of silver chloride (which seem best un-
derstood as emergent2) Broad suggested that the Archangel would be unable to
predict the smell of ammonia, since such secondary qualities are not behaviourably
analysable and thus emergent1 (Broad, 1925, 71-80). Once again, this second ar-
gument is rather reminiscent of the modern ‘knowledge argument’ for the non-
functionalisability of qualia, but this is a distraction from our central concerns.
We can simply understand the Archangel as Broad’s ‘acid test’ for either of his
senses of emergence.
Let us take an example to illustrate both. If we create a large system from
atoms by adding a single one at a time, the conglomerate will acquire new systemic
properties at each stage. However, most of these new systemic properties — such
as total mass, or total electric charge — will not be emergent in Broad’s sense.
They arise from the same general laws of composition that hold when we add the
second, third, or millionth atom. The crucial issue for Broad is the possibility of
new properties that are not covered under these laws.
I know no reason whatever why new and theoretically unpredictable
modes of behaviour should not appear at certain levels of complexity,
or why they must be explicable in terms of elementary properties and
1Broad introduced his Archangel in the course of a thought experiment in which Sir Ernest
Rutherford was imagined to predict the properties of large systems from the properties of their
component atoms. Recognising the limits placed by experimental technique and mathematical
ability, Broad replaced Rutherford by the Archangel. Replacing someone who famously held
that ‘all science is either physics or stamp collecting’ must have been particular pleasing for an
emergentist. (Incidentally, Rutherford was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry).
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laws of composition which have manifested themselves in less complex
wholes. (Broad, 1925, 73)
Now these could be emergent1 or emergent2. If an emergent1 property should ap-
pear, then the system might behave just as if only the general laws of composition
were in effect. Nevertheless, there are further, non-behaviourably analysable prop-
erties of the system that we (or the Archangel) would not be able to derive from
the general laws alone. Broad makes several suggestions about ‘vital’ properties as
emergent1, and also seems to think that secondary properties are examples (Broad,
1925, 80-1).
For emergent2 properties the situation is slightly different. A specific configu-
ration law will actually make the system behave differently to how it would if only
the general laws of composition were in effect. We would still not be expecting
this behaviour, and neither would the Archangel, since we would have no way to
suspect that the specific law of configuration existed.
A.3 Downward Causation
There is a further feature which is particular to emergence2. We have seen that
Broad is happy with microphysical supervenience holding in all configurations
(§1.6.2), so their components will also show different behaviour to that which one
would expect considering only the general laws — a case of “downward causation”.
Kim (1996) claims that British Emergentist thesis automatically implies “down-
ward causation” — a causal influence from macroscopic to microscopic levels of
nature. To interpret Kim’s claim, we must make several points clear. First, for
the purposes of the section, I shall assume that any causal influence relevant to
the British emergentist thesis must be law-governed. We must also decide how we
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should delimit the microscopic and macroscopic levels,2 and also whether we are
speaking of emergence1 or emergence2.
For emergence1 there seems a fairly clear distinction into “levels”: any descrip-
tion that mentions non-behaviourably analysable properties, or those laws that
govern them, is called a macroscopic description; any that do not is a microscopic
one. So if we look only at microlevel description we will miss the non-behaviourably
analysable properties of a large system. But emergent1 properties do not commit
us to any interesting form of downward causation. By definition (or at least what
we have taken to be the definition) the presence of non-behaviourably analysable
properties does not “act-back” on the behaviour of the parts.
For emergence2 the issue of levels, and thereby of downward causation, is rather
less clear. Here we must revisit the ambiguities in the terms ‘microphysical’, and
‘micro-level’ which were highlighted in §1.7.2. If we take one natural reading —
that a micro-level description is one that only mentions properties of microscopic
entities and their arrangements — then emergent2 properties provide no separa-
tion into “levels” of nature. For the specific laws of composition may be described
in microphysical terms. (Example: we just presented the silver chloride example
while mentioning only silver atoms and chlorine atoms and their spatial arrange-
ments.) And once the effects of the specific laws of composition have been included,
the microphysical description is complete and accurate (assuming we do not have
emergent1 properties as well).
To separate the micro- and macro-level using emergence2, we presumably re-
quire an understanding of levels such that emergent2 properties only belong to the
macro-level and not to the micro. We can of course engineer this: the natural move
is to call any description that does not take into account the effects of the config-
2In Kim’s own sophisticated discussions of emergence, he uses a supervenience based concep-
tion of levels, for which downward causation is extremely problematic, apparently threatening
the causal closure of the microphysical.
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urational laws, a “micro-level” description; and any that do, a “macro-level” de-
scription. Thus emergent2 laws would be placed on the macro-level, non-emergent
laws on the micro. But on this definition a micro-level description will just be
an inadequate description: it will get many properties wrong for any system that
exhibits emergence2, whether we describe them in terms of the properties of micro-
scopic entities, or in terms of a macro-level. The micro-macro distinction has been
defined such that the “micro-level” description simply misses out certain physical
laws.
It is only this possibility of emergent2 properties that implies that some sort
of downward causation must take place. But if we understand micro- and macro-
levels in such a way that microscopic and macroscopic levels are separated by
Broad’s criteria, then downward causation becomes an unproblematic consequence
of the existence of configurational laws. It just becomes the claim that certain
large arrangements of matter have causal influence. There are no issues relating to
the causal closure of the physical, or similar issues, since the configurational law
appears just as much a part of the physical world as the microphysical laws.
This deflationary conclusion can be taken through the parallels drawn with
New Emergentism, where the problems are defused even further. For the New
Emergentists do not claim that the behaviour of the system will be any different to
that dictated by the microphysical laws. Indeed in this respect, New Emergentism
shares aspects with emergence1, though it is its stronger parallels with emergence2
which I have concentrated on in the main text.
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